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ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY 



AND 



SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY. 



ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY 



AND 



SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY. 



BY 



J. S. ENGLE, A. M. 



Baltimoee 

King Brotheks 

1904 



^ 






J LIBRARY of CONGRESS 
Two Copies 

DEC 2? 1904 
GopyngHc tntry 

CLASS CX XXc. No; j 
COPY B. 






COPYEIGHT, 1904. 
BY JOHN SUMMEKFIELD ENGLE. 

All rights reserved 



DEDICATION. 

After the day's sport is over and the fishermen, 
seated in the evening twilight on the hotel jDiazza, 
haVe discussed the catch, the Mind turns to the old 
channels of thought. Thus it was, that the author 
and his friend sat one evening in the summer of 
1904, with 'Lake Champlain just visible through 
the darkening twilight. Psychology and Phil- 
osophy became the subject of conversation, and 
the new views, which the writer presents in these 
pages, found an interested hearer. 

This friend, with whom the writer fished last 
summer, and to whom, when the fish were slow in 
biting, he talked the views of Psychology and Phil- 
osophy herein presented, is the friend, who now, 
by his generous help, makes possible the publica- 
tion of this volume. 

In no sense is he committed to the views herein 
advanced. But, in every sense, he is committed to 
the policy of fast friendship. 

This volume is affectionately dedicated, therefore, 
to the banker, philanthropist and friend, 

T. T. FlSHBURNE. 



PREFACE. 

If the conclusions reached in this volume be cor- 
rect, there is here presented a system of Psychol- 
ogy as well as a Synthetic Philosophy. 

This whole work is based upon introspective 
study of the Principle of Interest in the Mind, 
together with a critical examination and study of 
psychological teaching. The literature has been 
thoroughly examined, and much of that which 
bears upon the subject of Interest will be found 
cited in its proper place. 

The first seven chapters of the Analytic Interest 
Psychology constitute really an introduction to the 
constructive work, beginning with Chapter VIII. 
In these first chapters the endeavor is made to 
discover what the Principle of Interest is. It is 
found to be : 

(1) The Basic Principle of Psychology. 

(2) The explanation of Abnormal Psychology. 

(3) The Nexus of the Mind. 

(4) Identical with Consciousness of Process. 



Vlll PREFACE. 

(5) So fundamental to Cognition, Feeling and 
Will as that it may be termed the Mental Ultimate 
which shows itself as Cognitive Interest, Affective 
Interest and Conative Interest. 

The reader will, however, in this connection, very 
probably ask : "But what is the definition of In- 
terest?" It is insisted that the work above stated 
is an attempt to reach the true definition of In- 
terest. In order, however, that it may be seen 
that this line of work is in line with the statement 
of the psychological authorities, the definition of 
Interest given in the Dictionary of Psychology (the 
standard in the psychological world) is here cited : 

"Interest * * The consciousness which ac- 
companies mental tendencies of any sort, so far 
as they terminate upon mental objects or stimu- 
late to the construction of them. 

"Considered in abstraction from the content or 
object upon which the tendency goes out, interest is 
usually considered a phase of feeling, and classed 
with the intellectual feelings." 

(This definition is signed by Baldwin and Stout.) 

Here, then, it is stated that Interest is really cona- 
tive and affective and that it is also an intellectual 
feeling — but intellectual feeling has a cognitive 
element. Hence the Dictionary itself, almost recog- 



PREFACE. IX 

nizes, although unconsciously, the contention of these 
first chapters. For Interest is clearly fundamental to 
Cognition, Feeling and Will. Certainly one cannot 
have a sensation without some glint of Interest. 
Blot all Interest absolutely from your Mind and 
what would you have left? Then, as Interest is 
thus fundamental to Cognition, Feeling and Cona- 
tion, and, since, by the very definition of the Dic- 
tionary, when that is properly interpreted, it is cona- 
tive and affective and has a cognitive strain, there is 
nothing for science, when it considers the rudimen- 
tary Consciousness, the very embryonic mind itself, 
to do, save to say that Consciousness and Interest are 
there identical — Consciousness is there, as it were, 
but a point of Interest. But rudimentary Conscious- 
ness gives the explanation of all other Conscious- 
ness. If, however, rudimentary Consciousness of 
the infant be a point of Interest, the process or 
active Consciousness of the adult is also this princi- 
ple of Interest. 

The writer, having long studied his periods of 
intensest Interest, found that always there was a 
kind of incubating period before new Meaning 
came. Thus the thought of Chapter I, Part I, that 
Interest is the Mental Dynamic or that Interest is 
the Basic Principle in Psychology, came like a flash 



X PREFACE. 

after a long incubating period. Upon examination 
he found this to be true of others. He also found 
that there was a kind of incubating period even in 
the apprehension of a percept. Upon investigation 
he found, that while this period might be but the 
smallest fraction of a second, there was something 
of temporality in the matter of Interest, through the 
attention, gathering even the essentials of a percept. 

Then, with these facts as basic positions in his 
thought, he made the generalization that this must be 
true of all Consciousness in all Time, and that there is 
something answering to what he, in this volume, terms 
the Interest-Moment. In this Interest-Moment, Inter- 
est incubates Meaning. It may be an instinctive 
Interest-Moment, and old Meaning only be incu- 
bated, or it may be an Interest-Moment in which 
new Meaning is incubated. 

The writer feels, now that he is writing this 
preface, after the greater part of the volume has been 
printed, that he must do further work in the matter 
of clearly differentiating the Interest-Moment, in 
which nothing but old Meaning is evolved, from the 
Interest-Moment in which absolutely new Meaning- 
is incubated. He may, perhaps, be pardoned, if, as 
he fears, in a few places, he is not exactly clear as to 
the Interest-Moment. In all this field of thought he 
has been in an absolutely new territory. He has 



PREFACE. XI 

had to get his bearings as best he could; he has 
had to construct terminology as best he could, and 
give definitions as best he could, and, all this, with 
the varied duties of his daily life demanding his 
attention. 

This Interest-Moment in which Meaning is incu- 
bated has its stress not upon " Moment," but upon 
the fact that it is a segment of Consciousness. It 
is a Cross-Section of Consciousness or Interest in ivJiich 
a Glint of Meaning is incubated. When the writer 
speaks of period, in the definition of Interest-Mo- 
ment, he means a period of Consciousness — a certain 
section of Consciousness. In all Consciousness the 
new Glint of Meaning is incubated by the aid of 
Instinctive Interest-Moment processes flashing in 
their instinctive Meaning-Glints until this particular 
Interest-Moment bursts in a new Glint of Meaning, 
i. e., a Judgment-Burst or new Meaning-Glint. Thus 
a present Interest-Moment may recapitulate all the 
Past. (See Chapter IX, Part I, on Instantaneous 
Mental Recapitulation.) 

The two great working principles here, as well as 
in the whole line of thought, have been the theories 
(1) Of Instantaneous Mental Recapitulation (Chapter 
IX, Part I), (2) Of the Instinctive Judgment (Chapter 
XI, Part I). These are thought to be basic facts, 
fundamental in the proper interpretation of Mind. 



Xll PREFACE. 

The position of Psychological Idealism has also 
been fundamental in the development of this line of 
thought. 

Thus the unit in the study of Consciousness was 
found to be the Interest-Moment. The Unit on the 
Process Side is functioning Interest, and the unit on 
the Content Side is a bit or Glint of Meaning. From 
these Units all the psychological or Mental facts are 
evolved and these are the great facts in all Mental Life. 

The Judgment- Cluster, i. e., the Mental Object, as ive 
call it, is produced by aggregations of Instinctive or 
Deliberate Interest-Moment Processes, each giving its 
bit of Meaning. 

Thus a simple and satisfactory explanation of the 
Mental Object having been reached, the whole pro- 
cess of Perception, Conception, Memory and Imagina- 
tion, was seen to be identical, the only difference being 
as to some of the instinctive Judgments (these par- 
ticular Judgments I term Instinctive Coefficient Judg- 
ments), which go into the Judgment-Cluster which 
constitute their particular Content, 

The Emotions and Feelings, also, to the author's 
mind, have explanation (Chapters XIII and XIV, 
Part I.) 



rilEFACE. Xlll 

The Categories have their explanation in what 
is called Meaning-Survival, (Chap. Ill, Part IY), 
i. e., in the processes of the Instinctive Judgment. 
Instinctive Judgment flashes forth these Meanings 
for us as a part of every Judgment-Cluster or idea. 

The Philosophies are but the natural development of 
the Psychology. That that explains Mind should ex- 
plain the facts of human life. Thus there stands forth 
the Philosophy of Psychology, the Philosophy of Social 
Psychology, the Philosophy of Life Development, the 
Philosophy of Ethics, the Philosophy of Practical Life, 
the Philosophy of History and the Philosophy of Re- 
ligions, etc., each with Interest as the Basic Explaining 
Principle. 

But this means, that, naturally, a Synthetic Phi- 
losophy has been found. Hence, in Part III, the state- 
ment, in regard to Interest Synthetic Philosophy, is 
given. 

But what is the Philosophy of Interest itself? 
What is the explanation of this Interest which in 
itself is a Synthetic Philosophy ? In Part IV this 
question is considered and we have the Philosophy 
of Interest itself. 



XIV PREFACE. 

Several articles are in preparation in which are 
considered certain positions, fundamental to this 
chain of reasoning. These articles, to which the 
reader is referred as they may appear, are : 

Interest is Identical with Consciousness of Process. 

Interest is Cognitive 

Interest explains Hypnotism. 

Psychological Idealism is necessarily the scientific 
position for Psychology. 

The theory of Instantaneous Mental Recapitula- 
tion and its Implications. 

The theory of the Instinctive Judgment and its 
Implications. 

There is no such thing as so-called Memory. 

The Units of Mental Process and of Mental Con- 
tent which explain Mind. 

The Philosophy of Mathematics. 

The Philosophy of Speech. 

The Philosophy of Art. 

The Philosophy of Sociology. 

(In these four last articles the thesis in each case 
is that Interest is the Basic Explaining Principle.) 

The Interest Synthetic Philosophy. 

Meaning-Survival. 



PREFACE. XV 

A New Apologetic for the New Testament — The 
Psychology of Paul and of Christ from the stand- 
point of Interest Psychology. 

The author wishes to stress the fact that the work 
presented in this volume was not done with the view 
of presenting a book to the public. The writer, for 
twenty years, has been endeavoring to find some 
order, in his own thinking, as regards psychological 
and philosophical subjects. The questions of the 
Psychological Ego, of the Mental Ultimate, of the 
explanation of Abnormal Psychology, of Association 
of Ideas, of Memory, of Interest, etc., in fact, the 
questions of the great jDrobleins of Mind and Phil- 
osophy have been more or less constant subjects of 
the author's thought. 

Attention is called to the fact that Chapter I, Part 
I, which may seem not to be in line with views 
given later regarding Interest, stands simply because 
the paper, as it was written in April, 1904, is given 
without change. This also explains why, in Chap- 
ter XVIII, Part, I, Problems of Interest, the state- 
ment is presented that the writer does not exactly 
see his way clear as to Psychological Idealism. 
The paper, as it was read at the Hopkins, is printed 
and it contained that sentence when read. The 
writer felt, when preparing copy for the printer, that 



XVI PREFACE. 

lie had to let the sentence stand, as he states that he 
gives the paper as read at the Hopkins. In the 
later preparation of Chapter VIII, Part I, however, 
the writer went over all his notes on the subject of 
Psychological Idealism, and the last shadow of 
doubt as regards the correctness of his position 
left his mind. He wishes to emphatically state 
that, to his mind, Psychological Idealism is the 
only scientific position for Psychology. 

It is well recognized that the whole of this volume 
presents views which are new and revolutionary in 
Psychology and Philosophy. The readiness, how- 
ever, with which thinkers, to whom these ideas 
have been advanced, admit that along these lines 
there is truth, even though they may not altogether 
agree with these positions, has led to the thought 
that perhaps the best method would be to thus pub- 
lish the present volume. The later and more de- 
tailed presentation of this line of work may thus be 
saved from those errors which necessarily spring 
from an uncriticised production. 

The term "Thesis" is used in this book in a tech- 
nical sense. By it the author means to indicate an 
original line of thought which he hopes to develop 
farther. 



PREFACE. XV11 

The proof of this volume has been read largely 
in the small hours of the morning. It is a striking- 
fact that proof read at these hours sometimes seems 
not to have been read. The following errata are to 
be noted: Page 16, "are" for "is." Page 50, 
" incohate " for inchoate ; " " Hoof ding " for " HofT- 
ding." Page 143, an unnecessary "the." Page 
183, "Physic" for "Psychic," etc. 

The author wishes to express to his friends Sena- 
tor Isidor Kayner, TV". H. Matthai, Edwin TV. King, 
C. E. Muller, George N. Numsen, O. L. Ehodes, C. 
M. Armstrong, G. C. Brinkman, B. F. Wescott and 
to his father, J. J. Engle, as well as to others, his 
appreciation of their kindly advice and assistance. 

J. S. Engle. 

BAiiTiMOEE, Md., December 14, 1904. 



CONTENTS. 
PART L 

ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

CHAPTER I. 

Page. 
Interest is the Mental Dynamic, or the Law 

or Principle of "Psychic Progressions".. 1 

CHAPTER II. 

Interest is the Apperceiving Principle 8 

CHAPTER III. 

Interest is the Explaining Psychological 

Principle in Abnormal Psychology 15 

CHAPTER IV. 

The Principle of Interest is the Nexus of the 

Mind 24 

CHAPTER V. 

Interest is Identical with Active Conscious- 
ness, i. e., the Process Side of Conscious- 
ness 29 



XX CONTENTS. 

CHAPTEK VI. 
The Peinciple of Interest is the one and 
only Mental Ultimate, fundamental to 
the three so-called ultimates, cognition, 
Feeling and Conation. In their essential 
nature, they are, respectively, cognitive 
Interest, Affective Interest and Conative 
Interest t 44 

CHAPTEE VII. 
The Fallacies of Conation from the Stand- 
point of Interest 68 

CHAPTER VIII. 
Psychological Idealism 88 

CHAPTEE IX. 
Instantaneous Mental Eecapitulation 93 

CHAPTEE X. 

All Cognition is the Development of the 

Cognitive Strain in Eudimentary Interest. 104 

CHAPTEE XI. 
The Theory of the Instinctive Judgment 110 

CHAPTEE XII. 

Theses which, for Lack of Space, can be pre- 
sented only in Outline 120 



CONTENTS. XXI 

CHAPTER XIII. 

Page. 
All Feelings and Emotions are the Develop- 
ment of the Affective Side of Interest.. 131 

CHAPTER XIV. 
The Genetic Explanation of the Feelings and 

of the Emotions 143 

CHAPTER XV. 

The Principle of Interest is the Psychological 

Ego 151 

CHAPTER XVI. 
Interest in Other Individuals is the Basic 

Principle of Social Psychology 168 

CHAPTER XVII. 
Interest, the Basic Principle of Psychology, 
is, by its Own Nature, the Basic Principle 
of the Philosophies 177 

CHAPTER XVIII. 
Problems Concerning the Principle of Interest. 183 

CHAPTER XIX. 
The Principle of Interest is the Psychologi- 
cal Subject 190 



XX11 CONTENTS. 

CHAPTEK XX. 

Page. 
The Will 192 

CHAPTEK XXI. 
Meaning 204 



CONTENTS. XX111 



PART IL 

OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES— INTEREST 
PHILOSOPHIES. 

Page. 

Preliminary Statement 211 

CHAPTER I. 
The Philosophy of Psychology 214 

CHAPTER II. 
The Philosophy of Social Psychology 216 

CHAPTER III. 
The Philosophy of Life Development ■; ■ . 228 

CHAPTER IV. 

The Philosophy of History 230 

CHAPTER V. 
The Philosophy of Practical Life 235 

CHAPTER VI. 

The Philosophy of Law and Government 238 



XXIV CONTENTS. 

CHAPTEK VII. 

Page. 

The Philosophy of Ethics 242 

CHAPTEK VIII. 
The Philosophy of Education 243 

CHAPTEK IX. 
The Philosophy of Religions 251 



CONTENTS. XXV 



PART III. 

SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY-INTEREST SYNTHETIC 
PHILOSOPHY. 



CHAPTER I. 

Page. 
Preliminary View of Interest Synthetic Phi- 
losophy 259 



CHAPTER II. 
Interest Synthetic Philosophy 263 



XXVI CONTENTS. 



PART IV* 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTEREST ITSELF, 



CHAPTEE I. 

Page. 

The Philosophy of interest — i. e., the Phil- 
osophy of interest synthetic Philosophy 
Itself 273 



CHAPTEE II. 
The Conscience 277 

CHAPTEE III. 

Can Interest Be Affected by Ought Save 

Human Mind and Matter ? 283 



ANALYTIC INTEREST 



PSYCHOLOGY. 



CHAPTER I. 

Interest is the Mental Dynamic, or, the Law or 
Principle of "Psychic Progressions." 

(This is my first paper on Interest submitted in 
the Department of Psychology at the Johns Hop- 
kins University, April, 1904. It represented a long- 
course of thought and of reading on the subject of 
Interest. I am working on the thesis of this 
chapter as a subject to be submitted for the Ph. D. 
degree. 

The thesis then presented, as will be seen, is that 
Interest is the Fundamental and Determining Prin- 
ciple in the construction of Mental Objects — that, 
as is said, Interest is "The Basic Principle" of 
Psychology. The body of the paper is given here.) 

Psychology cannot be a science unless it has a 
Principle by which to explain its phenomena. 

There may be enumeration of facts — collection 
of cases — explanation of one minor thing in terms 
of another, but until there be found a Principle 
which we call a Law or a Dynamic, etc., to which 



2 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

the maze of facts can be given reference and which, 
as we say, is the explanation of the facts, there can be 
no science. This is true of Astronomy, of Chemistry, 
of Political Economy, Morals, etc., etc. The newer 
Botany takes up the question of how the plant 
grows. So Psychology to be Genetic must show both 
that the Mind has Progressions and how it has Pro- 
gressions, i. e,, what Principle is the fundamental one 
in its progress and is the Nexus of all. Certainly 
Genetic Psychology must have such a Principle in 
order to be a science. 

To be true to psycho-physical parallelism it is nec- 
essary for this Principle to be a mental one. To find 
the Mental Dynamic on the physical side means to 
make of Psychology a province of brain Physiology. 
Whatever the future may show as to this, which 
would be not psycho-physical parallelism but psycho- 
physical identity, Psychology has a right to find 
that Principle which is mentally fundamental and to 
make it the basis of the science. Thus it is true to 
psycho-physical parallelism and a science at one and 
the same time. 

My thought is that Interest is this required Law 
of Progressions or Dynamic for Genetic Psychology — 
that to posit this Principle rounds out Genetic Psychology 
as a science. 



GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY COMPLETED. 6 

The Negative Argument. 

Cognition does not furnish the Explaining Prin- 
ciple, for in that the mental activity issues, and 
hence it does not find in Cognition its source, save in 
the give and take process and this process requires 
something for the cognized object to affect back in 
the Mind. The old Psychology said the cognized 
object affected the "Ego" and thus subject and 
object was found in the Mind, and a give and take 
process formed. 

Roughly, my view is, that here, where the old 
Psychology posited the Ego, we must posit Interest 
and we have a give and take process, not between 
mental activity (as subject) and the Object, but 
between Interest and the Object — the Object can influ- 
ence the mental activity only as it influences Interest. 
That would mean that the give and take process is 
between the Object on the one hand and the Subject 
(Interest) on the other, and this process is the 
mental activity. 

However it may be as to the above, the Principle 
of Genetic Progression is not to be found in Cognition. 

The Dynamic or Law of Progression is not Feel- 
ing, for Feeling is the coloring or tone of the Mental 
Activity and hence cannot be the explanation of the 
activity. 



4 ANALYTIC INTEEEST PSYCHOLOGY. 

(Here is a battle ground, of course ; if Feeling can 
be differentiated from Interest, much ground is 
cleared for my position, for Feeling is often held to 
be the Dynamic.) But : 

(1) In that great department of Mental Activity — 
the construction of sense and memory objects — Feel- 
ing is not the Dynamic — Interest is. The only way 
to make Feeling the Dynamic, is to make Feeling 
equal to Interest, which begs the question. 

(2) My position would be something like this — 
that the so-called "Feeling of Interest" is "atelic" 
Interest, which is "a sort of tendency" producing 
Mental Activity — which activity has the Feeling tone. 

(3) The only way in which Feeling is made the 
Dynamic is by giving it .two meanings which are (a) 
the tone of the Activity (b) the Initiative Power, and my 
point is that to give Feeling this latter definition is 
to really beg the question. 

(4) Feeling to be Dynamic has to arouse Interest- 
Feeling will not cause the construction of sense 
objects or of memory objects, etc., if there be no 
Interest. 

(5) Feeling, as strictly Feeling, in its highest 
manifestations, inhibits the construction of objects, 



FEELING NOT DYNAMIC. 5 

i. e., Mental Activity. While Interest, as Interest, in 
its highest manifestations quickens the construction 
of objects. With such differences in their effects, 
Interest and Feeling ought not to be identified. But, 
if on the point of Feeling, my contention were wrong, 
I could fall back upon the position that The Feeling 
of Interest is the Dynamic of Genetic Psychology. 

The law of Progressions is not the Will, for the 
Will= development of Conation= Mental Activity. 

There is Mental Activity in the construction of 
sense objects which does not involve the Will, but it 
does involve Interest. 

The Law of Progressions, is not Desire, for 
Desire does not explain the formation of sense and 
memory objects. I have not had the time to go 
into this part of the subject, but the preceding- 
sentence seems to be firm ground ; and, also, there 
is not Desire in all that is Interest, i. e,, Interest is 
more fundamental than Desire. 

Since Conscience is Feeling (of the Ought) Con- 
science is not the Principle or Law. 

This leaves Interest as the Mental Dynamic or 

Law of Progressions, for the above powers, with 
their sub-divisions, compose the human mind. 



t> ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

The Positive Argument for Interest as the Mental Dynamic 

or the Law of Progressions in the Formation 

of Mental Objects. 

The place of Interest, in the development of each 
class of Cognitive Objects, is the positive argument 
for Interest as the Dynamic in the formation of 
Mental Objects. 

In the formation of the nine kinds of Cognitive 
Objects of the table, Interest has played its part — 
the more one studies that part the more important 
it seems to be. Interest has its part in Desire — all 
Desire has Interest involved. It has its part in 
Feeling. It has its part on the Volitional side, 
through motives. The Will depends upon motives, 
but Interest is an essential factor there. 

Hence, wherever we take the Mind for examina- 
tion, we find Interest is the Basic Principle. Let 
Interest absolutely fail and Thought, Desire, Feeling 
and Volition would also fail — there might be reflexes 
in such a case, but not the Psychic, as we term it. 

All the teaching in regard to the place of Attention 
in Mental Life, is really stress upon the Fundamental 
Place of Interest. 

Of course, if Interest be the Law of Psychic 
Progressions, it is a standpoint from which Social 
Psychology should be studied. 



INTEREST THE BASIC PRINCIPLE. 7 

Now, I would like to make, as the subject of my 
thesis (j. e., for the Ph. D. degree) some such a sub- 
ject as this : Interest as the Principle or Law of 
"Psychic Progressions" or, if I find that Interest 
and Feeling cannot be differentiated : The Feeling of 
Interest, as the Law of "Psychic Progressions," or, 
using my original term : Interest as the Dynamic of 
Genetic Psychology. 



ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 



CHAPTER II. 

Interest is the Apperceiving Principle. 

(This thesis is one advanced in the paper submitted 
at the beginning of the term, and now on file in the 
Hopkins Psychological Seminary — the development 
here is a compend of the argument of that paper upon 
the same subject. There is great question among 
Psychologists as to what the Apperceiving Principle 
is. My position is that Interest apperceives.) 

Stout, in his Analytic Psychology, has over fifty 
pages on Apperception. Among other statements is 
this : 

" Under the head of Apperception we are especially 
concerned with the relation of the new to the old, in 
so far as it gives rise to modifications of the old. 
We consider the whole process as one by which the 
mind grows. As Mr. Shancl remarks, attention has 
a cumulative effect on its own process. Each act of 
attention leaves behind it a kind of deposit, which is 
taken up and utilized by succeeding acts, and ever 
grows with the growth of our attentive experience. 
Now, this cumulative effect of attention on its own 



ANALYSIS OF STOUTS VIEWS. 9 

process is precisely what is meant by Apperception. 
In the doctrine of Apperception we consider how 
Attention becomes progressively modified by reten- 
tion, how the products of past process determine and 
are determined by succeeding changes." (Stout's 
Anal. Psychology Vol. II, page 112.) 

Almost sentence by sentence this description of 
Apperception deserves to be considered. 

As Mr. Shand remarks, "Attention has a cumu- 
lative effect on its own process." But Attention is 
Volition and is the outcome of Interest. Hence this 
sentence should read — Interest has a cumulative 
effect on its own process. 

Again "Each act of Attention leaves behind it a 
kind of deposit"; but, since Interest is fundamental 
to Attention, the fundamental truth here is : Each 
act of Interest leaves behind it a kind of deposit. 

"Now this cumulative effect of Attention on its 
own process is precisely what is meant by Appercep- 
tion" This really should read : Now the cumulative 
effect of Interest on its own process is precisely 
what is meant by Apperception. 

"We consider how Attention becomes progressively 
modified by retention. " This should read : In the 
doctrine of Apperception we consider how Interest 
becomes progressively modified by retention. 



10 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

But as to Stout's definition of Apperception 
which follows his description : "From this point of 
view, Apperception may be defined as the process by 
which a mental system appropriates a new element, or 
otherwise receives afresh determination." (Italics his. 
Anal. Psychology, Vol. II, Page 112.) Now, as to 
this definition, discussion must be as to the phrase, 
"mental system," which he makes the apperceiving 
subject. That he really makes a " mental system" 
the subject, is seen from various passages, as : "A 
system so organized may so apperceive in a two- 
fold way according to the nature of the apperceived 
group. It may assimilate the new element in a 
general manner, etc." (Anal. Psychology, Vol. II, 
Page 129.) 

"It is apperceived by one of the subordinate sub- 
groups." (Page 130.) 

Stout has no clear definition of "mental system." 
He is delightfully vague as to this "mental system" 
— just so he is vague as to his " mental dispositions. " 

Now, not to multiply words, I insist (1) that there 
is no mental principle specified in his definition of 
Apperception, and (2) that the principle of Interest 
fulfills all the conditions which his supposed "Mental 
system" is invented to fill. Hence, the proper defi- 
nition of Apperception, from Stout's standpoint, is, 



JAMES' POSITION. 11 

The process by which Interest appropriates a new 
element or otherwise receives a new determination. 

James lias the following statement as to Apper- 
ception : "Apperception is a name for the sum total 
of the effects of what we have studied as Association ; 
and it is evident that the things which a given expe- 
rience will suggest to a man depend on wdiat Mr. 
Lewes calls his entire psychostatical condition, his 
nature and stock of ideas, or, in other words, his 
character, habits, memory, education, previous expe- 
rience and momentary mood. We gain no insight 
into what really occurs, either in the mind or in the 
brain, by calling all these things the ' Apperceiving 
mass,' though, of course, this may, upon occasion be 
convenient." (James' Psychology, Vol. II, Page 
107.) 

James is wrong in his statement that Apperception 
means only Association. The Psychologists who hold 
to Apperception are striking at a truth which is 
fundamental to Association itself. But this truth 
has not been properly presented. James is entirely 
correct in stating that nothing is gained by calling a 
man's nature and stock of ideas, etc., the apperceptive 
mass. For, if by this is meant part of the content 
of consciousness, then Apperception, as James says, 
becomes mere Association, while, if by " Apperceptive 
mass " is meant ought of mental process or Active 



12 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

Consciousness, there is nothing in Active Conscious- 
ness like "An Apperceptive mass." The term at 
which "Apperceptive mass" is aiming, though it 
does not reach it, is that "dispositional" Interest 
which becomes Active Interest, i. e., Interest which 
cvpperceives. Only here does Apperception become 
something separate and distinct from Association. 

The criticism, which Stout passes upon Wundt's 
idea of Apperception, is in point : " The reaction of 
Consciousness upon its own content, seems to form 
the essence of Wundt's Apperception. I venture to 
think that my position is not open to the objections 
brought by such critics as Munsterburg, against that 
of Wundt. The main point of Munsterburg' s con- 
tention, I take to be as follows : In order to investi- 
gate and define a process, we must be able to assign 
the special and definite terms between which it takes 
place, the special and definite factors which enter 
into it. Now Wundt's Consciousness or disposition 
of Consciousness cannot be regarded as such a 
special and definite factor ; therefore his whole pro- 
cedure must be envolved in vagueness and a kind of 
mystery" (Stout's Anal. Psychology, Yol. II, Pages 
41-42.) 

This is eminently a proper criticism — Wundt does 
not clear up the point as to what it is which apper- 
ceives. 



wundt's view. 13 

Stout continues: "This objection (that of vagueness) 
does not extend to the conception of noetic synthesis; 
for the schematic apprehension of a whole is as much 
a distinct content of Consciousness and a distinct 
factor in mental process as is the sensation of red or 
blue." But that only has to do with Apperception 
as a process, and Wundt describes the process. But 
as regards what it is which apperceives Stout is as 
vague as Wundt. Stout's "mental system," which, 
in his definition of Apperception, he says apper- 
ceives, is as vague as Wundt's "determination of 
Consciousness." My position is: that at which they 
are striking in their vague terms is really Interest 
— that Interest is that which apperceives. Only 
when this is recognized will the Psychology which 
stands for Apperception have solid ground beneath 
its feet. Only thus can it justify its position, which 
it feels to be correct, against Associationalism. 

In the Dictionary of Psychology, the following 
definition of Apperception is given by Stout and 
Baldwin : "The process of Attention, in so far as it 
involves interaction between the presentation of the 
object attended to, on the one hand, and the total pre- 
ceding conscious content, together with preformed 
mental dispositions, on the other hand." 

Now " the total preceding conscious content" can 
only mean the fringe of conscious content still exist- 



14 ANALYTIC INTEEEST PSYCHOLOGY. 

ing in the direction of the past — that is, if a psycho- 
logical fact be meant ; the " preformed mental dis- 
positions" do not exist as a psychological fact. 
Hence the interaction spoken of is between the "con- 
scious content," just leaving the mind and the con- 
tent just coming in, and the interaction is through 
the Attention. I submit that no one can understand 
such a condition as is here described. The only 
way by which the "conscious content" just leaving 
the mind, and the "preformed mental dispositions," 
can affect "the present presentation," is by them 
affecting Interest, which affects " the present presen- 
tation. " Now that is just what they do. The food 
of Interest is "the conscious content" as it passes 
out of the mind — the determination of Interest is 
the preformed disposition, which is a physiological 
or neurological condition, and Interest is that which 
apperceives the present presentation. 

Hence, it is thought that my thesis, that Interest is 
the Apperceiving Principle, is established. 



CHAPTER III. 

Interest is the Explaining Psychological Principle 
in Abnormal Psychology. 

(The theses positions advanced here as to Sleep 
and Hypnotism are contained in my paper on file at 
the Hopkins.) 

The question how far brain, mechanism is respon- 
sible for the facts of abnormal Psychology cannot be 
reviewed here. 

The position maintained in this connection is that, 
on the mental side, Interest is the chief explaining 
principle of abnormal Psychology. 

(a) Sleep. 

Introspection shows, in the few moments preced- 
ing sleep, the gradual dying away of mental objects. 
Interest, which is the Nexus of the mind, seems then 
to be relaxing. The bond between Interest and the 
mental object is being loosened ; or rather, Interest 
is beginning to cease the production of mental objects. 
This condition is exactly the reverse of a high state 
of Interest. When one is intensely interested in an 



16 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

object all the details are held by Interest. The 
rapid panorama of objects are flashed forth by 
Interest — one succeeding the other in quick suc- 
cession. But, in sleep, Interest's production of 
mental objects ceases. 



(b) Hypnotism. 

Perhaps no better way to use the very little space 
at command for the consideration of Interest as the 
psychological explaining principle of Hypnotism can 
be found than to give a few quotations from such a 
volume as Sidis : "The Psychology of Suggestion" — 
a recent volume on Hypnotism, of which Professor 
James speaks in high praise. 

This volume voices the common emphasis upon 
Suggestion as the explanation of Hypnotism. The 
point of the present chapter, as regards Hypnotism, 
is that it is not Suggestion which explains Hypnotism, 
out Interest. It is not the Hijpnotizer s suggestions, hut 
the patient's Interest in these suggestions which explains 
Hypnotism. 

Interest may not respond, in the least, to the 
Suggestion, and the result is, there is absolutely 
no hypnotic condition produced. 

Interest may respond to a degree to the suggestion 
and the patient feels that he has been almost hypno- 



INTEREST EXPLAINS HYPNOTISM. 17 

tized. Interest may make, what may be called a 
perfect response, hypnotically, to the suggestion, and 
one of at least two different results may follow : 

(1) The fixation of Interest upon one single mental 
object — the consequent cessation of that change in mental 
objects which is a condition of Consciousness, and conse- 
quently immediate sleep. 

(2) We may have the fixation of Interest not upon 
one object which does not change like the button on one's 
coat, etc., but the fixation of Interest on a mental object 
ivhich, because Interest is given a drift in a certain 
direction, changes and Interest runs in a certain channel 
and has no notice for anything else. 

Sidis says : "There is, however, one more element 
in Suggestion — an element which must be taken into 
account, and without which our definition of Sug- 
gestion will be incomplete. This factor, or element, 
is the overcoming or circumventing of the subject's 
opposition. The suggested idea is forced on the 
stream of Consciousness : it is a stranger, an unwel- 
come guest, a parasite, which the subject's Con- 
sciouness seeks to get rid of." (Sidis — The 
Psychology of Suggestion, pages 10-11.) The sub- 
ject's Will seeks to cast it off — but his Interest 
clings to it — this is the explanation here. 

Sidis gives an example of a hypnotic state : 
2 



18 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

"Evidently the post-hypnotic Suggestion took deep 
root in his mind. He struggled hard against it, to 
put it down, to suppress it ; and it was due to this 
fact that he attempted to counteract the suggested 
idea by ridiculing it. As long as I was in the room, 
he wanted to show the energy of his Will, and he 
struggled hard against the insistent idea, keeping it 
at bay ; but when I left the room one of the motives 
of resisting the Suggestion was removed, and the 
struggle became an unequal one. The insistent 
parasitic idea asserted itself with greater force than 
before, and this time, not meeting with such a 
strenuous opposition, it gained the upper hand and 
realized itself completely." (The Psychology of 
Suggestion, page 14.) Here one's Interest and his 
developed Will are in opposition, and the result is 
that Interest gains the upper hand. 

"A familiar thing in a strange abnormal position 
or shape produces the most effective suggestion. 
Nothing speaks so much to the childish or popular 
mind as a caricature, monstrosity, a grotesque figure. 
A distorted picture of a familiar scene or person will 
at once attract the attention of a child, and power- 
fully affect its conduct in case the picture is intended 
to show the fate of bad children." ("The Psychology 
of Suggestion," page 42.) This is simply because 



INTEREST FUNDAMENTAL TO SUGGESTION. 19 

the child's Interest is aroused — the monstrosity 
attracts Interest. 

"But however the case may be with the relative 
suggestibility of the particular factors studied, these 
last experiments on choice suggestion, together with 
the other suggestion experiments, establish the fact 
of normal suggestibility on a firm and unshakable 
basis. 3Ian is a suggestible animal, par excellence." 
("The Psychology of Suggestion," pages 43-44.) 

This fact of normal suggestibility is simply the 
fact of normal Interest. 

"The same is true in regard to normal suggesti- 
bility. It rarely attracts our attention, as it mani- 
fests itself in but trifling things. When, however, it 
rises to the surface and with the savage fury of a 
hurricane, cripples and maims on its way every thing- 
it cannot destroy, menaces life, and throws social 
order into the wildest confusion possible, we put it 
down as mobs. We do not in the least suspect that 
the awful, destructive automatic spirit of the mob 
moves in the bosom of the peaceful crowd, reposes 
in the heart of the quiet assembly, and slumbers in 
the breast of the law-abiding citizen. We do not 
suspect that the spirit of Suggestibility lies hidden 
even in the best of men ; like the evil jinnee of the 
Arabian tales it is corked up in the innocent-looking 



20 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

bottle. Deep down in the nature of man we find 
hidden the spirit of Suggestibility. Every one of us 
is more or less suggestible. Man is often denned as a 
social animal. This definition is no doubt true, but 
it conveys little information as to the psychical state 
of each individual within society. There exists 
another definition which claims to give an insight 
into the nature of man, and that is the well-known 
ancient view that man is a rational animal ; but this 
definition breaks down as soon as we come to test it 
by facts of life, for it scarcely holds true of the vast 
multitudes of mankind. Not sociality, not rationality, 
but suggestibility is what characterizes the average 
specimen of humanity, for man is a suggestible 
animal." (Siclis' "The Psychology of Suggestion," 
page 17.) 

Now all this is readily swung into place under my 
view — there is no such thing as suggestion unless 
the so-called suggestion strike's one's Interest — the 
greater the Interest aroused, the greater the sugges- 
tibility — the so-called "spirit of suggestion" is 
Interest. Man is a suggestible animal simply because 
in his inherent nature, Interest dwells as the Principle 
of the Mind. 

So far as my reading and study go, no one has 
hitherto suggested that Interest may be the expla- 



CRYSTAL VISION. 21 

nation of Hypnotism. It may be worth the consid- 
eration of thinkers to give some thought to this 
subject. 

(c) Crystal Vision. 

"'I find in the crystal,' writes a crystal-gazer, 
' bits of dark wall covered with jessamine, and I ask 
myself where have I walked today ? I have no 
recollection of such a sight — not a common one in 
the London streets ; but tomorrow I repeat my walk 
of this morning, with a careful regard for the creeper 
covered walls. Tomorrow solves the mystery. I 
find the very spot, and the sight brings with it the 
further recollection that at the moment we passed 
the spot I was engaged in absorbing conversation 
with my companion and my voluntary attention was 
pre-occupied.' ' (Sidis' "The Psychology of Sug- 
gestion," page 154.) 

Each of us has certain Interest Centers, i. e., our 
Interest functions, in regard to certain mental objects 
or to certain classes of mental objects, with greatest 
readiness. Just so Perception has, as it were, dif- 
ferent Interest centers. I, for instance, in my land- 
scape, will always note the tree and possibly the 
greensward comes next. Hence, the fact revealed 
by this case of crystal-gazing, was that a certain 



22 ANALYTIC INTEEEST PSYCHOLOGY. 

almost Sub-Interest centre had functioned suffi- 
ciently to leave a trace on Memory. 

(d) Double Personality. 

So far as I have been able to discover, there has 
been no investigation made, in the marked cases of 
double and treble personality, to discover whether 
the second personalty, which, suddenly one day 
asserted itself, to the exclusion of the first, was not 
in process of development for some time. Is it not 
possible that the cases of marked alternating person- 
alities had their inception in mere differentiation of 
two or three lines of Interest, and in the formation of 
a habit on the part of Interest to function in a certain 
way and hence to follow certain lines of thought, and 
that then the bond of memory, because of some neuro- 
logical condition failed and a certain line of Interest 
functioning prevailed? Why might not the student, 
who is a merchant, lose the power some day as he 
studies, of recalling his life and associations as a 
merchant ? Then how naturally for him to remain 
altogether a student ! The fact is, that we carry 
different incipient personalities with us. The won- 
der is not that there are double personalities, but 

t their number is so few. 



FIXED IDEA.S. 23 

(e) Fixed Ideas. 

The explanation of the Fixed Idea, from this point 
of view is this : 

Interest functions as regards the one tiling. Just 
as the bird is fascinated by the snake, so Interest is 
fascinated by this single Idea. The hypnotic state 
has become self-inflicted, as it were. There is now 
no need of an Hypnotizer, for Interest flashes forth 
that Mental Object which is Interest's own Hypno- 
tizer. The patient sits wrapped in his broodings 
because Interest is in a single groove. 

However important any other fact may be as an 
explaining Principle in Abnormal Psychology, the 
thesis here is tlmt the fundamental explaining Psy- 
chological Principle, in this field, is Interest. 



24 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 



CHAPTER IV. 

The Principle of Interest is the Nexus of the Mind. 

(This position is one of the earliest reached by 
me. Through the summer it was one of the topics 
upon which I worked and it is advanced in the 
paper on file at the Hopkins. Because of the neces- 
sities of space, a compend only of the treatment, 
which has been prepared, can be given.) 

Hume stated that the mind had a unity, but what 
it was he admitted that he could not discover. 

Royce, in his Psychology, emphasizes the unity of 
Consciousness, but does not explain that unity. 

James also stresses the fact of this unity. The 
empirical fact of the unity of Consciousness is clear ; 
but the question still remains an open one in 
Psychology as to what Mental Principle it is, if 
there be such an one, which is the Mental Nexus. 

The thesis herein presented is that Interest is the 
Mental Nexus. 



INTEREST CONSTRUCTS OBJECTS. 25 

(1) All that Interest fails to seize fails to enter 
into the composition of Mental Objects. All that 
Interest gathers becomes a part of the Mental 
Object. This fact alone is enough to raise the sup- 
position that Interest is the Nexus. 

(2) The bonds by which any Mental Object is held 
together are those of Interest. True, it may be said 
that memory holds objects together or that associa- 
tion is the mental bond. But the truth seems to be 
that Interest is fundamental to both memory and 
association and explains them. 

(3) The general proposition may be made that in 
every moment of mental life that which constructs 
Mental Objects is Interest. 

(a) So long as the Mental Object stands before 
us, Interest holds the compound elements of the 
Object together. 

(b) When the particular Mental Object falls to 
pieces, as it were, or to use another figure, fades 
away, Introspection shows always a relaxation of 
Interest. While, on the other hand, if Interest be 
high, the Mental Object may be of vast complexity 
and yet be held together. 

(4) The Mind's change from one Mental Object to 
another is directed by Interest. The falling to pieces 



26 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

or the fading away of a particular Mental Object is 
determined by Interest concentrating itself upon a 
particular aspect or part of this Object. This causes 
a relaxation on the part of Interest as respects the 
rest of this particular Mental Object. This part of 
the Mental Object which Interest loses (or in which, 
as we may say, " we lose Interest ") vanishes and 
the second Mental Object is built up by Interest 
from a nucleus born of the first Mental Object and is 
held together by Interest until the same process is 
repeated. Thus it is clearly seen that Interest is the 
Mental Nexus. 

(5) In the fading of the particular Mental Object, 
there is, it may be, some one phase or part which 
abides longer than all the rest of the Object and 
which really becomes the nucleus for a new Mental 
Object. But the part which lingers longest and 
which becomes the center of a new Mental Object, 
is always that feature of the former Object which is 
most interesting. Interest thus retains some parts of 
one object longer than other parts, simply because it 
has an affinity for them. Thus Interest is the Nexus. 

(6) Even in those cases, to which reference has 
already been made where association seems to be the 
only factor, and where the disassociated parts of a 
former Mental Object flash up because, as is com- 



INTEREST AND ASSOCIATION. 27 

nionly held, they have been frequently associated, 
the conditions are not changed. 

That which laid this track of association was the 
Principle of Interest. The Principle of Interest 
through the primeval forest of the possibilities of 
Mental Objects hewed out the way of association and 
walked therein all the time that associations were 
being made. Mere association of ideas is no work- 
ing Principle of the Mind. Let all Interest in a 
particular idea as it stands momentarily before the 
Mind die and no associations come, however 
beaten the track and easy the passage. Let Interest 
be somewhat aroused and there will be some asso- 
ciations. Let Interest be moved to the intensest 
point and scores of associated ideas troop in. 
Hence, it is Interest which rules in so-called Associ- 
ation. This must mean that Interest is the Mental 
Nexus. 

(7) Introspection shows that, just before the 
moment of sleep, the Mental Object almost disap- 
pears. Interest is falling to the point of Sub- 
Interest. The bonds uniting Mental Objects into a 
whole, are falling away, and Interest is not stirred 
by what is even the most interesting segment of the 
dismembered Mental Object, and instantly sleep is 
the result. 



28 ANALYTIC INTEEEST PSYCHOLOGY. 

(8) Interest has, in its essential nature, a synthetic 
capacity. For me to say that I am conscious of a 
thing does not imply a synthetic capacity of itself. 
James found that Consciousness tended to unity 
only by scientifically examining Consciousness. 
But as regards the nature of Interest it is readily 
apparent that Interest has a native synthetic 
capacity. 

"Reference is made to later chapters, especially 
those dealing with the subject of Cognition, for more 
detailed consideration of this thesis. The explana- 
tion of Cognition, given in these pages, is from the 
standpoint that Interest is the Mental Nexus. 



CHAPTER V. 

Interest is Identical with Active Consciousness, 
i. e., the Process Side of Consciousness. 

(This thesis is one contained in the paper on file 
in the Hopkins Psychological Seminary. The treat- 
ment given here is a compend from that paper.) 

(1) There can be no doubt that active conscious- 
ness or Consciousness of Process and Interest are 
coincident. Examine any mental state at any par- 
ticular moment, and so far as Active Consciousness 
extends Interest extends. Interest is coincident 
with Cognition. It is also coincident with all 
Affective and Volitional process. Where there is 
absolutely no Interest, no Consciousness can be 
found. Nor does Interest extend where there is no 
Consciousness. 

Moreover, Active Consciousness and Interest vary 
together. A high state of Consciousness is a high 
state of Interest. A high state of Interest is always 
a high state of Consciousness. A low state of In- 



30 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

terest is a low state of Consciousness. Now this 
fact that Interest and Consciousness vary uniformly, 
is unique. A high state of Consciousness does not 
necessarily mean a high state of Feeling, for Cogni- 
tion may be at its height in that state of Con- 
sciousness, and Feeling at a low ebb. But, as has 
been seen, a high state of Consciousness always 
means a high grade of Interest. 

Now, because of this fact, that Interest and 
Consciousness vary uniformly, either Interest and 
Consciousness are identical or else one is the outcome 
of the other. 

The classification has to be either 

} Cognition 

Active Consciousness or Interest \- Feeling 

J Conation 

or else 

) Cognition 
i 
Active Consciousness \- Feeling 

i 
J Conation 

and Interest be written with one of these three latter 
terms. Now this latter supposition cannot be correct, 
for, if it were, and Interest were identified with any 
one of the three so-called Ultimates, there would be 
times when a high state of Consciousness icould mean 



A UNIQUE FACT. 31 

a low state of Interest. This is true in the case of 
Cognition, Feeling and Will and would have to be true 
in the case of Interest, if it were identified ivith one of 
these. 

But a high state of Consciousness is never found 
with a low state of Interest. Active Consciousness 
and Interest are hence either always coincident or 
else identical. Bat to make Consciousness and In- 
terest absolutely coincident means with all the won- 
derful points of similarity between them, a constant 
endeavor on the part of Science to show them 
identical. It is here held that they are identical. 

But to show even more clearly that Active or 
Process Consciousness and Interest are identical, 
the views of several Psychologists may be con- 
sidered. 

(a) Spencer. 

Spencer says : "It is admitted on all hands that 
without change Consciousness is impossible ; Con- 
sciousness ceases when the change in Conscious- 
ness ceases." (Psychology, Vol. II, page 291.) 
Just so the condition of Interest is changed. If 
change in Interest can be prevented hypnotic sleep, 
etc., is the result. The fixation of the Attention, 
in the beginning of the hypnotic trance, means 



32 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

simply the cessation of change in Interest and the 
result is the unconsciousness of the hypnotic state. 

Spencer continues : " Consciousness is not simply 
a succession of changes, but an orderly succes- 
sion of changes — a succession of changes combined 
and arranged in special ways." (Psychology, Vol. 
II, page 292.) 

Now it is true that in Consciousnesss there is an 
orderly succession of changes — just so in a state of 
Interest this is true and Interest carries in itself the 
explanation of this "system of orderly changes." 

Spencer says : " The changes form the raw 
material of Consciousness ; and the development of 
Consciousness is the organization of them." (Psy- 
chology, Vol. II, page 292.) 

The point here is, that Spencer's Psychology is 
absolutely a Psychology of the Mental Object — he 
leaves out of view the Mental Subject. Hence 
he makes the changes to be changes in the Men- 
tal Object, (" the phenomena of Consciousness"), 
whereas they are changes, first of all in the Mental 
Subject, which bring changes in the Content. But, 
as I shall endeavor in another paper to show, the 
Pyschological Subject is Interest. Then the changes 
which constitute "the raw material of Conscious- 
ness" are changes in Interest. Hence Active Con- 
sciousness is Interest. 



INTEREST UNIFIES CONSCIOUSNESS. 33 

(b) Hoofding and Villa. 

"Consciousness is, as Hoof ding says, a unity. It 
is a unity, in so far as we can embrace, in a single 
mental act, objects, which, in space, are far removed 
one from the other, and this quality represents itself 
principally in the ' energy ' with which the Contents 
of Consciousness, in the beginning disconnected and 
dispersed, became gradually comprised in a united 
and connected whole." (Villa's Contemp. Psychol- 
ogy, 304.) This "energy" to my view, is Interest. 
It is Interest which gives the distinctive unity of 
Consciousness, for it is the energy which holds 
all together. On this point a separate paper will 
be submitted. 

"To recapitulate what we have said concerning the 
properties of Consciousness — the latter consists in a 
series of processes which are not merely reproduc- 
tions of external phenomena but apperceptive and 
volitional acts. It thus has its root in the funda- 
mental and most characteristic process of mental 
life — viz : the Will. The Will manifests itself in 
the course of mental life not only in each of the 
apperceptive acts of which Consciousness in general 
consists but in the general synthetic connection of them 
3 



34 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

which form individual Consciousness. " (Villa's Con- 
temp. Psychology, page 311.) 

Villa here makes the Will virtually identical with 
Consciousness, and he does this simply because he 
has confounded Spontaneity or Interest with the 
Will. As we shall see later, this confounding In- 
terest and Will is the reason why so many Psy- 
chologists place Will as the single Ultimate. 

But Villa, like many others, confounds Interest and 
Will. Hence he is really talking of Interest when 
he is placing the Will as the essence of Conscious- 
ness. 

"Consciousness," says Villa, after a review of all 
the different theories, "is a perpetual choice between 
the several impressions which offer themselves to us. 
The impression, which strikes us most strongly, to 
which we turn our attention especially, and which 
we perceive therefore with the greater distinctness, 
forms, in that given moment, the centre of Con- 
sciousness." (Villa's Contemp. Psychology, 300.) 

This is but to say that the centre of Interest is the 
centre of Consciousness, i. e., that Consciousness and 
Interest are identical. 

(c) James. 

"Consciousness," says James, "consists in the 
comparison of these ('simultaneous possibilities') 



INTEREST IS SELECTIVE. 35 

with each other, the selection of some and the sup- 
pression of the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting 
agency of attention." (Psychology, Vol. 1, page 
288.) 

But it is Interest which shows itself in this attention 
of which James speaks — hence he identifies Interest 
and Consciousness. 

James also says : " Consciousness is interested in 
some parts of its objects, to the exclusion of others 
and welcomes or rejects ; chooses from them, in a 
word, all the while." (Vol. I, page 284.) 

James in another place shows that Consciousness is 
one continuous process of selection : "Let four men 
make a tour of Europe. One will bring home only 
picturesque impressions — costumes and colors, etc.; 
a third will give a rich account of the theatres, etc.; 
to another all this will be non-existent and distances, 
prices, etc., will take their places ; whilst the fourth 
will perhaps have been so wrapped in his own sub- 
jective broodings as to tell little more than a few 
names of places through which he has passed. 
Each has selected, out of the same mass of presented 
objects, those which suited his private interest and 
has made his experience thereby." (Psychology, 
Vol. I, page 286.) 



36 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

Now all this is but a description of the principle of 
Interest at work — i. e., Consciousness is the same as 
Interest. 

(d) Bain. 

"While sleep, unaccompanied with dreams is the 
abeyance of Consciousness, becoming awake is its 
resumption. 

The awakened Consciousness may vary variously 
in its degree and its contents. It may be so feeble 
as to possess no specific quality in prominence ; it 
may rise to every gradation of intensity." (Bain's 
Dissertations on Leading Phil. Topics, page 228.) 
This is exactly true of Interest. It is Interest which 
must fall asleep if sleep comes. It is Interest which 
awakes when we say we awake. 

"Consciousness is essential to memory. It is cer- 
tainly true, in the main, that in order to make perma- 
nent acquisitions, or to associate trains of ideas, such 
trains must, in the first instance, have started in Con- 
sciousness. It is a recognized condition of reten- 
tiveness, that the things retained must have the full 
occupation of our conscious moments, for a longer or 
shorter time, and that the more intense the conscious 
flame, the more rapid is the adhesive growth." 
(Bain's Dissertations on Leading Phil. Topics, page 
232.) 



BAIN AND LADD. 37 

This is an exact description of the necessity of 
Interest to Memory. 

"No fact of our constitution is more irrefragable 
than this — the absolute necessity of Consciousness 
in order to acquisition." (235.) 

"Probably the most effective measure of conscious 
endowment is that, which we have chiefly laid stress 
upon, educability." (236.) 

But this is really descriptive of Interest. 

(e) Ladd. 

"We may, however, realize what Consciousness is 
by comparing it with the so-called Unconsciousness. 
But the Unconscious, considered as the contradictory 
of Consciousness, is synonymous with no psychic 
state or fact ; or, rather it is the denial of any truly 
psychic state or fact; it is the non-psychical." 
(Ladd's Psychology, 30.) 

"Where there is no Consciousness there are no 
psychic facts as data for Psychology ; wherever there 
is Consciousness there already exist psychic facts 
demanding scientific description and explanation." 
(Ladd's Psychology, 31.) 

Just so the range of Interest is the same as that 
of the psychic. The Sub-Conscious is the Sub- 
Interest. 



38 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

"Attention is the necessary presupposition and 
unceasing accompaniment of all the life of Con- 
sciousness. As many writers truly, yet figuratively 
say, attention may be variously distributed over the 
different parts of the area covered by each state of 
Consciousness." (Ladd's Psychology, 33.) 

But Attention is, if not the presupposition, at least 
the unceasing accompaniment of all Interest. Hence 
Ladd really makes Interest identical with Conscious- 
ness. 

"The unity of each state of Consciousness is such 
that it in no wise makes impossible a variety of con- 
tents (and even a variety of self-recognized contents) 
as belonging to that one state. But the variety also 
of the contents of each state of Consciousness is such 
that it, whether recognized or unrecognized, in no 
wise destroys or impairs the unity of that particular 
state." (Ladd's Psychology, 36.) 

But, exactly so, Interest "in no wise makes imjiossi- 
ble a variety of contents," and yet, "the variety of this 
contents" in no wise affects the Unity of Interest. 

"Different fields of Consciousness, differ, then, as 
respects (1) extent or circuit ; (2) intensity, or amount 
of mental life entering into them ; (3) speed of move- 
ment as measured by the number of recognizably 
different fields occurring in a definite amount of 



volkmann's error. 39 

objective time ; and (4) character, or predominating 
specific qualtity." (Ladd's Pyschology, 39.) 

But Interest lias these same four qualifications, i, e., 
Interest is identical until Consciousness. 

(f) Volkmann. 

"Dies fuhrt zum Begriffe des Bewusstwerdens. 
Unter diesem verstehen wir das wirkliclie (weil wirk- 
same) Vorstellen und stellen als leitenden Gedanken 
den Grundsatz auf : wir. werden dessen bewusst, was 
wir wirklich, d. h. durch ein umghemmtes Vorstel- 
len, vorstellen." (Volkmann's Psychology, Vol. 1, 
page 169.) 

I give this quotation from Volkmann to bring out 
the fact that Consciousness is often improperly iden- 
tified with knowing. Often, when one speaks of 
being conscious, he means simply knoiving. This 
use of Consciousness is proper, for a part of Con- 
sciousness is knowing, but it is not right to define 
Consciousness as knowing. 

To my view that Interest and Consciousness are 
identical, it may be said : "I can be intensely inter- 
ested in a sound of which I am hardly conscious. 
How can Interest and Consciousness in this case be 
identical? Is not the rule given, sometime since, 
that a high state of Consciousness always means a 



40 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

high state of Interest, broken here?" "No," my 
answer is : " When you say yon are hardly con- 
scious of the particular sound you mean that you 
hardly cognize it — you make Consciousness equal to 
knowing which is incorrect." 



(g) Wundt. 

Wundt, in his Physiologische Psych ologie, insists 
that "Verbindung von Elementen" is a characteristic 
of Consciousness. He argues for this at length in 
his third volume. But " Diese Verbindung von 
Elementen'' is a characteristic of Interest. Wundt 
could not possibly have more properly described 
Interest's work, for it is only as Interest deals with 
objects that the processes Wundt describes take place. 

Wundt, in his Physiologische Psychologie (Vol. 3, 
page 373) argues at length that the four features in 
the development of Consciousness are Synthesis, 
Attention, Passive Apperception and Active Apper- 
ception. The thesis will be taken up later that pass- 
ive and active Apperception of which Wundt speaks 
here, are but passive and active Cognitive Interest. 
Now, supposing them to be such, it is a very striking 
fact, that the four features which Wundt emphasizes 
in the development of Consciousness all belong to 
Interest. These four are : 



NO MENTALITY WITHOUT INTEREST. 41 

(1) Synthesis 

(2) Attention 

(3) Passive Apperception 

(4) Active Apperception 

and all are, as has been said, essentially of the 
nature of Interest, or spring from Interest. 

(hi Baldwin. 

The definition which Baldwin gives of Conscious- 
ness is ; "Consciousness is the one condition and abiding 
characteristic of mental states.'' (Italics his.) (Hand- 
book of Psychology, Vol. 1, page 45.) 

Now the one condition of mental states is Interest, 
moreover the abiding characteristic of mental states is 
Interest. 

(i) The Dictionary of Psychology. 

"Consciousness," Stout and Baldwin say, in the 
Dictionary, "is the distinctive character of whatever 
maybe called mental life." Now what "the distinct- 
ive character of mental life" is, is not stated. But, 
in plain terms, the distinctive character of mental 
life is Interest. There is no mental life without 
Interest — there is no perception — no memory — no 
feeling — no striving, as we shall see, without 
Interest. 



42 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

But to continue the definition of Consciousness 
given in the Dictionary : " Whenever there is not 
total unconsciousness in the sense in which we 
attribute unconsciousness to a table or a log of 
wood, the existence of some form of mind we denote 
by the word Consciousness. Whatever we are 
when we are awake, as contrasted with what we are 
when we sink into a profound sleep, that it is to be 
conscious. What we are less and less as we sink 
gradually down into dreamless sleep, or as we swoon 
slowly away, and what we are more and more as the 
noise of the crowd outside tardily arouses us from 
an after dinner nap, or as we come out of the mid- 
night of the typhoid fever crisis." (Quoted in Diet, 
from Ladd's Psychology, page 30.) 

But, "to sink into dreamless sleep," Interest must 
ebb more and more — "to come out of the midnight 
darkness of the typhoid fever crisis," L e., to come 
to Consciousness, is for normal Interest to once more 
begin its sway. 

The Psychologists, whose statements respecting 
Consciousness have been considered, are but a part 
of those whose writings have been reviewed. No 
greater Psychologists live than these. No "ex 
parte" consideration of their views respecting Con- 
sciousness has been given. In a reading of their 
writings concerning Consciousness, others may find 



INTEREST IS CONSCIOUSNESS. 43 

views which to them seem opposed to my thesis, 
that Interest is identical with Active or Process 
Consciousness. I must confess, however, that I 
have found, in their writings on Consciousness, 
nothing which to my mind is repugnant to this view. 
The present line of argument has been an exami- 
nation of the views of these different Psychologists, 
preceded by an Argument from the way Conscious- 
ness and Interest ever vary together. It is hoped 
that sufficient argument has been given to cause 
Psychologists to consider the question as to the 
correctness of these views. 



CHAPTER VI. 

The Principle of Interest is the one and only Mental 

Ultimate, fundamental to the three so=cal!ed 

Ultimates, Cognition, Feeling and Cona= 

tion. In their essential nature they 

are respectively, Cognitive In= 

terest, Affective Interest 

and Conative Interest. 

(This is a thesis upon which work was done dur- 
ing the summer of 1904 and which is contained in 
the paper at the Hopkins. The treatment here is a 
compend from that paper. This is one of the 
earliest positions reached in my thinking.) 

The human mind, when it considers itself, instinct- 
ively demands that unity be found. The so-called 
mental Ultimates, which are Feeling, Cognition and 
Conation, it is not satisfied with because they do 
not constitute a unity. The mind feels that a unity 
must be posited. A unity has, in fact, ever been 
posited. Psychologists speak of the " Mind " or of 



THE MIND DEMANDS UNITY. 45 

"Consciousness" as that which is the principle 
comprehending the three so-called Ultimates. 

Because the unifying principle is demanded by 
the mind itself and because all psychologists admit 
this in some form (either as "Mind," "Conscious- 
ness, " etc.), the question whether there is really a 
mental principle which is the single fundamental, 
deserves consideration. 

Now there is a mental principle to which our 
attention is especially drawn by the fact that 
psyschologists meet grave difficulties in satisfactorily 
placing it in any scheme of classification. 

This is the Principle of Interest. Some psychol- 
ogists hold that it is coned ive, some that it is affective 
and others that it is cognitive, in its nature. 

Thus Baldwin saj T s : " Steinthal agrees with Volk- 
mann, saying interest is the readiness of a group of 
ideas to assimilate a new idea." (Baldwin's Psy- 
chology, Vol. 1, page 147.) 

" Volkmann defines interest as the relation of an 
idea to the group of ideas which represent the 
Ego." (Baldwin's Psychology, Vol. 1, page 148.) 

These psychologists, then, hold that Interest is 
cognitive. Baldwin, etc., hold that it is affective, 
and Dewey, Royce, etc., maintain that it is conative, 
while Stout, in his latest psychology (1903), states 
that it is both affective and conative. 



46 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

It would seem that because authorities have thus 
looked at the principle of Interest from this three- 
fold standpoint, the question ought, long before this, 
to have been raised as to whether Interest is not the 
Ultimate comprehending the three so-called Ulti- 
mates. 

Then, too, Psychology is but beginning to deal 
with Interest. It is a striking fact that the great 
psychologist Herbart, who gave the first treatment 
of moment concerning Interest, gave his treatment, 
not in his Psychology, but in some letters on Edu- 
cation. It is a more striking fact that, with a few 
exceptions, the only authors, who have taken up the 
problems presented by Interest, have been those who 
have dealt with Pedagogics. These authors, unfor- 
tunately, have treated Interest from no strictly scien- 
tific or psychological standpoint. That Interest has 
not been properly studied by psychologists, I ad- 
duce, as a reason for considering the question as to 
whether, after all, it is not the fundamental. The 
failure to find the Ultimate, which has marked Psy- 
chology's history, may be possibly explained by this 
neglect to adequately consider what Interest is. 
Dr. Baldwin well says : " The place of Interest in 
the mental life has remained anomalous ; it has had 
no adequate discussion from psychologists." (Psy- 
chology, Vol. l,|page 147.) 



THE DEFINITION OF INTEREST. 47 

Now to state my position at the outset : My thesis 
is tJiat this principle of Interest is the single Mental 
Ultimate and that the proper and scientific classifi- 
cation is this : 

f Cognition 
i 
Interest Feeling 

Conation. 



Argument I. 

Argument from the Definition of Interest that Interest is 
not only Affective and Conative but also Cognitive. 

(1) It is an admitted fact that words should be 
taken in their ordinary acceptance, if possible. No 
one has a right, in order to support some theory, to 
cMnge the meaning of a word. He may, to his own 
satisfaction, prove his theory ; but his theory will 
not be taken over as scientific truth. 

There are, however, cases in which the meaning 
of a word is not changed, but its fall connotation is 
simply brought out. The word has always had in 
the minds of men a "psychic fringe " which the lexi- 
cographers have not caught. Their eye has been 
held by only a part of its meaning. In such a case 



48 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

as this, it is the part and duty of Science to bring 
to light all this implicit meaning. The word " Con- 
sciousness," itself, is a case in point. Once " Con- 
sciousness " was " Self-Consciousness." But at last 
it was seen that Consciousness was more than " Self- 
Consciousness " — that it was really "Conscious- 
ness," as we know it today. The true and proper 
implicit meaning was made explicit. Just so is it 
with Interest. My view does not change the mean- 
ing of Interest — it simply makes explicit what has 
ever been implicit — it simply gives to "Interest" 
the scientific recognition of its true connotation. 
My position is that the meaning of Interest is an 
argument for Interest as the Mental Ultimate. 

(2) The lexicographers, however, bear me witness 
that I do no violence to the meaning of Interest. 
Thus the Standard Dictionary says : " To Interest 
— to excite the sympathy, curiosity of or attention 
of" (Vol. 1, page 939.) Now "to excite the sym- 
pathy of" is to arouse the affective nature ; "to excite 
the curiosity of" is to start cognition — it is to 
arouse cognitive Interest, and to "arouse the Atten- 
tion of" is to start volition, for attention is volition. 
Hence, this definition asserts that "to interest" is 
to arouse cognitive, affective and conative process. 

(3) It is a striking fact that, unconsciously to 
himself, Baldwin, in his Psychology, treats of three 



IMPLICIT MEANING IN INTEKEST. 49 

kinds of Interest. He speaks of "Interest of a 
peculiar sort — a feeling of curiosity, of exploration. 
In early childhood interest is almost altogether of 
the exploring kind. First, it is physical explora- 
tion ; the infant explores his own body, then foreign 
bodies, his room, then adjacent rooms. The direc- 
tion of his attention is largely accidental, depending 
upon casual stimulations. Then there begins a kind 
of exploration, the understanding of his own dress — 
the meaning of facial and vocal expression. The 
exploring instinct satisfied, his interest is at an 
end." (Psychology, Vol. 1, page 141.) 

Now this so-called "feeling of curiosity" is really 
cognitive Interest with its feeling tone. And the 
above is an illustration of Baldwin's unconscious 
treatment of Interest as cognitive. 

On page 143 of his Psychology, Vol. 1, he speaks 
of Emotional Interest, and he classes Interest as an 
Emotion. Here, then, Interest is affective. 

Again, he says : "A general characterization of 
Interest as a psychical state is best reached when 
we ask why it is that we act voluntarily in this way 
or that. The answer must invariably be, because 
we are interested in this course or that. As will 
appear later, the most important thing about Interest 
4 



50 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

is its quality of stimulating the Will." (Baldwin's 
Psychology, Vol. 1, page 139.) 

Here, then, we have volitional Interest. Because 
Interest does stimulate the Will, or rather issue as 
Will, we may class it as volitional. 

Thus the fact which was noted in the beginning 
of this paper, that some psychologists consider 
Interest as cognitive, some, as affective, and some as 
conative, is to be supplemented by this fact : When 
a psychologist enters upon any proper discussion of 
Interest he necessarily, though he be unconscious of 
it. gives a triple view of Interest. 

In fact, Interest cannot be defined save in terms 
of the three so-called Ultimates. In all Interest 
there is (1) a feeling tone — this has caused many 
psychologists to make of Interest a feeling or an 
emotion ; (2) there is tension or striving — this has 
caused many psychologists to make Interest volit- 
ional, and in addition (3) there is in all Interest at 
least the incohate idea of an object — it is "interest 
in" — this has caused some psychologists to stress 
the intellectual side of Interest. My position is, 
that one who has introspectively considered the 
principle of Interest as he finds it in his own mind 
and then endeavors to give its full connotation will 
be forced to employ the three so-called Ultimates in 



DEWEY 'S VIEWS. 51 

the definition. Hence the very Definition of Interest 
shows that it is the single Mental Ultimate and that 
the proper classification is : 

Cognition 
Interest -j Feeling 

Conation. 

Dewey's views substantiate very forcefully the 
above position : 

"I begin with a brief descriptive account of 
interest. Interest is first active, projective or pro- 
pulsive. We take interest. To be interested in any 
matter is to be actively concerned with it. The 
mere feeling regarding a subject may be static or 
inert, but interest is dynamic. Second, it is objec- 
tive. We say a man has many interests to care for 
or to look after. We talk about the range of a 
man's interest, his business interest, local interest, 
etc. We identify interests with concerns or affairs. 
Interest does not end simply in itself, as bare feel- 
ings may, but always has some object, end or aim 
to which it attaches itself. Third, interest is sub- 
jective ; it signifies an internal realization or feeling 
of worth. It has its emotional as well as its active 
and objective sides. Wherever there is interest 



52 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

there is response in the way of feeling." (Dewey's 
Interest as Related to Will.) 

Again, Dewey says as to the objective side of 
Interest : "Every interest, as already said, attaches 
itself to an object. The artist is interested in his 
brushes, in his colors, in his technique. The busi- 
ness man is interested in the play of supply and 
demand, in the movement of markets, etc. Take 
whatever instance of interest we choose, and we shall 
find that, if we cut the factor of the object about 
which interest clusters, interest itself disappears, 
relapsing into mere subjective feelings." (Dewey's 
Interest as Related to Will.) 

It is seen therefore that the very Definition of 
Interest shows that it is cognitive as well as cona- 
tive and affective. 

Argument II. 

(A) Interest is fundamental to the three so-called 
Ultimates. 

(B) In their essential nature, they but express the 
essential nature of Interest. 

(A) Interest is fundamental to the so-called Ulti- 
mates. 



INTEREST AND EMOTION. 53 

(1) Interest is Fundamental to Feeling. 

(a) It is fundamental to the highest form of Feel- 
ing — the emotions — with which Interest is often 
identified. 

Now, if Interest be merely an emotion it is a very 
peculiar one, for it stands fundamental to all the 
emotions. 

Following Baldwin's classification of the emotions, 
we have : 

(1) Emotions of Activity — "these arise through the 
attention." (Baldwin's Psychology, Vol. II, page 
176.) But attention is the outcome of Interest, and, 
since these emotions arise through the attention, 
Interest is fundamental to them. 

(2) Emotions of Content — These are : 

(a) Self Emotions (Psychology, Yol. II, page 

57.) But here Interest in self is funda- 
mental. 

(b) Objective Emotions — But here Interest is 

fundamental. 

(c) Expressive Emotions — 

1. Emotions of attraction. 

2. Emotions of repulsion. 
But here also Interest is fundamental. 

(d) Sympathetic Emotions. 

But Interest in others is fundamental here. 



54 ANALYTIC INTEKEST PSYCHOLOGY. 

Also Representative Emotions and the Emotions of 
Religion find Interest as fundamental. To the whole 
circle of the emotional nature Interest stands as funda- 
mental — hence it is not a mere Emotion. 

(b) Interest is fundamental to the lowest forms of 
Feelings — i. e., the Sensations. 

Helmholtz says : " We only attend with any ease 
and exactness to our sensations in so far as they can 
be utilized for the knowledge of outer things : and 
we are accustomed to neglect all those portions of 
them which have no significence as regards the 
external world. So much is this the case that for the 
most part special training and practice are required 
for the observation of these latter more subjective 
Feelings." (Quoted from James' Psychology, Vol. 
I, page 241.) This statement but shows what almost 
all psychologists comment upon, that even as 
regards sensation the mind has a selective process. 
Now this selective process which the mind has, in 
dealing with possible sensations, is the selective pro- 
cess of Interest. Interest must he aroused before the 
possibility of a sensation becomes an actuality. 

The battle is on today concerning the lowest 
forms of life, as to whether they are mere reflexes as 
Loeb, for instance, teaches, or whether as others 
insist, they have mentality. 



INTEREST AND SENSATION. 55 

For our purposes it is not necessary that this 
question be decided pro or con. Where, of course, 
there is nothing but reflexes there is no mind, but 
where sensation begins to appear mind begins to 
show itself. Now the first sensation which appears 
in the scale of life implies the presence of rudi- 
mentary Interest. Fix the point where sensation 
shows itself, and then, necessarily, Interest is there, 
for Introspection shows us, beyond question, that 
the absolute elimination of Interest must mean the 
absolute elimination of Sensation. 

When we reach the human mind, the region of 
the "Sub-conscious" sensations is simply the region 
of the "Sub-Interest" sensations. Let a possible 
sensation arouse Interest and it becomes a sensa- 
tion. Let it fail to arouse Interest and it may stand 
as the portal of the mind from ones infancy to his 
death and yet he will never once have that particular 
sensation. 

Now, if sensation in its affective element be, as it 
is, the most rudimentary form of Feeling and if 
Interest is thus fundamental to sensation, Interest 
is fundamental to Feeling. If Interest be only a 
feeling it is most unique, for it lies at the base of 
all feeling and only as it is touched is there Feeling. 
Under these circumstances, to identify Interest with 



56 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

Feeling is to neglect the end and aim of classifica- 
tion, which is to discover fundamentals. 

(2) Interest is Fundamental to Cognition. 

(1) The Treatment of sensation under the last 
head comes in here as proof. For if Interest be fun- 
damental to the affective element in sensation, it is 
even more so as regards its cognitive element, since, 
at least, in a sense, sensation's affective element is 
fundamental to its cognitive element. 

(2) In the formation of the various kinds of Men- 
tal Objects, Interest has played its absolutely essen- 
tial part. No one of the mental objects, from the 
sense object to the aesthetic object could be con- 
structed did Interest not exist. 

(3) The whole treatment of Chapter I, as well as 
that of the Chapters which treat of Cognition, are 
referred to as sufficient proof that Interest is funda- 
mental to Cognition. 

(3) Interest is Fundamental to Conation. 

(a) The identification of attention and volition has 
reached such a stage that it is not necessary to 



INTEREST AND CONATION. 57 

pause to give proof. There is more and more a 
concensus of opinion that attention is the outcome 
of Interest. To take up that matter would be to 
only follow work which has already been done. 

Then if attention is identical with volition, and if 
attention is the outcome of Interest, volition is the 
outcome of Interest and Interest is fundamental to 
volition. 



(b) On the point that Interest is fundamental to 
conation, all the treatment of Dewey, Royce, Bain 
and that great school which insist that Interest is a 
part of conation might be submitted. Almost whole 
chapters could be quoted from these authors. 

Hence, it is seen, by a critical consideration in 
each case, that Interest is fundamental to Cognition, 
Feeling and Conation. 

As was stated, this argument is : 

(A) Interest is fundamental to the three so-called 
Ultimates. 

(B) The three so-called Ultimates in their essential 
nature, but express the essential nature of Interest 

The first division, (A) of this article has been dis- 
cussed. (B) remains to be considered. 



58 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

(B) The three so-called Ultimates in their essential 
nature, bat express the essential nature of Interest. 

It lias been shown that Interest is fundamental to 
the three so-called Mental Ultiinates. But it must 
also be shown that the three so-called Ultimates are 
the expression or outcome of Interest — that Interest 
is not merely something that lies back of Cognition, 
Feeling and Conation, but that it shows itself in 
Cognition, Feeling and Conation. Thus, if it can 
be shown that each of the three so-called Ultimates 
is, in its essential nature, of the nature of Interest, 
they become for us, respectively, Cognitive Interest, 
Affective Interest and Conative Interest. 

Now, as has been asserted, my position here is 
this : "The three so-called Ultimates in their essen- 
tial nature, but express the essential nature of Interest. 

(1) As to Cognition, my thesis here is that Cog- 
nition is in its essential character. Interest. 

In the Dictionary, Baldwin and Stout define 
Cognition as "the being aware of an object." 

Their aim is to give a comprehensive definition 
expressing the essential nature of Cognition. But, 
just as it is of the essential nature of Cognition to 
have reference to an object, it is a part of the essen- 
tial nature of Interest to refer to an object. The 



IDEAS — THE FOOD OF INTEREST. 59 

statements, "I am interested," "I am in a state of 
interest," all imply an object reference. My point 
here is that Interest, which, as has been shown, is 
fundamental to Cognition is, in part, at least, of its 
essential nature, Cognitive. Hence, Cognition is 
Cognitive Interest. 

(2) There is here another line of thought : 
Thought deals with ideas, and whatever ideas 
are or are not, their essential nature is to have 
meaning. Whatever one calls an idea is not an idea 
unless it has meaning, and having meaning makes 
the idea. Thus we see that it is of the essential 
nature of Cognition, in its higher stages, to deal 
with meanings. It is also of Cognition's essential 
nature in Judgment to deal with meanings. Turn- 
ing to even Sense-Perception, we find that Cogni- 
tion's essential nature is to deal with meanings. As 
has been pointed out in a quotation from James, 
sensations without meaning are disregarded. Stout, 
very properly, in his Psychology, has a treatment 
of what he terms "Primary Meaning" in his con- 
sideration of Perception. It is seen, therefore, that 
in all its stages Cognition's essential nature is 
to deal with meanings. But it is of the essential 
nature of Interest to do the same. In a part of its 
nature, it is as natural for Interest to deal with 



60 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

meanings as it is for the fledgling to open its 
mouth for food. In fact, meaning is the food for 
Interest just as it is for Cognition. Here again, we 
see that Interest, which as has been shown, is fun- 
damental to Cognition, is, in a part of its essential 
nature, Cognitive — that Cognition is of the nature of 
Interest. Hence Cognition is Cognitive Liter est. 

(3) Baldwin, justifying the classification of Cogni- 
tion, Feeling and Conation which he gives, says : 
"The representative states have as their common 
characteristic their reference to a thing or object. 
Knowledge is a function of mind only as there is 
something to be known, and in the higher forms of 
its operations its states are taken to represent or 
signify objects. In its earliest beginnings also, in 
sensation, the objective bearing of knowledge, as 
affording us a reference away from ourselves to a 
something which is presented to the Consciousness, 
is its distinguishing feature." (Baldwin's Handbook 
of Psychology, Vol. I, page 36.) 

But Interest has just this objective reference which 
Baldwin makes the mark of Cognition. 

(4) Interest determines the Cognitive Direction. 
Interest undoubtedly determines the direction of 

the Cognitive function in its normal operation. A 



THE COGNITIVE DIRECTION. 61 

dozen men, walking within the same city block, will 
each be thinking of a different subject, but, in each 
case, Interest has given the direction of thought. 
To quote an illustration from Stout : " Defoe 
describes in a very vivid and natural manner the 
state of Crusoe's mind after seeing the print of a 
man's naked foot on the shore : 'I came home to my 
fortification not feeling, as we say, the ground I 
went on, but terrified to the last degree ; looking 
behind me at every two or three steps, mistaking 
every bush and tree and fancying every stump at a 
distance to be a man. Nor is it possible to describe 
how many shapes my affrighted imagination repre- 
sented things to me in, how many wild ideas were 
found every moment in my fancy and what strange 
unaccountable whimsies came into my thought by 
the way.'" (Stout's Anal. Psy., Vol. II, page 104) 
Robinson Crusoe's eye was idly following the 
waves breaking on the shore and there came in the 
mass of his visual sensations, sensations which 
became a distinct percept — that of a man's foot- 
print. Interest and the Object now are at play like 
a shuttlecock. Each pulsation of Interest gives 
more meaning to the footprint there in the sand. 
And the added meaning of the footprint is food to 
the flame of Interest. Interest becomes Volitional 
as well as Cognitive. He starts for his fortification: 



62 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

"I came home to ray fortification not feeling, as we 
say, the ground I went on, but terrified to the last 
degree." Interest and the Object are still at their 
shuttlecock play and his terror is the affective side of 
this. "Looking behind me at every two or three 
steps ; mistaking every bush and tree and fancying 
every stump at a distance to be a man." So Interest, 
not terror has given the direction of Crusoe's Cogni- 
tions — the terror is but the subjective side of Inter- 
est. It is true that Interest has given the energy 
(Conative) but it has also given the Cognitive direc- 
tion. But ivlien we reach that which gives the direction 
to Cognitive processes we are in the very heart of the 
domain of Cognition, i. e., Interest, in part, is essen- 
tially Cognitive. 

(5) Interest not only determines the direction of 
Cognition but it determines the content of Cognition. 
To return to the illustration above : Interest brought 
the visual sensational element together into a percept 
for Robinson Crusoe. He saw a footprint. Thus, 
it was Interest which determined the percept of a 
footprint as the mental content at that moment. 
Moreover his cognitive content, while he stood gazing 
at that footprint and while he ivas on his way home teas 
absolutely determined by Interest. 



HOW THE MENTAL OBJECT IS MADE. 63 

It is not necessary to discuss this fact, which 
seems almost self-evident, that Interest determines 
the Cognitive content. But Cognition is that which 
determines the Cognitive content. The scheme uni- 
versally employed by the psychologists is this : 

f Cognition — thoughts 
Mind or Consciousness \ Feeling — feelings 

Conation — volitions. 



Here "the tJioughts " are the contents of Cognition, 
and Cognition is just what determines this content. 
But we have seen that it is, after all, Interest which 
determines the content of Cognition. Hence In- 
terest, in part, is identical with Cognition, i. e., Cog- 
nition is Cognitive Interest. 

(6) Interest does more than determine the direc- 
tion of Cognition — it does more than determine the 
content of Cognition — it makes the Mental Object. 

Thus Robinson Crusoe, between the time he saw 
the man's footprint and the time he reached his 
fortification, had a thousand mental objects, but there 
was not one which Interest did not make. Interest 
was that which, in the first place, brought out of the 
" buzzing confusion " of visual sensations the percept 
of a footprint. At one moment on his way home 



64 ANALYTIC INTEKEST PSYCHOLOGY. 

the mental object was "savages," at another "canni- 
bals," at another "his-own-death," at another "men- 
pursuing-him," etc., etc. Like a panorama, the 
rapid series of mental objects swept on for him, but 
each one was the output of Interest. Each mental 
object as it died away gave to Interest such a glint 
of meaning as that Interest with its synthetic and 
constructive process flashed forth another mental 
object ; or rather, the first mental object faded into 
the second as Interest dealt with the first, and so on 
to the end of the series. 

Thus Interest makes the mental object, but to make 
the mental object is the peculiar part of Cognition. 
Hence Interest, in its essential nature, is, in part, Cog- 
nitive, and Cognition is Cognitive Interest 

Stout and others admit that Interest is Conative 
and Affective. The generalization of this chapter is 
that Interest is also Cognitive. The arguments 
given to show that Interest is Cognitive are but brief 
outlines, but if they present the truth, mere outlines 
may suffice. 

All extended argument that Interest in its essential 
nature is also Affective and Conative is omitted here, 
since Stout and others~"admit this. 



ladd's position. 65 



Argument from Ladd's Position that Interest is Cognitive 

as well as Conative and Affective, and is hence, 

the Single Mental Ultimate. 

Ladd's position, apart from the line of argument 
already given as regards his views on Consciousness, 
substantiates the thesis that Interest is the Single 
Mental Ultimate. In his Psychology he has a long- 
chapter on Primary Attention. As Attention is the 
outcome of Interest, this "Primary Attention" (as 
will be seen from his statements) is really Interest. 
But : "Primary Attention is a form of psychical 
energy which necessarily enters into the determina- 
tion of the character of every field of Consciousness. 
In other words Primary Attention is a most general 
form of mental life." (Ladd's Psychology, page 65.) 

"Whereas Voluntary Attention is of the nature of a 
developed and trained faculty, Primary Attention is a 
necessary accompaniment of every truly psychic fact." 
(Italics his — Psychology, page 71.) 

"Primary Attention, essentially considered, is the 
variously related degrees of psychic energy expended 
upon the different aspects, elements and objects in 
the one field of Consciousness. Now, the three 
Primary aspects of all mental life are Intellectuation, 



66 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

Feeling and Conation. All objects known, in any 
field of Consciousness are constituted and held in 
the mind only by activity of the mind as InteUectua- 
tion, Feeling and Will." (Ladd's Psychology, page 
75.) 

Here, Ladd points out Primary Attention as that 
of which InteUectuation, Feeling and Will are the out- 
come. But to all Attention, Interest is fundamental, 
hence his Primary Attention is Interest, and there- 
fore, according to Ladd's view, when it is properly 
interpreted, InteUectuation, Feeling and Will, are 
the outcome of Interest. 

Ward's Position. 

Ward, in his celebrated article in the Encyclo- 
pedia Brittanica, stands emphatically for a "Sub- 
ject" in Psychology. But what the Psychological 
Subject is which many psychologists realize must 
be posited, he cannot say. 

Stout, in his last Psychology (1903), takes the 
position held by many that investigation as to a 
Psychological Subject is fruitless. 

Now in Cognition the Psychological Subject, so far 
as Psychology can discover it, is Interest. Farther 
treatment of Interest, as the Psychological Subject, 
will be given later. But if Interest be the Psycho- 



INTEREST IS COGNITIVE. 67 

logical Subject, then since the Psychological Subject 
is the Psychological Ego, we have the classification : 



Interest 



Cognition 

Feeling 

Conation. 



As has been stated, the argument in this chapter, 
in which it is sought to show that Interest is the 
single Mental Ultimate, gives only a part of the 
positions on this subject which the paper in the 
Hopkins Seminary contains. It is hoped that this 
chapter will at least cause some to turn their think- 
ing upon this subject. 



CHAPTER VII. 

The Fallacies of Conation from the Standpoint of 
Interest. 

Bain, who really began the modern teaching on 
Conation, says : "I shall examine at length the two 
fundamental component elements of the Will. 
There are, first, the existence of a spontaneous ten- 
dency to execute movements independently of the 
stimulus of sensations or feelings ; and, secondly, 
the link between a present action and a past feeling 
whereby one comes under the control of the other." 
(Bain-Emotions and Will, page 298.) 

" This fact of spontaneous activity I look upon as 
an essential prelude to voluntary power, making one 
of the terms or elements of Volition, in other words, 
Volition is a compound made up of this and some- 
thing else." (Page 296.) 

Bain confuses mere reflex spontaneity with mental 
spontaneity. He, however, is correct in insisting 
that the Will is to be traced back to the essential 
fundamental of our mental nature, if such there be. 



TRUE MEANING OF CONATION. 69 

He is also right in defining Conation from the strict 
standpoint of the Will. He does not seek to make 
Conation the whole of mental process. In other 
words, Bain's view of Conation is sensible and 
proper. 

The same is to be said of Ladd's view of 
Conation : " We have already chosen the word 
Conation to correlate with sensation and feeling in the 
most fundamental use of the latter terms." (Ladd's 
Psychology, page 210.) 

This is exactly as it should be — Conation is made 
to correlate with Feeling and Sensation (by Sensa- 
tion here, he means Cognition) in the most funda- 
mental sense. 

"By Conation we do mean to designate a primary 
and indubitable datum of Consciousness. To repeat 
the truth which came before us while studying the 
Attention, all psychic life manifests itself to the 
subject of that life, as being, in one of its funda- 
mental aspects, its own spontaneous activity. All 
complex psychic facts are fully described only when 
we add to the phrases, ' I have such sensations and 
recognize such objects and feel affected so and so,' 
this other equally pertinent and necessary declara- 
tion, 'I now act in this or that way.'' (Ladd's 
Psychology, page 215.) 



70 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

Here Conation is properly correlated with elemen- 
tary Feeling and elementary Cognition. 

Sully's views are also correct : 

"It should thus seem to follow that the most 
obvious general differentiating circumstances in all 
Conative phenomena is the presence of the psychical 
correlative of muscular action. Our Consciousness 
of Activity is based upon the common peculiarities 
of our muscular sensibility." (Sully's Human Mind, 
page 173.) 

"Taking Feeling first of all, we see that Conation 
contrasts with this in respect of its passivity. 
Pleasure and pain are non-active. The difference 
between Feeling and Conation is further seen in the 
peculiarities of the psychical initiation of voluntary 
action. 

In like manner one differential serves, in general, 
to differentiate conation from the region of intellec- 
tion" (Sully's Psychology, pages 175-176.) 

Thus it is seen that Sully seeks to make Conation 
merely the volitional side of our nature, traced to its 
very beginning. He stands with Ladd and Bain as 
to this. 

But from this proper view of Conation there has 
been wide departure. This brings up the subject of 
"The Fallacies of Conation." 



INTEREST NOT MERE CONATION. 71 

I. The Fallacy which confounds Conation and Interest. 

This lias already been referred to in this volume. 
To confound Conation and Interest is a dangerous 
fallacy. Interest is more than energizing or striv- 
ing. But this is all that is contained in the true 
meaning of Conation. Interest has in it, the feel- 
ing tone which has caused many to class it as an 
emotion. Pure Conation is energizing — striving. 
It is " Wherever one state of Consciousness tends 
by its inherent nature to pass into another" (*. e., 
the activity in that process). But Interest is far 
more than this. We can imagine a state of pure 
Conation in which there is simply mental energizing. 
We can also imagine a state of pure Interest and in 
this there would be at least rudimentary reference to 
an Object and a Feeling tone, beside the energizing. 
Hence Interest and Conation are not to be con- 
founded. 

II. The Fallacy of confounding Conation and Mental 
Spontaneity. 

" Spontaneity is a conception relative to mechan- 
ical Causation on the one hand and Self-Activity 
(q. v.) on the other." (Dictionary of Psychology.) 

" Self -Activity — (1) Change determined in a being 
without other conditioning factors, and without 



72 ANALYTIC INTEKEST PSYCHOLOGY. 

destroying the identity of the being ; entirely immi- 
nent change. 

(2) Such change within the psychic self. * * * 
As used in current thought it is applied mainly to 
change in the mental self." (Dictionary of Psy- 
chology.) 

Now, by confining Spontaneity and Self-Activity 
to Conation and ruling out a Spontaneity of Feeling 
and a Spontaneity of Cognition, Conation is, of 
course, made the single Fundamental. But Spon- 
taneity is change—^, e., Change in mental states. 
But cognition is change in mental states — Feeling is 
change in mental states, hence Spontaneity is to be 
used also as regards these two terms. There is 
more than the volitional side of our nature which runs 
back into the sphere of Spontaneity. 

By Spontanity I mean here the root and funda- 
mental of Mental Life. There is a sphere of the 
inner life which is spontaneous. 

James thus describes it : It is what welcomes or 
rejects. It presides over the perception of sen- 
sations, and by giving or withholding its assent, it 
influences the movements they tend to arouse. It 
is the home of interest — not the pleasant or painful, 
nor even pleasure or pain, as such, but that within 
us to which pleasure and pain, the pleasant and the 



WHICH IS CORRECT 



73 



painful, speak. (James' Psychology, Vol. I, page 
298.) 

Now the question is simply this : 

Is the following the representation of the true 
mental situation : 



& 



A? 



& 



,(V 



V* 



m 



§?' 



Cogji/vtitoii/. 



7Te,e/l~i7<vg. 



C071/6(/~trOQ7 / l/. 



This diagram means that Mental Spontaneity 
(however you may define it) does not run out into 
Cognition and Feeling, but runs out only into Cona- 
tion, and that Conation is to be written also where 
Mental Spontaneity is written, so that Mental Spon- 
taneity consists in Conation alone. Now, is the 
above diagram the proper view, or is the follow- 
ing the truth of the case ? 



f 



J* 



SV 



o 1 



• fyk Cog 7-t/T/ ttO 71/. 

Co 7^CWt%/0 71/ . 



M 



74 ANALYTIC INTEEEST PSYCHOLOGY. 

This second diagram means that Mental Spon- 
taneity shows itself, not only as Conation, but also 
as Cognition and as Feeling, and that Cognition, 
Feeling and Conation are to be written with Mental 
Spontaneity, showing that each begins in that region. 

It seems to me that to thus present the case is to 
answer it in favor of the 2nd view. The language 
and thought of everyday life, as well as of the psy- 
chologists, support the view that Cognition, Feeling 
and Conation all run back into Mental Spontaneity. 

The situation has been something like this : 






V*** 



St' 



X is the region of Spontaneity. Now Bain simply 
extended the domain of Will back into the region X, 
and said : Some X is Volitional and called the some 
X, Will or Conation. Then came other psycholo- 
gists who began to claim more and more of X (or 
the region of Spontaneity) for Conation until the 
school arose which teaches that Conation is the 



INTEREST IS MENTAL SPONTANEITY. 75 

Ultimate — that Conation is the whole of X or the 
whole of Spontaneity. 

But Interest is now more and more recognized as 
this region of Spontaneity. Simply because the 
Will has been made to mean the whole of Mental 
Spontaneity, Interest is made to equal the Will. It 
is not seen that Spontaneity is as distinct from 
Conation as from Feeling. The only proper state- 
ment is that the region X of the diagram (Mental 
Spontaneity) is Interest, which lies back, not of Will 
alone, but also of Cognition and Feeling as well — 
that is, that Interest is fundamental to all three and 
is the single mental Ultimate, and that the three 
so-called Mental Ultimates are only expressions of 
it. This view commends itself because of its sim- 
plicity, and fundamental truth is always simple. 
There is a Mental Principle — Interest — which is 
certainly a fundamental one — it is admitted that 
Interest is of the region of Spontaneity — then posit 
Interest and give Conation its proper meaning of 
"energizing," and we have : 

Cognition 
Interest. 1- Feeling 

J Conation. 



76 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

III. The Fallacy of Confounding Mental Activity when 
used in the sense of Mental Process and Conation. 

There is an ordinary method of speech which 
psychologists themselves employ. They use "men- 
tal activity" in the sense of "mental process." Sully 
states that he uses the term "mental activity" in a 
two-fold sense — first, as mental process, and sec- 
ondly, as strict activity, (conative) : "The reader 
must note the double employment of the expression 
mental activity, now comprehensively and somewhat 
loosely to include all manifestations of mind, and 
now more strictly to mark a distinctly active phase 
of mind." (Sully's Human Hand, Vol. I, page 62.) 

Thus Sully states that he uses the term mental 
activity in the two-fold sense above indicated. 

Now with the tendency of Thought, as it exists 
today, strongly toward Conation as the single mental 
Ultimate, this fact, that mental activity is commonly 
used to mean mental process, is a fine opportunity 
for confusion and for arguments that the Will is the 
Fundamental. If Conation be mental activity (in one 
sense of the term) and if mental process means 
mental activity (in another sense of the word) the 
improper inference, is drawn, that Conation is men- 
tal process, and hence is the Fundamental. This 



MENTAL PKOCESS MOKE THAN CONATION. 77 

fallacy has undoubtedly made many believe that 
Conation has some peculiar place as the Fundamen- 
tal. 

IV. The Fallacy of Boldly Identifying Mental Process 
and Conation. 

Many have been influenced by the fallacy just 
described, but more have they been influenced by 
the necessities of the case. The tremendous diffi- 
culty with Wundfs Apperception and with all Apper- 
ceptive teaching is that there is no proper explanation 
of what it is which apperceives. The psychologists 
of the new school who hold, first, that the question 
of the Ego must be decided by Philosophy, and, 
second, that Psychology must make its deliverance 
before Philosophy can properly begin its work, are 
ruled out of the use of an Ego in their Psychology. 
But they must have "an apperceiver" and the "Ego" 
flourishes as luxuriantly in the writings of Wundt 
or of Stout as in those of McCosh. They feel, how- 
ever, the utter and absolute inconsistency of their 
position and are keenly alive to the necessity of dis- 
covering some psychological principle which is the 
"Apperceiver" The three so-called Ultimates will 
not do — not one of them — for that would be the 



78 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

"Faculty" Psychology with a vengeance! Hence, 
in this hour of need, Conation is as fully identified 
with Mental Spontaneity (define it as we may), as 
possible, and is then boldly made to be the same 
thing as mental process and thus the single mental 
principle of Conation is reached as that which apper- 
ceives. The position of this chapter is that it is the 
necessities of the case more than anything else which 
is running so much Psychology into the Conative 
Camp. These necessities, hoivever, disappear wlien it is 
seen that Interest is the Apperceiver, psychologically, 
and that Cognitive Interest is really Apperception. 
Thus the need, which has caused Conation to be 
loaded down with meaning that does not belong to 
it, disappears, and a simple and satisfactory solution 
of the problem is found. 

Stout stands as an illustration of those who have 
committed this fourth fallacy of identifying mental 
process and Conation. Stout says : "According to 
the view which we have expouaded, to be mentally 
active is identical with being mentally alive or 
awake." (Stout's Anal. Psychology, Vol. I, page 
168.) 

Now, it is true that there is mental activity in all 
conscious life. Other statements of his, however, 
show that he means more than this in this particular 
case. " We have repeatedly spoken of the further- 



stout's views. 79 

ance and hindrance of psychical activity. To make 
our analysis sufficiently definite, we must now ex- 
amine the nature of the obstacles which may impede 
the current of Consciousness. There are two kinds, 
first, the first falls entirely within the sphere of 
mental process, it consists in a conflict between two 
incompatible moods of mental activity, an internal 
discrepancy in the course of a train of thought on a 
theoretical point, the discovery of an obstacle to the 
execution of a plan for some practical end, the con- 
flict of motives, etc." (Anal. Psychology, Vol. I, 
page 156.) 

Now the reason that I give this quotation, is this : 
(1) In the first two sentences Stout evidently iden- 
tifies psychical activity and " the current of Con- 
sciousness." 

(2) He gives an example of Cognition: "An in- 
ternal discrepancy in the train of tJiought " — and an 
example of Volition — "The conflict of motives,'" and 
calls these u two incompatible modes of mental 
activity." Thus he really classifies Cognition from 
his standpoint of Conation. Just following this, 
he speaks of "the general flow of mental activity 
arising out of a conflict between its special modes " 
(page 158.) Again, "the antagonistic modes of 
activity" (same page.) This simply means that he 
is classifying Cognition, Feeling and Conation from 



80 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

the standpoint of Conation alone, as modes of 
activity. This is the position of Losakij, in his 
" Die Grundlehren des Psychologie von Standpunkte 
des Voluntarismus, " and that of Lipps, in his 
"Leitfaden der Psychologie" (1903), in which 
(pages 213-214) he classifies the Cognitive Pro- 
cesses by the "Arten des Strebens." 

The above description of Stout's position is true 
of his whole treatment of mental activity. Thus on 
page 148, Vol. I of his Anal. Psychology, he con- 
trasts two trains of thought, and says of one case : 
"But the activity involved is obviously of a lower 
grade than that which is exemplified in a train of 
reasoning, or in a systematic effort to recollect a 
series of events." 

This classifying mental processes by their differ- 
ent "grades of activity" simply means that mental 
activity is made by Stout identical with mental pro- 
cess. Thus a foundation for his treatment of Apper- 
ception as conative is laid. 

Turning to his second volume (Anal. Psychology) 
we find him saying : "Under the term Apperception 
are included all such processes as understanding, 
interpretation, identifying, subsuming, etc." (Page 
110.) Thus it is clearly seen that, in this state- 
ment, Stout makes Apperception include the Cog- 
nitive Processes. But the definition of Apperception 



stout's error. 81 

which he gives is ivJiolly from the volitional stand- 
point: " Apjoerception, may be defined, as the pro- 
cess by which a mental system appropriates a new 
element, or otherwise receives a fresh determina- 
tion." (Page 112.) On page 113 he says: " Ap- 
prehend " means originally "I grasp." On page 
114 he is explicit: " Apperception is Conative pro- 
cess." "A mental group or system is a grouped or 
systematized tendency, and the union of such groups 
or systems is the confluence of different modes of 
mental activity." (Page 113.) 

Stout's whole treatment of Apperception is thus 
from the conative standpoint. It is not necessary 
to multiply quotations. Examples may be found on 
any page of his chapter on Apperception of the way 
he makes mental process identical with mental ac- 
tivity, and then, by the use of this fourth fallacy 
which we are considering — i. e., by identifying Co- 
nation and mental activity — he makes the mind 
essentially conative. 

I have examined Stout's position minutely, be- 
cause he, with his conservatism, is a fine illustration 
of whither the present tendency of thought, respect- 
ing Conation as the Ultimate, must necessarily carry 
one. 



82 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

Now, the question here as to Conation is simply 
this, and it is fundamental to Psychology : Is mental 
synthesis merely conative? Stout's position is that 
it is conative and that since it is conative and since 
mental synthesis is a great part of the mind, the 
mind is essentially conative. (This last is whither 
his view must carry him.) Thus he has the long- 
chapter in his Analytic Psychology in which he 
seeks to show that the concept "activity" enfolds 
all mental process. Then, according to his view, 
since Conation is mental activity, and since mental 
process is mental activity, conation is mental pro- 
cess, and is, hence, the whole thing. He expends, 
upon this view, the strength of his learning and 
intellect. 

Now, mental synthesis is as essentially cognitive as 
it is conative. If, in the human mind, there is any- 
thing cognitive, mental synthesis is cognitive. If 
mental synthesis be not cognitive, there is nothing 
essentially cognitive about the mind, for mental 
synthesis is the predominant factor in perception, in 
memory and in thought. Of course, in mental 
synthesis, there is the energizing or striving, which, 
as we say, "causes" the synthesizing; but energiz- 
ing a process is not the same as the process itself. 
There is more in mental synthesis than the energiz- 



MENTAL SYNTHESIS NOT MERELY CONATIVE. 83 

ing. To say that mental synthesis is conative, 
because Conation gives the energy (in whatever defi- 
nition of the view one pleases), is, to use an illus- 
tration from the world of things, the same as to say 
that a railroad train is steam because steam gives 
the energy by which the train is run. Why, also, is 
Feeling not the Fundamental to Stout and to the 
great conative school of today? With just as much 
justice, all mental process might be made a state of 
Feeling, for there is Feeling in all such process. If 
Stout selects the "energizing" factor as the factor, 
others have the right to select Feeling as the factor. 

The fact is, that the Apperceiving Principle, after 
which Wundt, Stout, etc., etc., make such a struggle, 
is Cognitive Interest. It is no mere faculty, but the 
psychological subject, showing itself in a particular 
way — the psychological subject apperceives. What 
Introspection shows to be the fact, i. e., that the 
subject apperceives, is in accord with this psycho- 
logical view. 

It is to be remembered that Conation is, after all, 
but a theoretical principle. The Dictionary stresses 
this fact in more than one place. The psychologists 
also stress it. Yet to explain certain facts in the 
human mind, the theory of Conation is posited, and 
then, that theory is made to explain all the phe- 
nomena of the mind ! 



84: ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

The explanation of the present tendency of psy- 
chological thought, which as has been seen is toward 
Conation as the explanation of the mind, is found in 
the fact that biological explanation of mind rules the 
day. There is so much "striving" in biology's 
sphere that it becomes very easy, when the distinctly 
mental is reached, to make striving or Conation the 
Basic Explaining Principle. The insistence here is 
that errors are being carelessly fallen into by some 
of the greatest thinkers simply because sufficient 
thought is not being given to the Fundamentals of 
Psychology. If there be hundreds of acute thinkers, 
in the psychological field, intent upon solving some 
of the remaining problems of vision, why may not 
a few pitch their tents before the greatest of all 
problems which psychology has? Such problems 
are : What is the Nexus of the Mind ? What is the 
Apperceiving Principle? What is the Psychological 
Subject? What is the Psychological Ego? What 
is the explanation of Hypnotism ? What is the true 
province of Conation? What is Interest? What is 
Interest's place in the mind ? What is the determi- 
nation of Mental Objects? What is the Mental 
Object? How is the Mental Object constructed? 
It is repeated that certainly here, before •these great 
problems, the thinkers of today should pitch their 
tents. There can be absolutely no question that 



GREAT PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY. 85 

the so-called foundations of the Psychology of 
today need reviewing. Why should one be unwilling 
to take up great problems when they are at hand ? 
Why should the thinkers in psychological university 
seminaries or in colleges be delving after the solution 
of minute questions yonder on the borders of the 
science, when it is plainly and clearly the fact that 
in the caj)ital itself of Psychology there are condi- 
tions which require the presence of some of the 
forces of Psychology ? 

If these chapters can bring but a few thinkers to 
see the necessity of having a part of the forces of 
Psychology turn their attention to the very center 
of the Science itself, my aim will be accomplished. 



CHAPTER VIII. 
Psychological Idealism. 

There are few subjects in Psychology which are 
as deserving of minute and careful investigation as 
that of so-called Sense-Perception. The psycholog- 
ical authorities have such an uncertain tone here 
that one's attention is necessarily aroused to try to 
discover the cause of these uncertainties of statement. 

The old view that a tree was seen as a tree has 
given place to the view that there is not much imme- 
diate knowledge in the perception of a tree. Yet the 
authorities cling to a bit of immediate knowledge of 
the external world. A nest-egg seems to be abso- 
lutely a requirement. In such a case as this every 
thinker must necessarily examine for himself the 
question as to whether, after all, this nest-egg of 
immediate knowledge of externality, be an absolute 
requirement. 

If a system of concepts be built up by judgment 
— if a concept be enlarged by judgment — if a per- 
cept be built along the same lines as a concept — if 
apperceptive processes develop, as Stout and others 
teach, both percept and concept, it seems that the 



JUDGMENT IN ALL MENTAXITY. 87 

imperative necessity is upon us of asking whether 
judgment cannot give an explanation which will 
show this nest-egg of immediate knowledge, which 
psychological science is clinging to today, to be a 
mere figment of the imagination. Judgment builds 
up concept systems — judgment fattens concepts — 
judgment builds up concepts. Why may not Mind 
have developed ability to interpret sensation (affec- 
tive) from the very first and inchoate judgment be at 
the base of all Mentality ? This valued bit of 
knowledge of Externality — this "minimum" of the 
cognition of the external world — how different it is 
from all else that Mind has ! The flashings forth of 
judgment are seen in all other reaches of Mentality, 
but this sacred bit of immediate knowledge of 
Externality has been immediately given, and Mind 
must reverence it ! Mind must accept it as a thing 
given ! But if I, as I sit here writing, can judge 
that the sound, yonder in the street, is a wagon's 
noise, why may not Mind from the very start have 
carried this judging — this interpreting ability — and 
used it from the first ? 

For me now to meet the requirements of Life, I 
must develop ability to interpret varied sensations. 
Why may it not have been always thus with Mind ? 
Why may not this necessity which is now upon me 
to judge aright of Externality have been upon all 



88 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

Minds ill all times? Why may not this necessity 
of judging Externality, laid upon Mind from the start, 
be the secret of mental development? 

The view of but a single author can, for lack of 
space, be considered, James, because of his emi- 
nent position in the psychological world, and be- 
cause of his proper position as a leading authority, 
is, therefore, briefly reviewed. 

James begins by defining sensation, and begs the 
question at the start. He defines sensation as cog- 
nitive. (James' Psychology, Vol. II, page 3.) 

Perception and sensation are names for different 
cognitive functions according to him. He holds 
that sensation, so long as we take the analytic point 
of view, differs from perception only in the extreme 
simplicity of its object and content. 

He says : "As we can only think or talk about 
the relations of objects with which we have acquain- 
tance already, we are forced to postulate a function, 
in our thought, whereby we first become aware of 
the bare immediate natures by which our several 
objects are distinguished. This function is Sensa- 
tion." (James' Psychology, Vol. II, page 3.) 

So he, because of necessity, postulates this func- 
tion which gives immediate knowledge of the nature 
of things — because he has to have it, he postulates it. 



JAMES BEGS THE QUESTION. 89 

He takes a thing which is admittedly feeling, and 
says, necessarily, this thing mast be cognitive, hence 
we make it cognitive by definition and all will go well. 
But, my position is, that he has no right to thus 
beg the question at the very start. 

James continues : " The nature and hidden causes 
of ideas will never be unravelled till the Nexus 
between the brain and consciousness is cleared up." 
My point is that this cutting off of everything below 
immediate awareness of external things and saying 
that we cannot know anything about the part below 
the immediate awareness of externality, will not do — 
that sensations give the raw material of the Mental 
Object. 

James continues: "All we can say now is that 
sensations are the first things in the way of con- 
sciousness. Before conceptions can come, sensations 
must have come, but before sensations came, no 
psychic fact need have existed, a nerve current is 
enough." 

That James is clearly wrong as to his position 
here, the whole trend of thought in the chapters of 
this book seem to show. Interest is fundamental 
to sensation (affective) and, since this is the case, it 
is unscientific to postulate a bit of immediate 
knowledge of externality as a kind of batch of 
dough for the baking. It is held that this sacred 



90 ANALYTIC INTEEEST PSYCHOLOGY. 

bit of immediate knowledge is but a remnant of the 
days of uncritical thought and that Science, find- 
ing a proper explanation, can well dispense with it. 

One trouble with James is that he calls thought, 
feeling ; and feeling, thought — he is not clear-cut 
here, and the result is that in these fundamentals 
he does not do clear-cut work and this results in 
vast differences for all the rest of his work and for 
his Epistemology. Yet he continues : " Sensations 
are the stable rock, the terminus a quo and the 
terminus ad quern of thought." 

Moreover, James studies only the adult mind. In 
it sensation may be always instinctively knoivledge- 
giving. But the question is as to the start — the first 
mind — rudimentary mind — from which all higher 
minds come — what of it ? My position is that 
Mind developed only by the development of ability 
to " size up " the outer through the inner — that 
sensations (feelings) became the signs of outer 
things and the ability to read these signs aright 
brought survival. 

James says : " In his dumb awakening to the con- 
sciousness of something there, a mere this, as yet, the 
infant encounters an object in which (though it be 
given in a pure sensation) all the categories of the 
understanding are contained. It has objectivity, 
unity, substantiality, casualty in the full sense in 



THE INFANCY OF MIND. 91 

which any later object or system of objects has 
these things. Here the young knower meets and 
greets his world, and the miracle of knowledge bursts 
forth as Voltaire says, as much in the infant's lowest 
sensation as in the highest achievement of a New- 
ton's brain." (James' Psychology, Vol. II, page 8.) 
Now let us admit all this, but remember, that 
behind this infant mind there are many generations, 
that the question is not of the infant's mind but 
of Hind in its infancy (a tremendously different 
question.) This infant's mind which James ex- 
amines has, I admit, this instinctive ability to per- 
ceive, but it has this, my contention is, instinctively. 
This instinctive apprehension of the external world 
by the infant is possible, because it has inherited a 
brain system ready to work in that way, and ready, 
because it has inherited the advances of many 
generations. The real question is as regards Mind 
in its infancy — in its embryonic period — in that 
time when it was only a point of Interest, showing 
itself in feeling, primary cognition and conation. 
The question is what then was the Mental Object ? 
What is it Cognition deals with first of all ? 

Now, it would seem that, because sensations (af- 
fective) are in the lowest minds and because it is 
admitted that judgment does deal with sensations, 



92 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

it; is an unnecessary supposition to suppose that 
judgment in its start had any other object save sen- 
sation to deal with. The supposition that in the 
lowest minds there is any object save feelings or 
sensations (and that which cognition built out of 
sensations by judgment) is against Science's insist- 
ence on simplicity of explanation — it is not scientific. 
Mark it, cognition had to find its start. To start, 
there must be the raw material of a Mental Object. 
What is this raw material? James' position is that 
it was a blur which had objectivity about it. The 
position here is that it was a sensation, a feeling 
that a feeling is the raw material of cognition, and 
that cognitive processes of interpretation simply had 
to be developed to meet the demands of Externality, 
and that the Mind has thus devoloped — that the 
adaptations to environment shown in bodily growth 
are as nothing to the adaptations shown by the 
Mind in the ability it has developed to interpret the 
external world aright. 



CHAPTER IX. 



Instantaneous Mental Recapitulation. 

I have submitted my theory of Instantaneous 
Mental Recapitulation to a high psychological au- 
thority, and he tells me that it is new in litera- 
ture. So far as my reading and knowledge go, 
nothing similar to my theory of Instantaneous Men- 
tal Recapitulation has been advanced by any thinker. 

The chapter on Instantaneous Mental Recapitula- 
tion is given place at this particular point in this 
volume as an introduction to chapters X, XI, 
XII, which deal immediately with the subject of 
Cognition. 

The view is held, that, in order to follow the 
thought of the next few chapters, the marvelous 
recapitulating power of Mind must be stressed. 
Only as we see that Interest can sweep instantly 
from one point of mental development to another 
can the explanation of Cognition, etc., of these pages 
be properly considered. 

The following positions seem to be bound up 
together as basic explaining principles : 



94: ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

(1) Interest is Consciousness. 

(2) Instantaneous Mental Recapitulation. 

(3) Instinctive Judgments. (Chap. XL) 

The writer therefore requests that these chapters 
be considered as an organic whole. 

In fact this Interest Psychology is an organic 
whole in this : It stands as a presentation of the 
General Thesis that Psychology is the Science of 
Interest. 

It is generally held that the individual Conscious- 
ness, in its development through life, is a recapitula- 
tion of the racial or even a recapitulation of all finite 
Consciousness. 

In the few years we spend here we recapitulate 
the life which has preceded us. Whatever have 
been the stages of its advance we follow therein and 
recapitulate in ourselves the race's development. 
Hence, although our days may be few, there is hur- 
ried into our brief life a compend of all the past. 

Now my position is that this view of recapitula- 
tion is utterly inadequate — that it constitutes an 
utter failure to set forth the true facts of recapitula- 
tion. According to my theory of Instantaneous 
Recapitulation it is held that the individual, at any 
second, may reduplicate the whole racial experience. 

In other words, if the race has existed for thousands 



MILLIONS OF YEARS IN A SECOND. 95 

of years, each of us, in a moment, may, in our Con- 
sciousness, live over again these thousands of years. 
Or, if the evolutionary hypothesis be true, and Mind 
has been even millions of years in its development, we 
may live in a moment all these millions of years. 

Thus, when Consciousness or Interest functions 
at the sleep point, the lowest Consciousness is re- 
capitulated. But in a second the man may be awake 
and conceptualizing processes start. In this case, 
Consciousness or Interest has flashed its progress, if 
evolution be true, across the bridges of millions of 
years. Or one has a sensation, and immediately in 
the higher region of thought mental processes 
go on. Here, too, is Instantaneous Recapitulation of 
conscious processes which once were slow and labored 
in their operations. 

There is, thus, the Instantaneous Recapitulation of — 

(1) The slow development by which Mind reached 
any processes higher than sensation. 

(2) There is thus also the Instantaneous Recapitula- 
tion of the slow processes by which the racial Mind 
reached higher thought processes. 

(3) There is, in this passage in thought from a sen- 
sation to a concept, an Instantaneous Recapitulation of 
all the slow mental processes by which the individual 
passed from mere ability to feel a sensation to ability to 
conceptualize. 



96 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

There can, it is maintained, be no question that at 
any moment our Hind sweeps the strings of all the Past 
and lives in a moment the ages which have gone. 

The Concept Consciousness has borne evil fruit- 
age in Psychology since it is static in its connota- 
tions. The Mind, in the full sweep of its activities, 
has not been fully studied. The thought has not 
been emphasized that Mind climbs the Alps of the 
Past every second. Down to the abysses of the 
Past, Interest may drop or up to the point of highest 
mental development, Interest may function. The so- 
called Reduplication which teaches that one's whole 
life is a reduplication of the past sees nothing of 
what is really the case — that Mind is the true and 
real Reduplication or Recapitulation. All the past 
is compressed into the Mentality of this present 
moment. Science, it would seem, must recognize 
this as a basic fact. Thus will the proper concep- 
tion of the vast and wonderful ability of Interest or 
Consciousness to function with matchless rapidity 
be seen. The view given in this volume of the In- 
stinctive Judgment as a basic explaining principle 
in Psychology will then be seen to be necessarily a 
fact. 

The roads our fathers labored over in cart or car- 
riage, we pass over now by steam or electricity. 



ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS EXPLAINED. 97 

So the thought processes, which once struggled only 
a step at a time, now have the rapidity of light. 
Men have called this rapidity of thought, Associa- 
tion. It is maintained that it is essentially the 
Thought Process, and that Instantaneous Reduplica- 
tion and the Instinctive Judgment furnish its expla- 
nation. 



Instantaneous Mental Recapitulation alone can Explain 

and Justify Introspection as a Method of Study 

for Genetic Psychology. 

The line of argument here is this : Introspection 
necessarily stands as a fundamental method of all 
psychological study, whether this study be genetic 
or not. But unless this moment's Consciousness car- 
ries in it the varied points of development readied in 
the past of Mind, Introspection cannot be this instru- 
ment of psychological study. Hence necessarily In- 
stantaneous Mental Recapitulation is a fact. 

The theory of Instantaneous Recapitulation can 
alone give warrant for Psychology's dependence 
upon Introspection as a method of study in Genetic 
Psychology. Without Instantaneous Reduplication, 
Genetic Psychology can study, by the help of Intro- 
spection, only the highest reaches of Conception. 
7 



98 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

For, in the moment of Introspection, the Mind is 
functioning at the Conception point, and hence, 
introspective knowledge of mental processes, lower 
in the scale of development, must be impossible if 
the static view of Consciousness be held. But when 
it is seen that Instantaneous Reduplication is a fact, 
Introspection's place in Genetic Psychology is justi- 
fied. For, according to the view herein presented, 
we may have a percept, and since our Mind can flash 
through, in a moment, all the mental development of 
the centuries, Introspection, standing far up at the 
conception point, starts forth and notes this partic- 
ular percept living down, as it were, in the distant 
past of development. 

Thus Introspection, which is itself, one of the 
highest mental operations, can study the whole 
genetic series of mental development, however long- 
that series has been in process of development, 
because, in any moment of conscious life, that long- 
course of mental development may be recapitulated 
by the Mind, which thus brings it before Introspec- 
tion's gaze. Thus we can study the very infant Con- 
sciousness introspectively since the sleep point with 
us is the infant Consciousness. 

As ive are about to sink to sleep, thus reduplicating 
in that instant the infant Consciousness, our Conscious- 
ness or Interest may suddenly function away yonder on 



ONLY MIND IS WONDEEFUL. 99 

the heights of Conception and Introspection, standing on 
the summits of the Mental Development of the ages, may 
look into the very face of the rudimentary Consciousness 
of generations gone by. 

When this great fact of Instantaneous Kedupli- 
cation is grasped and we realize that we are living 
ages in every second that passes, Introspection's 
place in Genetic Psychology is justified. There 
exists, at this moment, only the narrow segment of 
Mentality of the duration of a moment or two. The 
Mentality of five minutes ago is no more — the Men- 
tality of five minutes hence has not come. Mind 
flies onward, over the waters of the Great Unknown 
Sea — a little bark. But within this little bark of the 
present Mentality are stored all the rich possessions 
and gains of the past. And Introspection can 
examine all aboard the bark, learn from all and con- 
struct a scientific explanation of the development of 
all, because all the past lives aboard this little craft. 
Of all things which this world has, truly only Mind 
is wonderful ! Introspection catches a flash of 
thought passing from a percept to a concept and 
lo ! here is the problem of the ages before it ! The 
ages of the past are compressed into a second's 
time before Introspection's very eye. 

A critisism was passed by some on my paper on 
file at the Hopkins Psychological Seminary to the 

L.ofC. 



100 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

effect that the paper studied cross sections of Con- 
sciousness instead of studying Consciousness in its 
longitudinal development, (i. e., as it developed 
through the past.) My view then and now is, that 
because cross sections of Consciousness of, let us 
say, the duration of a moment or two, is, accord- 
ing to my theory of Instantaneous Recapitulation, 
a reduplication of ages of genetic mental develop- 
ment, the study of cross sections is the very method 
by which Introspection can study Consciousness at 
any and all stages of its development. 

The only justification for the use of Introspection 
as a scientific method in the study of Mind in its 
development, is found in the fact of Instantaneous 
Recapitulation. According to this view, Introspec- 
tion may, at any moment, hold in its momentary 
view, a miniature complete Mind, as it were, which 
presents the stages of the genetic mental progress 
of the past. 

The biologist, to follow stages of development, 
must needs take different animals and forms of life 
for study. 

The psychologist, however, it is maintained, can, 
seated in his chair, have before him the whole series 
of genetic advances by changing from a moment's 
drowsiness to an introspective view of that drowsi- 
ness in what, we may say, is the same moment's time. 



A COMPLETE MIND IN MINIATURE. 101 

For the passage from drowsiness to eager introspec- 
tive psychological study of that drowsiness, marks 
the whole sweep of mentality's development. Or, 
again, Introspection may turn from the study of a 
percept to the study of a series of concepts of the 
highest complexity. Here, in an instant, the stage 
of development reached by vast struggles stands 
forth a living entity, and Introspection's eye is upon 
it. Out of the Great Past the Consciousness of this 
present moment rises like a spirit, but on its very 
face it bears the record of the way by which Mind 
reached all higher processes than sensation and per- 
ception. 

An experiment showing exactly what is meant by 
Instantaneous Recapitulation may be readily per- 
formed. If, at this very instant, as you read these 
words, you lift your hands, and, placing your fingers 
upon your eye balls, press with some vigor, you 
have an illustration of what is meant by Instanta- 
neous Recapitulation. For, in the very instant you 
thus give yourself physical pain, your Consciousness 
or Interest sweeps back from the higher point of 
conception to the point of mere physical pain — the 
years of individual mental development are crossed — 
the ages of racial mental development are passed, 
and you are back at the beginnings of Mentality. 



102 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

II. 

Only Instantaneous Recapitulation can give the Proper 

Point of View from which to Study the Wonderful 

Rapidity and Complexity of Mental Operations. 

It is repeated, that the Static view of Conscious- 
ness can never hope to explain Mentality. No Con- 
cept that is not pregnant with the Dynamic idea can 
do justice to what Mentality really is. 

The passage of Consciousness from the sleep 
point of development to the highest reaches of de- 
velopment, which, as has been emphasized, often 
occurs in a second's time, is not by mere associ- 
ation. No one can hope to establish such a propo- 
sition as that. The only explanation is such a 
view as this of Instantaneous Recapitulation. But 
if, in such extremes as that between a percept and a 
concept, Interest can thus rapidly function, why may 
Interest not function along all the so-called associa- 
tion tracks ? 

The Association of Ideas means, therefore, simply 
that Interest functions more rapidly through this 
particular stage of thought than before. When one 
is " reminded " by a certain word of a long forgotten 
incident which suddenly appears before the Mind, 
there is absolutely nothing like one idea calling 



THE EXPLANATION OF COGNITION. 1U3 

up the other. The explanation seems to be that 
Interest, functioning along a track made easy by 
past process, reaches the second idea with the 
rapidity of light. This line of thought is con- 
tinued in the next chapter — that on Cognition 
being the development of the Cognitive strain in 
Interest, and in chapters following that. 

The point to be emphasized here is, that the view 
that Consciousness and Interest are identical, leads 
to the position of Instantaneous Recapitulation, and 
Instantaneous Recapitulation leads to the position of 
Instinctive Judgments. With these explaining prin- 
ciples at command, Cognition, it would seem, can be 
more readily explained than it is by many. Cogni- 
tion becomes but a study of this rapid functioning 
of cognitive Interest, and it is thought that sim- 
plicity of view is gained by a study from this point 
of view. 



CHAPTER X. 

All Cognition is the Development of the Cognitive Strain 
in Rudimentary Interest. 

(If, in this chapter or any other, the author 
advances views which have been already expressed 
by others, he is not aware of that fact, and will 
greatly appreciate it if his attention is called to the 
matter.) 

There is, as has been seen, a Cognitive strain in 
Interest. Interest is not only Affective and (Dona- 
tive, but also Cognitive. 

The present thesis is that all the adult's Cognition 
is developed from the cognitive side, let us say, of 
the child's first gleam of Interest. However strange 
this thesis may appear, it is held that the facts sub- 
stantiate it. 

The thought upon this topic is given in brief out- 
line. The subject is continued through several of 
the next chapters. 

(1) The identification of Sensation (affective) and 
Perception (cognitive) constitutes, to the point of 
view of these papers, one of the greatest of fallacies. 



A GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL FALLACY. 105 

Because of this fallacy the simplicity of the cog- 
nitive process is not seen, the nature of the Mind's 
true development is obscured and emphasis is 
placed upon the material object and the material 
world. The author holds that Sense-Perception is 
mediate, that Psychological Idealism is true and 
that Mind, hard up against the fixed conditions of 
Externality which it could know only by developing 
the ability to interpret sensations (affective) coming 
from Externality, did develop this ability. The 
arguments in favor of Psychological Idealism in 
a preceding chapter are necessarily far too brief. 
It is hoped to take up this point again and to use 
material already gathered on this subject. 

(2) Thus Interest stands over against matter. 
Sensations (affective) come, just as to the telegraph 
operator the click of the ke*ys come. The learning 
process, which the operator had to pass through in 
order, as we say, to understand the click of his 
instrument, Mind itself had to pass through in 
order to understand the external world. The op- 
erator must needs develop an interpreting power or 
he cannot hold his position. So the necessity of 
interpreting sensation's (affective) element was upon 
Mind. 

(3) It is held that there are Interest-Moments 
which issue in a Judgment. To judge is for Cogni- 



106 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

tive Interest to catch a new glint of meaning. It is 
maintained that the concept itself has its origin in these 
Interest-Moments. When we use language we are but 
passing from one concept, as we say, to another — 
according to this view ive are passing from one Interest- 
Moment to another. The Interest-Moment is in. some 
sense James' pause of Consciousness — the Judg- 
ment-Burst is about what James speaks of as the 
rapid flight of thought. With every Judgment-Burst 
(i. e., the apprehension by Cognitve Interest of a new 
glint of meaning) the nucleus of a new Mental Ob- 
ject may be given, or Interest may function in old 
ways, building up this new Interest-Moment or con- 
cept, until a novel (new) glint of meaning comes and 
straightway, we have the beginning of another con- 
cept or Interest-Moment. 

(4) It is thought that here we have, in part at 
least, the explanation of Cognition — that from Cog- 
nition's dawn to brightest day the process is as is 
described above — that there are inchoate Concepts 
and Judgments far down in the scale of mind 
where we have never looked for them. 

(5) Moreover, there are not different hinds of Men- 
ial Objects but, in essential nature, there is but one hind, 
i. e., a sensation (affective) or feeling, externally or 
centrally initiated, with its Judgment- Clusters. A 
certain constant Judgment, or certain constant Judg- 



INTEREST-MOMENTS. 107 

ments in this Judgment- Cluster flashed forth by 
Interest, which we, in each case, may call the Classi- 
fying Judgment or Judgments or the Instinctive 
Coefficient Judgments, decide ivhether this particu- 
lar Menial Object is to be for us a Percept, a 
Memory, a Concept — whether, in fact, it is to be for 
ns a taste, a touch, a sound, a thing seen or smelt. In 
any case, were these classifying Judgments to 
vanish, this particular Mental Object would fall out 
of its group and the Percept not be known from the 
Concept. Different sensations (affective) may be 
essentially different. The point here is that to 
know them as different requires a Judgment and 
this Judgment becomes instinctive. 

(6) The thesis is also presented that there is a 
great class of Judgments which Psychology fails to 
recognize — this is the class of what I term In- 
stinctive Judgments. Only as we posit Instinctive 
Judgments can Mind be properly explained. In- 
stincts are no mere reflexes — there is mentality 
there. But as mentality consists, in part, as to its 
very essential nature, of Cognitive Interest, and as 
Cognitive Interest's very first step is one involving 
Judgment, i. e., apprehension of a glint of meaning, 
necessarily in Instinctive Mental Expressions there is 
Judgment involved and this Judgment it is which is 
here termed Instinctive. 



108 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

(7) How quickly do our Judgments, at first formed 
with the slowest deliberation, become Instinctive 
Judgments ! Multitudes of examples could be given 
of this. 

(8) The animal has Judgment. It is but instinct- 
ive, but none the less is there apprehension of that 
which for him answers to what for man is termed 
meaning. 

(9) It is only Instinctive Judgments which can 
explain the standing forth of a precept before In- 
terest. The particular precept is not brought back 
by memory as a thing once fused and now solidly a 
unit. The Instinctive Judgment processes burst again 
instantaneously to the building up of a similar Mental 
Object to that ice had before. 

(10) The thesis of this Chapter is that all Cogni- 
tion is the development of the Cognitive Strain of 
Interest. Start with the rudimentary Interest of the 
babe — there is an objective reference in the babe's 
Cognitive Interest — the essential nature of that rudi- 
mentary Cognitive Interest is best expressed by 
"What ? " The Interest-Moment bursts in a Judg- 
ment and all the Mental Objects of the ivhole Life 
come in the same ivay. To my mind there is no 
essential difference between building two groups of 
meaning (two Concepts) together and building a smaller 



JUDGMENT-CLUSTEKS. 109 

bit of meaning into a large unit of meaning. The 
authorities say that the first case is Judgment, but 
there is Judgment in each case. 

(11) Cognition, instead of being a lumbering, 
many-jointed thing, is as simple as fundamental 
truth itself. Its highest reaches are just like its 
rudimentary beginnings. There may be vast sys- 
tems upon systems of Concepts yonder at its highest 
development, but the rudimentary Concept is found at 
the very beginning of Cognition. The rudimentary 
Concept is the rudimentary Interest-Moment. 
Where one is found the other is found. 

(12) Between the Judgment- Cluster which constitutes 
the percept and the Judgment- Cluster which forms the 
concept there is no essential difference save that the 
clustering point in the latter case maybe a Judgment 
and not a Sensation, but both are formed alike. 

(13) Of course, if it be true that there are In- 
stinctive Judgments and that Mind has had to meet 
the hard and fast requirements of externality, by 
developing judging ability from the very beginnings 
of Mentality, the basic argument as regards Epis- 
temology is that correct knoivledge of the external 
world, being the means of self-preservation, has, by the 
elimination of minds that were not fully developed in 
ability to interpret externality, become more and more 
perfected. 



CHAPTER XI. 

The Theory of the Instinctive Judgment. 

(I am well aware that to the psychologists my 
theory of the Instructive Judgment may seem a 
strange innovation. It is believed, however, that 
mind cannot be explained unless the Instructive 
Judgment be recognized.) 

(1) Does the mind ever work as it were auto- 
matically — i. e., without deliberation? Is there ever 
found any kind of mental functioning which bears 
the character of an instinct? 

To ask this question is to answer it. Instincts 
themselves, whatever they are, are on the mental, not 
the physical side. Hence there are mental opera- 
tions which are instinctive. Thus we see that the 
ground is clear for the consideration of the question 
as to whether there are Instinctive Judgments. For 
since there is clearly some mentality which is in- 
stinctive, there is no inherent reason why there 
should not be Instinctive Judgments. 



Ill 

(2) There is wide question among psychological 
authorities as to just where Judgment begins in the 
mental life. A view very common even to recent 
times, allowed Judgment only to the higher opera- 
tions of Thought. But the trend has been to lower 
the mark which registers the beginniugs of the 
Judgment. There is now much talk about Exis- 
tential Judgments. Since this is the situation as 
regards the authorities, the question may receive 
consideration when one sees cause to write Judg- 
ment lower in the scale of Mentality than before. 
The tendency of thought, it is repeated, is in this 
direction. 

(3) When sharp distinction between mere reflexes 
and Mentality is made, it becomes evident that an 
explaining Principle must be found. If the chick, 
just emerging from its shell, be a mere reflex, of 
course, no explanations are necessary — the nerve 
stimulation explains the reflex action. But if the 
chick have ought of Mentality, and certainly all 
admit this, the question necessarily arises : What is 
the nature of this Mentality? It is Instinctive 
Mentality, is the reply. But what is this Instinctive 
Mentality of which so much is made ? According 
to my view, it is simply Instinctive Judgments — it is 
Cognitive Interest functioning in Interest-Moments 



112 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

which issue in Judgment-Bursts without any delib- 
eration or reflection. 

The animal finds meaning in the food yonder that 
it does not find in the rock — he finds meaning in the 
call of his mate that he does not in the call of man, 
and this is because of Instinctive Judgment. 

(4) We admit that the hound sees the fox. Is 
that which results mere automatic action? If so, 
the dog has no Mentality, he is but a reflex. But 
the fact stands certain that the hound has Mentality 
in some form. Then, if that be the case, there is 
some Cognition involved even in catching sight of 
the hare — in that there is Sense-Perception. But 
Sense-Perception of what sort? Of course, of an 
instinctive kind. Then my view is that this Sense- 
Perception which the dog has is that of Instinctive 
Judgment Processes. 

(5) In the acquisition of a new language, we have 
ever before us examples of the formation of Instinct- 
ive Judgments. We come, when just beginning the 
study of German, to the word " Wiederernnerung. " 
It has for us absolutely no meaning. But let us 
suppose that we now learn something about German 
prefixes. We come again to this same "Wiederern- 
nerung," and find there perhaps a glint of meaning. 
We have now a lean Interest-Moment or Concept. 



HOW MEANING IS MASTERED. 113 

The next time we see the word, perhaps the mean- 
ing comes to us — our Interest-Moment or Concept 
has fattened with meaning. But all this has been 
under the influences of deliberate Judgment. We 
encamped, as it were, each time with all our batteries 
of thought before the closed gates of " Wiederernne- 
rung." But now its gates are open to us. Today 
our winged Thought flies through these open gates, 
and through all the content of its meaning without 
a pause. But necessarily its passage must be along 
the route over which Thought has so often marched 
before. Judgment-Bursts are as necessary now as 
ever, but they come with lightning rapidity. 

We can recall how Judgment, each time we found 
in our reading " Wiederernnerung," acted more and 
more rapidly until the time came when we did not 
note that Judgment was functioning. But the result 
of the rapid flight of Thought through the whole 
extent of that concept is just as logical and as con- 
sistent as before. This can but mean that Judgment 
still guides the process. 

(6) The inherent nature of Cognition is, according 
to the view expressed here, shown in cognitive 
Interest. This is of the very nature of "Whatness." 

The Judgment-Burst in its very nature is a "That- 
ness." So the shuttle-cock play goes on, the con- 



114: ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

stant play between "Whatness" and "Thatness." 
Now if this be found in higher Cognition, why not in 
lower Cognition? If this be the nature of Cogni- 
tion, it must necessarily be found in lowest Cogni- 
tion. 

(7) The theory of the Instinctive Judgment forces 
itself upon us because of the wide explaining power 
of such a veiw. 

(1) The Instinctive Judgment Explains Instincts. 

There is for the homing pigeon, some glint of 
meaning somewhere which sets the wings in motion. 
In man there is bodily action as the result of a 
mental image, which sets off the trian of bodily opera- 
tions. It must be so in the case of animals. The 
chick just out of the shell acts with precision in 
pecking at a piece of food. If there be Mentality 
there, there must certainly be Instinctive Judgments 
there also. The usual view of a mere reflex opera- 
tion cannot stand. Mentality is not mere reflexes, 
and Instincts are on the mental side, 

(2) Instinctive Judgments help to Explain Interest's 
Work in Apperception. 

Interest apperceives, as is stated in Chapter II, 
but it is not by gathering up an idea or a bit of 



INSTINCTIVE JUDGMENT IN APPERCEPTION. 115 

meaning which in itself has power to attract other 
bits of meaning. Apperception is by Interest itself 
flashing forth the whole Apperceived Content upon the 
proper stimulation. 

But this is necessarily so rapid a work, that almost 
all of it must be done instinctively. The Instinctive 
Judgment, thus, is a great explaining principle as 
regards the Percept, the Concept and the whole of Cog- 
nition. It is held that the Nature of Cognition cannot 
be properly shown unless we recognize the fact of the 
Instinctive Judgment. 

(3) The Theory of the Instinctive Judgment Explains the 
Logical Processes. 

There are few questions which have been more 
fully discussed than that of the nature of the Logical 
Processes and the guarantee of their validity. 

Posit the Instinctive Judgment and it is seen that 
mind does not lose the acquisitions made in the 
past. The mind like a good general keeps the road 
which has been travelled in constant repair. Judg- 
ment band after Judgment band traverse the road 
over which the army of thought has passed, keeping- 
it open and plain. Once Judgment had to struggle 
through gate after gate of Interest-Moment, with 
sometimes the way blocked. But now the gates fly 



116 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

open wide and Judgment-Burst after Judgment- 
Burst comes so rapidly that they are not noticed. 

(4) The Theory of Instinctive Judgment helps to Explain 

the Seemingly Incomprehensible Complexity of 

Mental Operations. 

To one who studies Psychology the question how 
one Being or one Principle can have such different 
manifestations as the scores of different powers, etc., 
catalogued there, must needs arise. But now Sense- 
Perception is seen to differ from Memory only in 
this, that in Sense-Perception the raw material is a 
Sensation (affective), whereas, in Memory, the raw 
material is centrally initiated and Sense-Perception 
and Memory differ only in the fact that they have 
different Instinctive Coefficient Judgments. 

Instinctive Judgments help to Explain the Emotions. 

Here we have that which will be, it would appear, 
of importance for the explanation of the complexity 
of the Emotions. In the Emotions, as is the teach- 
ing of all the authorities, there are intellectual ele- 
ments. There are certain Mental Objects in the 
construction of which the Emotional-Tinge comes. 
Yet these Emotional-Tinges are of vast numbers 



INSTINCTIVE JUDGMENT AND THE EMOTIONS. 117 

and wonderful complexity. This is so patent that 
the greatest Psychologists say there is no reason in 
any attempt to properly classify the emotions. 

Now from the point of view of the theory of 
Instinctive Judgment, this is as it should be — there 
should be just this complexity found in the Emo- 
tions. For with each Judgment-Burst, there is a 
Feeling-Tinge. Now multiply these Judgment- 
Bursts and the Feeling-Tinges are multiplied. They 
run together and we have the complexity of the 
Emotions. 

Thus to fully explain the Emotion of Vanity, 
what vast systems of Judgment-Bursts must be 
unearthed ? Up a certain road Mental Processes 
have come like spirits on the wing, passing through 
Interest-Moment after Interest-Moment, which in 
their time length are now but smallest fragments of 
a second, and yet, in each of these Interest-Moments, 
the Emotion has been perfecting its Feeling-Tinge 
until now it stands full-orbed Vanity. 

(5) The Instinctive Judgment is the Explanation of 
Association. 

Chapters would be necessary to even attempt to 
consider the literature of the great school of Asso- 



118 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

ciationalists. There is space merely for me to sug- 
gest that Association of Ideas finds its explanation 
in the Instinctive Judgment. True, it may be said 
that one idea suggests another idea to Interest and 
that the second idea comes by Association. 

This, however, is no proper statement of the case. 
The first idea is functioned first by Interest, i. e., 
Interst feels, let us say a sensation, and cognitive 
Interest recognizes or interprets this sensation and 
and thus an Interest-Moment is found and a Concept 
or idea thus comes. Now it is said by the Asso- 
ciationalists that this particular idea suggests 
another idea. The fact is that Interest having func- 
tioned in the old track, does so more readily now, 
and by a line of Instinctive Judgments, Interest 
reaches the second idea. 

Thus it is often pointed out in the psychologies 
that the line of association which seems impossible 
of demarcation can be sometimes traced. If we 
analyze such cases we find that there has been rapid 
Judgment-Burst after Judgment-Burst. In many 
cases it seems that certain sensations have been 
fused into a unit, and are now reproduced as a 
unit, as, for instance, our percepts. It is main- 
tained, however, that this unity is but the unity of 
a concept, i. e., that it is a Judgment-Cluster. 



INSTINCTIVE JUDGMENT AND ASSOCIATION. 119 

The author is fully aware that to properly con- 
sider from all standpoints his theory of the Instinct- 
ive Judgment, a volume would hardly suffice. 

It is hoped in the future to give this subject, as 
well as others, the fuller treatment which they 
deserve. 



CHAPTER XII. 

Theses which, for Lack of Space, Can be Presented 

only in Outline. 

The theses positions of this chapter are presented 
in brief outline in order that a compend of the 
thought along these lines may be given. To seek to 
give the development of these positions in consecu- 
tive chapters, as should be done, would carry this 
present volume beyond the unpretentious size which 
was planned. These theses, however, represent 
developments along this new line of thought which 
may cause consideration of the justice and validity 
of these views. 

The following theses are therefore, merely enu- 
merated in this volume. It is hoped that the oppor- 
tunity for their proper development and defence may 
be found later. 

These theses are : 

I The thesis of Interest-Moments. 

II The thesis of Judgment-Bursts. 

III The thesis that Psychological Idealism is neces- 
sarily the scientific position for Psychology. 



VAKIOUS THESES. 121 

IV. The thesis of Judgment- Clusters. 

V. The thesis that the Raw Material of the Mental 
Object is originally a Sensation {affective.) 

VI. The thesis that the Mental Object is a Sensa- 
tion (affective) together with a Certain Judgment Clus- 
ter. (The raw material of the Mental Object may 
be what Kulpe calls an internally originated sen- 
sation.) 

VII. That there is a great Class of Judgments 
which Psychology has failed, to recognize, i. e., those I 
term Instinctive Judgments. 

VIII The thesis that Instinctive Judgments exist: 
(1) because of the very nature of Cognition ; (2) be- 
cause of the facts of animal psyclwlogy ; (3) because 
of the facts of human psychology ; (4) because we see 
every day, in our own experience, judgments, reached 
with deliberation, becoming instinctive. If Blind today 
coins Instinctive Judgments, why has it not done so in 
all the past? 

IX. The thesis that Instinctive Judgments constitute 
one of the most important explaining facts in Psy- 
chology. 



122 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

X. The thesis that the Percept in its essential nature 
is identical with the Concept — both being Judgment- 
Clusters. 

XI The thesis that there are certain classifying 
Instinctive Judgments tohich may be termed Instinctive 
Coefficient Judgments. These Instinctive Coefficient 
Judgments are the so-called "Coefficients." Thus the 
''Coefficients" of Reality are certain Instinctive Judg- 
ments. Reality has its explanation here. 

XII The thesis that the difference in these In- 
stinctive Coefficient Judgments constitutes the essential 
difference between a Percept, an Image, a Memory or a 
Concept. The thought is that because a certain Judg- 
ment-Cluster has a certain content of Constant In- 
stinctive Coefficient Judgments, it is instinctively classed 
as a Memory, a Percept, an Image or a Thought. 

XIII The thesis that the Science of Speech has its 
explanation in the passage from Inter est- Moment to 
Interest- Moment, (Concepts being thus produced) each 
of which dies away as there comes a Judgment-Burst 
luhich gives a neiu glint of meaning, which thus be- 
comes the nucleus around which Interest flashes forth 
Instinctive Judgments to the building up of another 
Interest-Moment or Concept. 



THE SCIENCE OF EPISTEMOLOGY. 123 

XIV. The thesis that the Science of Epistemology is 
necessarily a study (1) of the Instinctive Judgments 
(2) of Deliberate Judgments, (3) of the validity of 
each kind of Judgment. 

XV. The thesis that Interest with its instinctive 
Judgment- Bursts, is the Explaining Principle in Ani- 
mal Psychology. 

XVI. The thesis that the relative poverty or rich- 
ness of one's Mental Life has to do with these Interest- 
Moments. 

Some have Interest-Moments as lean as Pharaoh's 
lean kine. Some have Interest-Moments as fat as 
the fat kine Pharaoh saw. But, in every case, it 
is not association which brings together the contents 
of the Interest-Moments. It is Interest itself, 
which, functioning in old Interest-Moment tracks, 
with incalculable rapidity flashes forth Judgment- 
Burst upon Judgment-Burst until the Interest- 
Moment (Concept or Percept) reaches that point of 
development where there is a glint of New Meaning 
— the new Judgment-Burst— and in this Judgment- 
Burst there springs forth the nucleus for a new 
Interest-Moment. Thus ever on and on Interest 
functions, producing from itself its Mental Objects 
which are a true copy and transcript of External 
Objects, because the hard and fixed necessity has 



124 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

been upon Mind that the Mental Object be the cor- 
rect interpretation of the External Object, or the 
Mind must perish. 

XVII. The thesis position is held (this position a 
friend and I are collaborating upon. See Chap. Ill, 
Part II.) that Biological Life Development has 
found in Interest or Mind the dominant controlling 
factor of its progress. Mind has been in its awful 
necessities, where mere body can never be. Mind 
has had tremendous requirements and necessities laid 
upon it that never were laid upon body. The 
animal Mind developed ability to judge in order to 
live. The so-called survival of the fittest is not in 
any sense the survival of the strongest merely, but 
of that animal ivhich best developed the ability to ins- 
tinctively judge of his adversary's distance — of what 
toas food, etc. 

Mind or Interest in Animal and in Man has been the 
determining factor and feature of Development. 

The friend, of whom I speak in Chapter III, of 
part II, of this volume, who is largely concentrating 
his attention upon the one problem of Biological 
Life-Development, and who has ability of the high- 
est order for this work, tells me that that field gives 
more and more promise with increasing research. 
It seems that the whole subject of Evolution must 



THE "TNTER-ESSE." 125 

be reopened. If Evolution be the true view of Life 
Development, it must be written from the side of 
Mind and not of Body. The position as stated in 
Chapter III, of Part II, on this subject, is that there 
is an ' Tnter-esse " between Matter and Life — that 
this is Interest and that Interest has been the de- 
termining factor in all advance. 

XVIII. The thesis that the Science of Logic finds its 
validity not merely in the Deliberate Judgment of the 
present moment, but much more in the Instinctive Judg- 
ment. 

XIX. The thesis that the Science of Epistemology 
must be largely governed in its deliverance by: 

(1) Psychological Idealism. 

(2) The fact of the Instinctive Judgment. 

It is thought, however, in this connection, that 
perhaps a somewhat fuller statement in regard to 
the Interest-Moment, the Judgment-Burst and the 
Judgment-Cluster is required. 

The phrase Interest-Moment is employed in order 
that the thought may be held to the Interest which 
is functioning. 

The Judgment-Cluster is really the Mental Object. 
Whenever and wherever the Mental Object is found 



126 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

there is the Judgment-Cluster. In the difference 
between Judgment-Clusters there is found the won- 
derful complexity of our Mental Objects. 

Analysis can take a Mental Object to pieces and 
it will be found to consist of : 

(1) Deliberate Judgments or a Deliberate Judg- 
ment. 

(2) Instinctive Judgments. 

(3) Instinctive Coefficient Judgments. 

(4) The Raw Material (sensation, [affective] or a 
judgment.) 

The Raw Material, the Instinctive Coefficient 
Judgments and the Instinctive Judgments are always 
found in the Mental Object. The Deliberate Judg- 
ment is found only in cases of what we call the 
higher operations of thought. 

The Judgment-Cluster is a Cluster, not because 
these Judgments have a clustering affinity, but 
because Interest functions them forth and holds 
them by its synthetic power. Emphasis here is 
upon the acquisition already made. The Judgment- 
Cluster is the Meaning- Cluster. 

The Interest- Moment. 

The first Interest-Moment of the infant ends when 
something becomes a Sign. In these lower cases 
the sign is usually a sign or meaning for action. 



THE INTEREST-MOMENT. 127 

Here, for instance, are two men who are alone in 
the great forest fighting the Indians. Each is 
behind a sheltering tree ; one makes a sign to the 
other, the other understands the sign and drops on 
the ground and thus saves himself from the bullet 
of the foe. This is but an illustration of the daily 
and hourly importance of being able to understand 
signs and to act upon signs. Now, it is a fact of the 
very first importance that all bodily acts on the part of 
animal or man is upon some sign — the idea or mean- 
ing gives the power to act. When one loses the idea 
one cannot act. Bodily acting is in virtue of having 
received a Sign or Meaning. 

Now we begin to have an opportunity to measure 
the length of the Interest-Moment, and to in some 
sense describe it. The Interest -Moment is the incu- 
bating time of a Sign or of a Meaning- Glint. 

The incubating time ends in the Judgment-Burst 
which is a kind of Thatness and which is in itself 
the Sign or the Meaning-Glint. 

Hence the three definitions are given : 

(1) The Interest-Moment is Interest's incubating 
period in the production of a sign or glint of meaning. 

(2) The Judgment-Burst is the fashing forth by 
Cognitive Interest of a sign or glint of meaning. 



128 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

(3) The Judgment- Cluster is the Instinctive Judg- 
ments which Interest functions forth in a particular 
Interest- Moment in the developing incubation of a sign 
or glint of meaning. 

(This answers, in a sense,- to the idea of a con- 
cept, but the idea concept is a poor term for Psy- 
chology, because there is no Dynamic connotation. 
No term seems worthy of having place in our psy- 
chological terminology, which is Static in its conno- 
tations, as this term concept is. We need terms 
which keep our thought to what Interest is doing. 
Hence, it is thought that here a term like Judg- 
ment-Cluster may serve better than concept.) 

Now, as the Interest-Moment is the incubating 
period of a sign or glint of meaning, i. e., the period 
in which Interest is functioning in an incubating way 
— the whatness functioning — the second Interest- 
Moment will be shorter than the first, because it has 
the first Interest-Moment back of it. 

Now by these definitions and considerations we reach 
a great law of the Mind. It is this : 

The ivhole tendency of Mental life is toward Rapidity 
of Interest-Moments, and this means : 

(1) Increase of Judgment-Bursts or Meaning- 
Glints. 



JUDGMENT-CLUSTERS BECOME COMPLEX. 129 

(2) Ease of Judgment-Bursts or Meaning -Glints. 

(3) Complexity of Judgment- Clusters or Meaning- 
Clusters. 

Thus Judgment- Clusters necessarily become complex, 
and we see that, necessarily, according to this explana- 
tion of Mind, percept and concept must arise in their 
complexity just as they do. 

There are two kinds of Interest-Moments, the 
instinctive and the deliberate. The Judgment- 
Cluster is produced by Interest functioning through 
a number of instinctive Interest-Moments, each of 
which results in an instinctive Judgment-Burst. 
These instinctive Judgment-Bursts help to consti- 
tute the Judgment-Cluster of the deliberate Interest- 
Moment, which results in the deliberate Judgment- 
Burst. This same deliberate Judgment-Burst, 
Interest soon, it may be, functions forth as an 
instinctive Judgment-Burst in the formation of some 
instinctive Judgment-Cluster. 

Thus there is : 

(1) The instinctive Interest-Moment and the 
deliberate Interest-Moment. 

(2) The instinctive Judgment-Burst and the delib- 
erate Judgment-Burst. 



130 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

Thus cognitive Interest both makes advances and 
preserves its communications. All these advances 
which have been of real permanence have been pre- 
served by the processes of the instinctive Interest- 
Moment and the instinctive Judgment-Burst. The 
acquisitions made today are reproduced by the 
instinctive Interest-Moments and instinctive Judg- 
ment-Bursts. 

The usual teaching, that the faculty of memory 
recalls the acquisitions made in the past or that 
there is such a distinct faculty, is, it is thought, 
utterly misleading. Interest functions through 
instinctive Interest-Moments and thus the results 
usually attributed to memory are reached. The 
instinctive Coefficient Judgments in a memory 
object bespeak it a memory for us. 

Thus Cognition has to do with (1) the Interest- 
Moment ; (2) the Judgment-Burst, or what we may 
also call the Meaning-Glint ; and (3) the Judgment- 
Cluster, or what we may also call the Meaning- 
Cluster. 

The problems of the Deliberate Interest-Moment, 
of the Deliberate Judgment-Burst, are taken up in 
the Chapter on the Conscience and the Will. These 
problems involve the questions of Free- Will and 
the rise of Personality. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

All Feelings and Emotions are the Development of 
the Affective Side of Interest. 

(This chapter is a compend of a part of the paper 
submitted at the beginning of the term of 1904 and 
now on file at the Hopkins. If the view herein pre- 
sented be correct, the whole extent of the feelings 
and of the emotions must yet be thought through 
in a genetic way, beginning at the lowest and as- 
cending to the highest.) 

This chapter seeks : 

(1) To lay a proper foundation for a genetic study 
of the Feelings and the Emotions. 

(2) To justify the validity of such a study of af- 
fective Psychology. 

(3) To give the proper working tool for such an 
attempt, i. e., the affective tone of Interest. 

If feeling be the expression of Interest, the ordi- 
nary identification of Feeling and Interest is readily 
explained. "How is it possible that it was not seen 



132 ANALYTIC INTEEEST PSYCHOLOGY. 

that Feeling is the outcome of Interest if that be 
the case?" 

The view here is, that the true situation has been 
reversed in the past. Interest was made the out- 
come of Feeling, i. e. } an emotion, whereas in fact, 
Feeling is the outcome of Interest. This error is 
subtle and hence easily overlooked. 

The natural supposition is, because of the identi- 
fication of Interest and Feeling, that one is the out- 
come of the other. But we have seen that Interest 
is fundamental bo Feeling — (Chapter VI.) Hence 
Feeling in its nature is but the expression of In- 
terest. 

Another probability in this case is this : Motives 
are given by Interest. This statement is very gen- 
erally accepted by psychologists. But motives are 
affective and Interest is fundamental to Feeling. 
Here, then, we have Interest reaching up through 
Feeling to fashion motives in the sphere of the 
Feelings, or to describe the situation in another way 
— there is a part of the Feelings which is the direct 
outcome of Interest. The probability is then that 
all Feelings are the outcome of Interest. 

But to pass from probabilities to the proof that 
Feelings in their essential nature are the outcome of 
Affective Interest. 



INTEREST IS FUNDAMENTAL TO FEELING. 166 

(1) Interest is fundamental to Feeling. This we 
have already seen. 

(2) Interest, at least, in a part of its nature, is 
affective. Interest, wherever found, has a feeling 
tone. A feeling tone is of the very nature of In- 
terest. This is so clear that it needs no proof. 
The fact is that the first Feeling does not follow 
Interest, although Interest is fundamental to it, but 
rises as a part of the outgoings of Interest. 

Now these two facts, that Interest is fundamental 
to Feeling and that the Feeling tone is of the essen- 
tial nature of Interest, means, at least, this : that a 
part of our feelings is the direct outgoings from 
Interest. 

But how as to the rest of our Feelings ? 

Now the ordinary view that the human mind has 
a great stock of feelings, sensations, etc., at once is, 
as we know, erroneous. The mind really, at one 
time, has only one Feeling at the height of its swell, 
another may be receding, another may be coming in, 
but there is only one that holds chief place. Now 
the contention here is that if that Feeling, which is 
at the swell, be caught, it will be found to have been 
born of the Interest Feeling Tone. 

When we come to deal with the Feelings, we are 
admittedly upon uncertain ground. All psycholo- 
gists admit, while they deplore, this fact. Hence in 



134 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

considering the thesis which now is presented that 
All Feelings spring from the Interest Feeling Tone, 
we must take our bearings from the positions of the 
psychologists. 

As to Ideal Feelings. 

Baldwin gives the following definition of Ideal 
Pleasure and Pain : " Strict analogy, accordingly, 
from the philosophy of the sensuous Feelings leads 
us to define Ideal Pleasure as the conscious effect 
of that which makes for the continuance of the 
apperceptive life or its advancement, and Ideal Pain, 
the conscious effect of that which makes for the 
decline of the apperceptive life or its limitations." 
(Baldwin's Psychology, Vol. II, page 150.) This 
definition of Ideal Pleasure and Pain is strictly in 
line with his broad definition of all Ideal Feeling. 
Hence, admitting my thesis, that Apperception is 
Cognitive Interest, Ideal Feeling becomes Affective 
Interest. 

There are so many different kinds of subdivisions 
and sub-subdivisions among Ideal Feelings that, at 
the first blush, it seems foolish to speak of identify- 
ing all Ideal Pleasure and Pain with Interest Feel- 
ing. But in this connection, a statement made by 
Ward gives light : "By a pleasure or pain we mean 



PLEASURE AND PAIN. 135 

some assignable presentation or presentations which 
are pleasant, i. e., afford pleasure ; by pleasure simply 
is meant this subjective state of Feeling itself. The 
former, like other objects of knowledge, admit of 
classification and comparison. But, while the 
causes of Feeling are manifold, the Feeling itself is 
a subjective state, varying only in intensity and 
duration." (Ward's Article, Psychology, in Ency- 
clopedia Brit.) 

This is all true. We, then, while having many 
pleasures, have only one sense of Pleasure. On the 
Content side there are pleasures — on the Process 
side there is simply "Pleasure." This explains 
how it is, that though there is a sea of pleasures and 
a sea of pains, there is simply, on the Process side, 
Pleasure and Pain. Thus we reach a simplicity 
which is compatible with the idea that the Affective 
nature is simply Affective Interest. 

In the Dictionary of Psychology this definition is 
given: " Pleasure and Pain — an antithesis of quali- 
ties which characterize the Affective aspect of Con- 
sciousness." 

"The pain (1) which attaches to organic condi- 
tions has recently been distinguished somewhat 
sharply from (2) so-called unpleasantness, the 
former being considered, on the basis of considerable 
evidence, as a sensation, the latter as a more general 



136 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

affective character attaching with its antithesis, 
pleasantness, to the mental life in all its phases." 
Hence, our discussion really turns, as regards Ideal 
Feelings, upon the nature of Ideal Pleasure and 
Pain. 

Stout, in his Analytic Psychology, has this to say 
on this subject : " The antithesis between pleasure 
and pain is coincident with the antithesis between 
free and impeded progress toward an end ; the 
unimpeded progress is pleasant in proportion to the 
intensity and complexity of mental excitement. An 
activity which is thwarted or retarded, either by the 
presence of positive obstruction or by the absence of 
co-operative conditions, or in any other conceivable 
way, is painful in proportion to its intensity and 
complexity, and to the degree of the hindrance." 
(Anal. Psychology, Vol. II, page 270.) 

Now my line of argument here is this : Stout's 
position respecting pleasure and pain really means 
that they constitute the hedonic tone of Interest. 

Stout says : "We begin with that class of pains 
which is in any way due to being bored or dis- 
tracted. There are manifold ways in which this 
form of disagreeable Consciousness may arise ; but 
all have one point in common. The attention is in 
some way confined to comparatively indifferent or 
actually distasteful subjects, so as to suppress the 



stout's views. 137 

free flow of mental activity which tends in other 
directions." (Anal. Psychology, Yol. II, page 273.; 
But the attention is the outcome of Interest — the 
attention is but the mental activity — the impeded 
activity of Interest — it is to Interest and not to the 
attention that the pain belongs, which is caused 
when mental activity is impeded. 

Again, Stout says : "It is the arrest of mental 
activity, in the repressed tendency to pursue other 
lines of thought or action, which causes pain. 
(Same page.) 

But the mental activity is the outcome of spon- 
taneity, and belongs to that — the arrest of the ac- 
tivity is the arrest of this spontaneity — Interest ; 
hence the pain belongs to that, psychologically. 

"The pains we have so far discussed are due 
rather to competition than to conflict. They arise 
from attention being drawn simultaneously to dis- 
parate objects, rather than from any obstruction 
which it encounters in a given direction." (Page 
275.) That is, they arise from Interest " being- 
drawn simultaneously to disparate objects," and 
hence are subjective to Interest. 

" The pains of bereavement are easily referable to 
thwarted activity. The person taken from us has 
formed part of our life. So far as this is the case, 
his removal means the repression of our previous 



138 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

modes of thought and action. While the loss is 
recent, these 'preformed mental tendencies are stimu- 
lated by everything which can remind us of the 
deceased ; but they are stimulated only to be 
crushed." (Page 278.) 

But "these preformed mental tendencies," which 
are stimulated only to be crushed, and the crushing 
of which gives the pain of bereavement, mean sim- 
ply Interest. Hence it is the crushed Interest to 
which the pain attaches. 

Quotations might be multiplied, to show that 
Stout's view, that pleasure and pain are the result of 
unimpeded or impeded mental activity, really has 
reference to Interest of which this activity is the outcome. 

Arguments, from the position of other psychol- 
ogists, as to the Ideal Feelings might be given. 
But brevity requires that Baldwin's and Stout's 
views suffice. Their views substantiate the posi- 
tion that Ideal Feeling is Affective Interest. 



PERCEPTION AN APPERCEPTIVE PROCESS. 139 

As to the Affective Element of Sensation being Affective 
Interest. 

Having argued that Ideal Pleasure and Pain are 
the Affective tone of Interest we come to consider 
Sensation. 

The problems of Sensation are the battlefields of 
the centuries. One can well spend a lifetime 
studying the one problem of Sensation. Systems 
of Philosophy, as well as systems of Psychology 
receive their direction here. The uncertainties here 
are so great that I can hope but to point out some 
facts which narrow the special problem. 

(1) The present tendency is to make more and 
more of the cognitive life, Apperceptive. Stout by 
his noetic synthesis really makes perception an 
apperceptive process. Thus his definition of "noetic 
synthesis" is : "That union of presentational ele- 
ments which is involved in their reference to a 
single object." (Anal. Psychology, Vol. II, page 1.) 
"In almost every moment of our looking life an apper- 
ceptive process is taking place. Whenever an object 
is attended to the presentation of it is apperceived. 
These aspects of the presentation which are con- 
gruent with the apperceptive system acquire special 
significance. Others remain outside the sphere of 



140 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

the Attention process." (Anal. Psychology, Vol. II. 
page 113.) 

Other authors might be quoted to show that Per- 
ception is being more and more considered a pro- 
cess, not of mere association of percepts, but of 
Apperception. But, as has been seen from chapter 
II, Apperception is cognitive Interest, and therefore 
the Feeling accompanying Apperception is affective 
Interest. Thus, as the range of Apperception is 
extended into the domain of Perception, the range of 
that Feeling which has been shoivn to be affective 
Interest is widened. 

That part of sensational Feeling which does not 
enter into Perception remains for consideration. 
But there is none, so many psychologists hold, that 
does not enter into Perception. Hence, since all 
sensational Feeling is the subjective side of Appercep- 
tion (which is Cognitive Interest), it is Affective Interest. 

Hence it is seen that all Feeling is affective In- 
terest. And all Feelings are the output of affective 
Interest. 

Now, Wundt defines Feeling as the mode of reac- 
tion of Apperception upon Sensations, i. e., Feeling is 
Affective Interest. 

Kulpe says of this theory of Wundt' s, as to Feel- 
ing : " The hoinogenity of Feeling agrees excel- 
lently with the homogenity of Apperception ; and 



INTEREST AITEKCEIVES. 141 

the Feeling which accompanies a sensation in Con- 
sciousness may be conceived of as originating at 
once with its Apperception. All that this theory 
haves to be desired is a more exact determination of the 
substrate of the specific affective qualities. (Kulpe's 
Outlines of Psychology, pages 274-75.) 

Kulpe thus says that if this substrate of the Apper- 
ceptive process could be found, Wundt's theory that 
Feeling is the reaction of that substrate would be the 
best theory of Feeling. Now, Interest is this sub- 
strate of Apperception. Interest is that which apper- 
ceives, and hence the lack in Wundt's view is sup- 
plied and Feeling is seen to be affective Interest. 

Eoyce makes the same point that Kulpe makes 
against Wundt's Apperception : "Psychologists are 
interested," he says, "in a power whose influence 
upon mental phenomena seems to be of so ambigu- 
ous a character as that which the Wundtian 
Apperception possesses." (Royce's Outlines of Psy- 
chology, page 329.) But when Wundt's principle of 
Apperception is seen to be cognitive Interest the 
whole situation is simplified. 

Hence it is maintained that all Feelings and 
Emotions are the development of the affective side 
of Interest. 

Thus it is to be noticed that the aim of this chap- 
ter is, as is said in the first paragraph, to seek to 



142 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

establish what may be termed a working basis for 
the genetic consideration of the Feelings and of the 
Emotions. The thesis has been presented that the 
Feelings and the Emotions are the development of 
the Affective Strain in Interest, with, of course, in 
the case of the Emotions, intellectual elements 
involved. It has been thought best to give full con- 
sideration to this basic position. If this be true, 
the genetic study of the Feelings and of the 
Emotions must be found along this line. The fact of 
Instinctive Judgments is also to be considered in this 
connection. It is thought that the Instinctive Judg- 
ment is an explaining fact in the sphere of the Feelings 
and of the Emotions. Reference is therefore made to 
the whole treatment of Cognition in these chapters, 
especially to the views advanced upon Instantaneous 
Mental Recapitulation and upon the Instinctive 
Judgment. Also the whole position as to Interest- 
Moments, Judgment-Clusters and Judgment-Bursts 
comes in as regards the genetic explanation of the 
Feelings and of the Emotions, which is given in the 
next chapter. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

The Genetic Explanation of the Feelings and of the 

Emotions. 

Using the last chapter as the basis of work, the 
following Genetic Explanation of the Feelings and 
of the Emotions is given in mere outline. To 
attempt properly to work out this theory of the 
Genetic Development of the Feelings and of the 
Emotions, would require a volume. The position, 
therefore, is merely stated here, in order that future 
work may be attempted in this field. 

(1) The reader is requested to consider in this con- 
nection the chapters of this book which deal ivith The 
Instinctive Judgment {Chapters X, XI, XII.) 

(2) It is thought that The Instinctive Judgment is 
an explaining principle in the sphere the of Emotions 
and of the Feelings. 

(3) The vast complexity, especially of the Emo- 
tions, is so notable, that the greatest psychologists 
maintain that it is time wasted to attempt to classify 
them. There are such varieties of Feeling-Tinge, 
giving such complex emotional coloring, that the 



144 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

attempt to properly classify tlie Emotions is vain. 
But, as has been pointed out in another place, this com- 
plexity of Feeling -Tinge in any Emotion is just what 
should be, supposing that there are Instinctive Judg- 
ments and postulating that the explanation here given, 
of Cognition is correct. For the Emotion has de- 
veloped* by a series of Interest-Moments, each with 
its peculiar Feeling-Tinge being rapidly functioned 
through by Interest The Emotion stands fully 
developed only by such a process as this and hence, it 
must necessarily have the complexity which we find it to 
possess. 

It is thus by the complex Feeling -Tinge, a part of 
which is gathered in each separate Interest-Moment 
that the Emotion is constituted. Just as the bee carries 
pollen, which is a mixture from many flowers since it 
has sipped the siveet of each, so Affective Interest gath- 
ers its Feeling -Tinge by a combination from the tinge 
of each Interest-Moment through which it passes. 

(5) In the course of the development of Envy, let us 
say, Interest functions through many Interest-31oments. 
There are many Judgment-Bursts. In each Interest- 
Moment or Judgment-Burst there is a new Tinge of 
Feeling. Now when the passage is rapid and 
when the Judgment-Bursts are instinctive, they become 
so numerous in a single second as to give an Affective 



JAMES' THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS. 145 

Tinge of wonderful complexity. Thus, it is thought, 
the Emotions are developed. 

The theory of the Emotiom which James advanced 
in Psychology and which holds sway in psychological 
thought today, does not do justice to the facts of Mind 
at all. In no sense does the Emotion arise from 
the bodily expression. The bodily expression is but a 
reflex matter — a result from mentality on the physical. 
That which James and other thinkers seem to be 
striving after, in their insistence upon the inrush of 
bodily influences to account for the emotions, it is here 
held, is effected by the view of the Instinctive Judgment. 
There is an inrush, but it is all after Interest has been 
aroused, and hence, is all on the Mental side and it is 
an inrush that comes from the functioning processes of 
Interest ^ itself as it sips up the Feeling- Tinges of count- 
less Interest-Moments into a Single Tinge which we 
term an Emotion. 

(6) Perhaps the best method of presenting my 
views as to the genetic treatment of the Feelings and 
Emotions, may be given by the study of the devel- 
opment of a single Emotion. 

Suppose that in reading a book we come to a cer- 
tain paragraph which has in it a most affecting 
description. The paragraph which closes the page, 

10 



146 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

let us say, lias been of a distinctly ludicrous tone. 
We turn the leaf and now our eye catches the first 
word of the paragraph of which I speak, which is 
distinctly one which will engender, let us say, a sym- 
pathetic Emotion, by the time we read to the close of 
the paragraph. We have here then, an experimental 
opportunity to study the development of a sympa- 
thetic Emotion. As has been said, we knew nothing 
of the contents of this particular paragraph when 
we turned the page. The closing paragraph of the 
last page was, as has been said, distinctly ludicrous. 
Hence, here, in the space of one minute's reading, a 
sympathetic Emotion will be absolutely produced from 
its very inception. If we can discover how this 
single Emotion comes, Ave have insight into the 
development of the Emotions. 

Now, the page itself, as we turn it, stands forth 
as the page of a book because of certain Interest- 
Moments in which Instinctive Judgment-Bursts 
come to the flashing forth by Interest of the Judg- 
ment-Cluster, which we call a "page." In this case 
Interest-Moments, Judgment-Bursts and Judgment- 
Cluster are seemingly all bound up together. 
They can, however, be readily differentiated by 
analysis. They give, as is said, the "page." The 
same occurs with the first word our eye catches on 
that page. There is still this series of almost in- 



TRACING AN EMOTION'S GROWTH. 147 

stantaneous Interest-Moments, instinctive Judgment- 
Bursts and the resulting Judgment-Cluster which 
constitutes for us the meaning of that one word. 

Now, the above is the description of that which takes 
place, as word by ivord, we read the paragraph, spoken 
of Bat in each and every Interest- Moment, since 
Interest makes tJiat Interest-Moment and since Interest 
is affective as ivell as cognitive and conative, there is 
the Interest Feeling -Tinge. The Interest Feeling- 
Tinge in a particular Inter est- Moment may predomi- 
nate or may vary to all the extremes as regards the 
presence of much conation or cognition. 

Now to continue the reference to the particular 
paragraph, which we are supposed to be reading. 
The first sentence which is read, simply because the 
mental process pursues its onward way along the 
lines above indicated, may, in its totality, give little 
of a distinctly Feeling-Tinge. 

Interest here may be almost altogether cognitive, 
and in the primal instinctive Interest-Moments the 
cognitive element of Interest may predominate, and 
hence, as has been said, there may result, when the 
end of the first sentence of the paragraph of which 
we are speaking has been finished in our reading, no 
particular and distinctive Feeling-Tinge. But it is 
very probable that already the Feeling-Tinge has 
changed from the ludicrous which was ours a 



14:8 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

moment since as we read the preceding paragraph 
on the preceding page. The Interest-Moments of 
this first sentence have had their effect on our 
Feeling-Tinge already, and in fact may have given 
already the trend toward an Emotion we call Sym- 
pathetic. 

The second sentence is now read. There are the 
same kind of mental processes as in the case of the 
first sentence — the same wonderful and almost in- 
conceivable rapidity of the simplest operations, 
already described, go on. There are Interest- 
Moments, Judgment-Clusters (with their primal raw 
material of sensation [affective] ), and Judgment- 
Bursts which result in the beginning of Interest- 
Moments and the repetition of the same thing as 
before. In every one of these Judgment- Clusters there 
is flashed forth what has been termed Instinctive Co- 
efficient Judgments. Thus, this paragraph which we 
are reading may be descriptive of the sufferings of 
Columbus in his imprisonment. We reach the word 
"Columbus," and there are in the Judgment-Cluster, 
which constitutes the concept "Columbus," certain 
Instinctive Co-efficient Judgments which are the test 
of a thing remembered. Thus, it is repeated, the 
wonderful rapidity of these simple primal operations 
go on. On through the gates of each Interest- 
Moment, Interest flashes its way. Judgment-Clus- 



THE ORIGIN OF EMOTIONS. 149 

fcers are flashed forth — Judgment-Bursts come, and, 
through the gates of another Interest-Moment, In- 
terest passes on, gathering in each Interest-Moment 
a shade of Feeling-Tinge, until, now that the para- 
graph's close is reached, and the brief description of 
how Columbus suffered in his prison has been read, 
there is in our minds a well-developed sympathetic 
Emotion. 

This, it is thought, is a genetic explanation of the 
origin of any particular Emotion in our Mind at any 
time. 

It is also the genetic explanation of the origin of 
Emotions. 

Now, when it is remembered that our Interest 
may really take in several seconds of time, and that 
hence there is in the synthetic grasp of Interest 
complex systems of Judgment-Clusters, i. e., sys- 
tems of what are usually termed concepts, one can 
readily see how wonderful the complexity of the 
Emotions must be. 

Of course the proper explanation of this position, 
as regards the development of the Feelings and 
Emotions, would require critical consideration of all 
other theories and proper amplification of positions 
in this chapter which have, because of the necessi- 
ties of space, been compressed into a sentence or two. 



150 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

The author does not wish to be misunderstood as 
to his position. The positions advanced are the 
result of mature deliberation, but they cover so 
wide an extent that necessarily the proper opportu- 
nity to present arguments and proofs is not now at 
hand. A busy man, who has many duties upon 
him, may, perhaps be pardoned for merely stating, 
in brief outline, some of his thought. It is hoped 
that the opportunity may be found to take up the 
views here presented as to the genetic development 
of the Feelings and of the Emotions, and to give 
them proper support in critical examination and 
discussion of other positions and in presentation of 
arguments and illustrations. 



CHAPTER XV. 
The Principle of Interest is the Psychological Ego. 

(This thesis is one of my earliest positions as 
regards Interest. During the spring and summer of 
1904 it was worked upon, and much material was 
gathered for a very much fuller presentation than 
that contained here. In order, however, that a 
glance may be given at Interest Philosophy, in the 
latter part of this work, the treatment of this subject 
is abridged. 

This thesis is contained in my paper at the Hop- 
kins, and several paragraphs of this chapter are 
taken therefrom. 

Strict Psychology, of course, asks only after the 
Psychological Ego. The question of the Pure Ego, 
or of the Soul is for the domain of Philosophy. 
In the Philosophical section of this volume the 
Philosophy of Interest itself is taken up. Just as 
Consciousness itself has not the capacity in and of 
itself to originate, so the very Spontaneity of In- 
terest must depend on something deeper.) 



152 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

JAMES' POSITION. 
(a) Argument from James' Teachings as to the Self. 

" The Empirical Self of each of us is all that lie 
is tempted to call by the name of ME. — In the 
widest possible sense a man's self is the sum total 
of all that he can call his." (James' Psychology, 
Vol. I, page 291.) 

In his Chapter on "The Consciousness of Self," 
James argues at length that the Self is one's Inter- 
ests. Thus things in which one is supremely inter- 
ested in one's Self or various Selves, according to 
James. 

But if the Self is identical with one's Interests. 
the Psychological Ego which builds up the Self or 
Me is necessarily the Principle of Interest. It is 
only by Interest attaching itself to an object that 
that object becomes "an Interest." Now, if these 
Interests constitute the Me, the Psychological Ego, 
which is the Psychological Subject as regards this 
"Me," is the Principle of Interest. 

(b) Argument from James' view that the Passing 
Thought is the Thinker, or Psychological Ego. 

James holds that, psychologically, " the passing 
Thought is the Thinker." 



JAMES' POSITION. 153 

"For liow would it be if the Thought, the present 
Judging Thought, instead of being in any way sub- 
stantially or transcendentally identical with the 
former owner of the past Self, merely inherited his 
title and thus stood as his legal representative now ? 
It would then, if its birth coincided exactly with the 
death of another owner, find the last Self already its 
own as soon as it found it at all, and the past Self 
would never be wild, but always owned by a title 
that never lapsed. We can imagine a long success- 
ion of herdsmen coming rapidly into possession of 
the same cattle by transmission of an original title 
by bequest. May not the title of a collective Self be 
passed from one Thought to another in some analogous 
way ? 

" It is a patent fact of Consciousness that a trans- 
mission like this actually occurs. Each pulse of 
Cognitive Consciousness, each Thought, dies away 
and is replaced by another. It is, as Kant says, as 
if electric balls were to have not only motion but 
knowledge of it, and a first ball were to transmit 
both its motion and its consciousness to a second, 
which took both up into its consciousness and 
passed them to a third, until the last ball held all 
that the other balls had, and realized it as its own." 
(James' Psychology, Vol. I, page 339.) 



154 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

Now, as against James : 

(1) James does not make it absolutely clear 
whether the "Passing Thought" is on the Process 
or on the Content side of Consciousness. It would 
seem, however, that this "Passing Thought" stands 
in his estimation, on what we would call the Content 
side of Consciousness, for he speaks of the title of a 
collective Self being passed from One Thought to 
another. If it be meant that this "Passing 
Thought " is on the Content side, his position is 
plainly wrong, for Content cannot of itself and by 
itself generate Content. 

(2) If he means by the "Passing Thought" the 
Passing Thinking, the criticism is that to make this 
the Psychological Subject or the Ego is to leave out 
of the question all reference to the Spontaneity of 
Feeling and of Conation. It is to commit, on the 
side of Cognition, the same error which so many 
have committed as regards Conation — i. e., to make 
one expression of the Psychological Ego, the Psy- 
chological Ego itself. 

(3) Supposing the question of the Soul to be re- 
ferred to Philosophy where it properly belongs, 
there is nothing which Psychology can find as the 
Thinker save the Principal of Interest. It fulfills 
all the conditions which James lays down. The 
Present Interest' which a mind has is heir to the 



BIOLOGIC AX EXPLANATIONS FAIL. 155 

Past. It will bequeath its possessions by means of 
what Stout calls "Mental Dispositions " to the In- 
terest of the next moment. This Interest has the 
appropriating power of which James speaks. It is 
not a mere Thought on the Content side of Con- 
sciousness. It belongs to the Process side. It is 
in its nature, as has been seen, Conative, Affective 
and Cognitive and hence meets the conditions cf the 
Psychological Ego. 

(c) The view of many Psychologists as to the Psycho- 
logical Ego is that it is Conative. 

It would seem that biological explanation of Psy- 
chology has been carried much too far. Twenty 
years since Life was explained in terms of Matter. 
Today Mind is being explained in terms of mere 
biological Life. The question is raised whether, 
after all, just as the attempt to explain Life from a 
materialistic standpoint has failed, the view that 
Mind is to be interpreted biologically will not also 
pass. The fundamental laic may be posited that all 
biological explanations affect merely the conditions of 
the Mind's activities. This biological fact or that is 
nothing more than a stimulus to arouse Mind. 
Mind in its entity does not stand, in any of these biolog- 
ical facts lohiclt are so much insisted upon. James' 



156 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

theory of the Emotions, for instance, deals with 
the inrushing tide of stimulations from the body. 
But the Emotions are not in the body or a part of 
the body. The inrushing mass of stimulation from 
bodily processes can do no more than arouse 
Interest and after that has been touched the Emotions 
themselves are born. Because of this trend of the 
times to explain Mind from a biological point of 
view it has been very ea.sy to make Conation (striv- 
ing) the fundamental feature of Mind. The proto- 
plasm and the animal strives after food, etc., and 
hence it is thought that all higher mentality must 
be described in terms of this striving. It has been 
forgotten that in man the physical striving comes 
after a mental image {Cognition) has given the idea of 
striving and that therefore there is Cognition inter- 
mingled with all mental striving. So, as is pointed 
out at length in the Chapter on The Fallacies of 
Conation, many authorities posit Conation as the 
fundamental fact in Psychology. 

Hence the supposition that the Psychological Ego 
is mere Conation — that it is mere striving with Cog- 
nition and Feeling afterwards worked in, is not an 
uncommon one among our psychological authorities. 
Moreover, many think that the point of transition 
from mere life reflexes to mentality is seen in Cona- 
tion or striving and that, if it cannot be shown that 



11EFLEXES AND MENTALITY. 157 

Matter passes gradually into Life, it can, at least, be 
shown that mere Life passes gradually into Mentality. 
Against this view, these Chapters insist that with all 
mental striving there is at least inchoate Cognition — 
that Interest is the Basic Principle, and that for mere 
Life to develop into Mind it must be shoivn how mere 
reflexes develop into Interest It is not said this can- 
not be shown, but it is held that the indications seem 
to be that, just as fuller discussion has caused admission 
that Evolution has a break betioeen Blatter and Life, so 
fuller investigation of the nature of even rudimentary 
Interest will show another break in Evolution's chain, 
i. e., between the mere reflexes of biological Life and 
Mind. 

Hence, it is maintained that the very common 
view that Conation is the Psychological Ego is in- 
correct. One expression of the Psychological Ego, 
the Willing expression, is taken to be the whole of 
the Psychological Ego. This is plainly fallacious. 

(d) Argument from Bradley's Position as to the Psycho= 
logical Ego. 

It can be readily seen that Bradley's view is that 
the Self is identical with our Interests. Thus he 
says : "We may say, generally, the Self here is that 
in which it feels its chief Interest. For this is both 



158 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

indivisible from and prominent in its inmost being." 
(Bradley's Appearance and Reality, page 96.) 

But the argument used in the consideration of 
James' position applies here also. If the Psycho- 
logical Self be our Interests, the Psychological Ego 
must be the Principle of Interest which builds up 
these Interests. 

Yet Bradley's search for what he calls the essen- 
tial Self (by which he can only mean the Psycho- 
logical Ego) is vain. 

He says : "But this inner nucleus is not separated 
from the average Self of the man by any line that 
can be drawn." (Appearance and Reality, page 81.) 
My point, however, is that there is a distinct separa- 
tion between the Psychological Ego and its Content. 

Moreover, Bradlej^, in approaching the problem of 
the Psychological Ego from the point of view of 
Subject and Object, finds the relations of Subject 
and Object one he cannot explain and hence he finds 
no light as to the Psychological Ego here. He 
maintains that Subject and Object have contents and 
are actual psychical groups (page 89.) His view is 
that anything in the psychic mass may pass over to- 
become Subject or may be Object, and that Subject 
and Object arise merely by the shifting of the 
psychic mass. (Appearance and Reality, pages 92- 
93.) It would seem that Bradley leaves out of 



bkadley's views. 159 

question all reference to that which produces the 
"psychic mass." The view here is that everything 
turns on just what Bradley leaves out of view — that 
this "psychic mass" is the product of the Physio- 
logical Ego and that, however, much of mere 
"Appearance," according to Bradley's view, there 
may be about the "psychic mass" itself, the Inter- 
est which produces it, is a Reality, and the Basic 
Reality for Philosophy. 

Again, Bradley says : " The question is whether 
we can state the existence and continuity of a real 
Self in a way which is not ruined by the difficulties 
of previous discussions." (Appearance and Reality, 
page 113.) 

It is thought that the view given here, in con- 
nection with the whole treatment of Interest in these 
pages, meets Bradley's demands. Positing Interest 
as the Psychological Ego explains the mass of facts 
and answers the question as to what the Psycho- 
logical Ego or Subject is, and answers this question 
in so simple a way that a child may understand. 
This matter of simplicity is important, for when- 
ever, in dealing with psychological or philosophical 
problems, plain and simple statements cannot be 
made, it means that we are in the domain of fog 
and not of true science. 



160 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

(e) Argument from Royce's Views as to the Psycho- 
logical Ego. 

Eojce really stands with James and Bradley in 
identifying the Self with one's Interests. Thus 
Eoyce says : 

"By a man's Self you mean a certain totality of 
facts, viewed as more or less immediately given and 
distinguished from the rest of the world of Being. 
There facts may be predominantly corporeal facts, 
such as the man himself and also his neighbors may 
observe and comment upon. In this sense my coun- 
tenance and my physical deeds, my body and my 
clothing — all these may be regarded as more or less 
a part of myself." (Boyce's The World and the 
Individual, page 257.) 

Again he says : "There is the equally empirical 
and phenomenal self of the inner life, the series of 
states of Consciousness and the feelings, thoughts, 
desires, memories, emotions, moods." (The World 
and the Individual, page 257.) 

Hence it is seen that really to Eoyce also one's 
Interests constitute one's Self. 

But as to the problem of the Pyschological Ego, 
Eoyce is also far afield. He says : "No purely 
rational principle guides us in defining the Self 



THE EGO IS NOT THE IDEA OF THE EGO. 161 

from moment to moment in the world of common 
sense or in distinguishing it from not-Self. But 
there still does remain one psychological principle 
running through all these countless facts and 
explaining in genera] both why they vary, and why 
we always suppose, despite the chaos of experience, 
that the Self of our inner and entire life preserves 
a genuine although to us a hidden unity." (The 
World and the Individual, 260.) 

"This psychological principle is the single one 
that in us men the distinction between self and not- 
self has a predominantly social origin and implies a 
more or less obviously present contrast between 
what we at any moment view as the life of another 
person, a fellow being, or as what you may for a 
short time in general call "him," an alter, and the 
life which by contrast with that of the alter is just 
then viewed as the life of the Present Ego." (The 
World and the Individual, 260.) 

Now, the play between the Ego and the Alter may 
give the idea of self, i. e., Self-Consciousness. This 
Self-Consciousness means Interest in Self. But the 
idea of Self and the Self-Principle — the Psychologi- 
cal Ego — are very different things. A man who 
never saw another, and who, hence, never had an 
opportunity to obtain an idea of Self, would still 
11 



162 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

have a Psychological Ego, and the question Royce 
is on is as to the nature of this Ego. Hence he is 
greatly afield in giving Dr. Baldwin's explanation of 
society as the explanation of the Ego. The situa- 
tion as regards Royce is just this — he starts out to 
consider the Ego, but really considers the idea of the 
Ego ivliicli one lias. 

Our question is not how my idea of myself devel- 
oped, but what the Psychological Ego is, and Royce 
does not touch this point. 

No idea of Self gathered from others gives a unity 
to a Mind. This unity is given by the Physhological 
Ego, and this must be the Principle of Interest. 

(f) Ward's Views as to the Psychological Ego. 

Ward's view is that the dualism of Subject and 
Object must not be investigated. He says : " We 
start then with this duality of Subject and Object in 
the unity of experience. What a Subject without an 
Object or what an Object without a Subject would 
be, is, indeed, as we are often told, unknowable ; 
for, in truth, the knowledge of either apart is a con- 
tradiction. It is their unity that especially interests 
us, for we look to this to free us from the perplexi- 
ties of dualism." (Ward's Agnosticism and Nat- 
uralism, page 119.) 



AKGUMENT FROM WARD'S VIEWS. 163 

Now, his arguments in this passage just quoted 
for the absolute inseparability of Subject and Object, 
even as regards scientific consideration, are two. 
To the first argument, that one without the other 
is unknowable, the test of fact has to be applied, 
and when it is applied, it seems that it is readily 
seen that the Psychological Subject is Interest, and 
the Object is, or tends to be, Interests. 

Ward's second argument is, that because the Sub- 
ject and Object are inseparable we are saved from 
the dualism of Mind and Matter. But, however 
much the good may be that an error accomplishes, 
that good does not cause the error to become truth. 
So let us suppose that by positing the insepara- 
bility of Subject and Object we are freed from 
dualism. The question still stands open as to the 
justice of such a declaration that Subject and Object 
must not be considered apart. 

Again Ward says : "We infer that the distinction 
between Subject and Object is not given in our 
earliest sensation. The sensation felt is all that the 
infant at first is conscious of ; it tastes before it 
perceives the cause of the taste ; there is no dis- 
tinction of Subject and Object, of the Ego and the 
Non-Ego." (Page 224.) 

This is very true. But because the bee does not 
distinguish itself from the flower upon which it 



164 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

rests, are we to say that the bee and the flower 
must not be distinguished by Science? The ques- 
tion of the Psychological Ego is not as to when that 
Ego distinguishes itself from the Non-Ego, but as 
to what principle of the Mind constitutes this Ego. 

Ward, continuing this same subject, says : "You 
cannot dismember percepient and percept, individual 
Subject and concrete Object, into two distinct and 
separate things — the attempt leaves us with an 
indeterminate X on the one side, which we have no 
right to call a Subject, and on the other an indeter- 
minate X which has as little claim to be called an 
Object." (Ward's Agnosticism and Naturalism, 
page 198.) 

Here then is a spot where the investigator's foot 
must not tread. Ask questions concerning all 
things else, but Subject and Object must ever be 
studied as a union ! As to what they are, indi- 
vidually, you must not ask ! And why this caution ? 
Why is this ground sacred ? This answer comes 
back : The attempt (i. <?., to study them apart) 
leaves us with an indeterminate X on either side. 
This position means simply that one is not to 
attempt to study them apart, for if he makes the 
attempt, he will fail. But Science is not accustomed 
to decide, because there has been failure along a 
certain line in the past, that effort must cease. It 



THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. 165 

seems that when we posit Interest as the Psycho- 
logical Subject or Ego, having already, from several 
authorities, learned that Interests constitute the 
Psychological Self, we have, so far as Psychology is 
concerned, the solution of the problem. 

Hence, against all the great School of Empirical 
Psychologists who maintain that a Subject in Psy- 
chology cannot be found or that a Subject is unnec- 
essary, it is insisted that here, in the Principle of 
Interest, we have a Psychological Subject. It may 
be stated, in this connection, that this has bearing on 
our ideas of the Subject of all. The view held by 
many thinkers today that since there is no Subject 
in Psychology, the idea of Causation is essentially 
wrong, is seen to have no support. There is a Sub- 
ject in Psychology, and hence our concept of Causa- 
tion is correct, and we have firm ground beneath our 
feet when we ask as to the Subject of things — as to 
even the first cause of things. It is also seen that 
the usual view that there is something which pro- 
duces things is psychologically correct. In Psy- 
chology itself, it is the Principle of Interest which 
produces the Mental Object. Since we here find 
justification for our inquiry as to what it is which, 
psychologically considered, produces the Mental Ob- 
ject, we are absolutely within the scientific field when 
the problem of what produces Mind and Matter is 



166 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

taken up. Science cannot rale this question out of 
Court simply because the answer may not be forth- 
coming. To thus find the psychological Subject, and 
to find it producing Mental Objects, stamps, as abso- 
lutely scientific, the pursuit of the question as to the 
Subject of all. If we cannot in this pursuit find that 
which is absolutely and clearly the answer, the scien- 
tific spirit insists that we build our best hypothesis. 
This question as to the best hypothesis of causation 
being forced upon us by rigid Science itself we have 
to examine all hypotheses. Among these hypotheses 
is that which the Church holds of Creation by an 
Omnipotent Beiug. Scientifically, this hypothesis 
must be examined, and if it seems the most reason- 
able — the one most capable of defense, the scientific 
spirit will impel scientific thinkers to accept it as 
Science. Great hypotheses which yet lack absolute 
verification stand as scientific truth in Physics, Bi- 
ology, Astronomy, Botany, Geology, Psychology, 
etc., etc. 

It would seem that we are in danger in this day 
of having Science neglect even to consider the 
explaining hypotheses which the Church has, while 
the Church neglects to consider the explaining 
hypothesis which Science has. Truth is Truth, 
whether Science or the Church holds it. 



THE SUBJECT OF ALL. 167 

Scientific Philosophy has to ask after the Subject 
of all, for we find, as has been said, that which in 
Psychology shows itself as the Subject. Now, if, 
after all things have been considered, if after all the 
facts that can be reviewed have been reviewed and in 
it all one keeps himself honest and holds no brief for 
either side, one comes to a matured conviction that 
the best and most truthful view which can be held is 
that which the Church holds — that of a Being as 
the Subject of all, who is Omnipotent, it is here 
maintained that that conviction has been reached in 
a scientific way. 



CHAPTER XVI. 

Interest in Other Individuals is the Basic Prin= 
ciple of Social Psychology. 

(The following paper, in which Rousseau's Social 
Contract was reviewed, is part of the paper read 
in the Hopkins Psychological Seminary in May of 
1904, as the completion of my year's work in Social 
Psychology. 

In the discussion which followed the reading of 
the paper, the point was raised that Rousseau's 
Interest here was but Self-interest. My reply was 
that that criticism struck the weak point of my 
paper, but that if the criticism was a correct one, 
and if Rousseau's Interest, which he made the cause 
of the Social Contract or Society were mere Self- 
interest, a distinctly new thesis position was left me, 
in the view that Psychological Interest in Individ- 
uals is the Basic Principle in Social Psychology. 

A careful examination of this paper will, I think, 
convince one that Rousseau is speaking of Self- 
interest when he makes Interest the socializing 
force. 



VOLITION DOES NOT SOCIALIZE. 169 

Hence, my position at the head of this Chapter 
stands as a thesis position.) 

While Bosanquet stands with Rousseau in main- 
taining a General Will, he forsakes the Social Con- 
tract view of the origin of that Will. 

The book in which de Greef insists upon Con- 
tract as the explanation of Society, is not in any of 
the Baltimore libraries. Barth, however, in his 
Sociology as the Philosophy of History, gives a 
brief statement of de Greef's position. 

The Contract idea to him is the idea of volition. 
He maintains that the socializing power is the vol- 
untary act. Barth says however, that de Greef 
has this idea only in the germ, giving little attention 
to it. It is not necessary, however, to give special 
attention to de Greef's view, since it is not com- 
prehensive enough, as an explanation of sociality, for 
it leaves out of view the whole field of instinctive 
sociality. 

However, it is plain, that men who never knew 
each other cannot upon their first meeting become 
socialized or develop a general Will merely by will- 
ing to do so. By willing to be social they would 
have Rousseau's will of all, but not Rousseau's 
General Will. 



170 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

Hence, having glanced at Bosanquet's and de 
Greef's explanation of the development of the Gen- 
eral Will or of Society, and finding them unsatis- 
factory, we turn to Eousseau. 

As has been stated, Rousseau's explanation of the 
General Will, is the Social Contract.- The logical 
order of his great themes is this : 

(1) The state of Nature. 

(2) The Social Contract. 

(3) The Social Contract produces the General 
Will. 

(4) Sovereignty, which is the exercise of the 
General Will. 

(5) Government — the agent of the General Will — 
the means by which the sovereignty of the General 
Will operates. 

Certainly one reason why Rousseau employed the 
idea of a Contract as the solution of the General 
Will was, that it was an idea current in literature — 
it was a kind of ready-made explanation that 
especially suited his views as to government, and he 
was far more interested in giving an explanation of 
government than of the General Will. If govern- 
ment depended upon a Contract, those who wrote 
the Contract, could abrogate it. The theory of gov- 
ernment and of sovereignty which he gave, was 
all tilings considered, the most powerful factor in 



THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. 171 

superinducing and continuing the French Revolution. 
Hence, since this explanation of the General Will in 
terms of the Social Contract looked really to a 
Theory of the State we must not look for a scientific 
formulation as regards the Social Contract. 

To Hobbes the Contract was an act of surrender 
on the part of the many to one or to a number — to 
Rousseau it was an act of association among equals 
who remained equals, and this constituted Civil 
Society. 

It has been seen that Rousseau makes the Social 
Contract the explanation of Society or the General 
Will. But what does he make the Explanation of 
the Social Contract? This, after all, is the funda- 
mental question, for the Social Contract is but a fic- 
tion and hence, the question as to what he makes 
the cause of the Social Contract, is really a ques- 
tion as to ivhat he makes fundamental to the General 
Will. This question, which I now take up, none of 
the commentators of Rousseau so much as raise. 
True, Bosanquet, in one division, does glance at the 
point, but he does not bring out the logical relations 
of Rousseau's position. 

Morley sees nothing worth considering in the 
General Will, and, of course, he does not bother 
about what Rousseau may have held as the expla- 
nation of the Social Contract. 



172 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

Now the point I wish to make is that Rousseau 
showed his genius not simply, as Bosanquet main- 
tains, by grasping the fact of a General Will — there 
is intuitive genius in that — but also by giving an 
explanation of the Social Contract, and hence of 
society also, which should cause him to be classed 
with those who have sought psychological explana- 
tion of Society. His explanation of the Social 
Contract, i, e., of Society, is so simple and common- 
place, that one is certain to overlook it unless, be- 
cause of special reasons, his attention is drawn to 
it. Because for a long time I have been interested 
in the subject of Interest, my attention was drawn 
to what is Rousseau's explanation of the Social Con- 
tract. In a word, his position, which can hardly be 
called his position, since he does not emphasize it 
or in any sense show that he realizes that he is doing 
more than dealing in hackneyed facts, is this : In- 
terest lies at the base of the Social Contract, which 
means, since he makes the Social Contract the cause 
of the General Will, that Interest is the socializing 
Cause. 

I have made this statement only after a careful 
examination of Rousseau's statements. In order 
for me to substantiate it, it will be necessary to 
quote a number of passages. 



INTEREST SOCIALIZES. 173 

" If scattered individuals are necessarily enslaved 
by a single man, in whatever number it may be, I 
see in it only a people and its chief ; it is, if you 
please, an aggregation, but not an association (i. e., 
not society), there is neither public propert}^ UO r 
political body. This man, had he enslaved half the 
world, would still be an individual ; his Interest 
separated from that of others, is always a private 
Interest. Should this man die, his empire would 
remain after him, scattered and without union." 
(Social Contract, Book I, chap. 5.) 

Here the reason why this aggregation is not 
socialized is, Rousseau says : " That the ruler's 
Interest is a private Interest." 

"As soon as this multitude is thus united, (i. e., 
by the Social Contract into a body), one of the 
members cannot be injured without attacking the 
body, and still less can the body be injured without 
the members feeling its effects. Thus Duty and 
Interest alike oblige the two contracting parties to 
mutually aid each other." (Book I, Chapter 7, 
page 4) 

"In fact each individual can, as man, have an 
individual Will contrary to or different from the 
General Will which he has as a citizen : his indi- 
vidual Interest may speak quite differently from the 
Common Interest." (Book I, Chapter 7, page 7.) 



174 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

That is, the Common Interest produces the General 
Will. 

"There is often a great difference between the 
Will of all and the General Will : one regards the 
common Interest only ; the other regards private 
Interests." (Book II, Chapter 3, page 2.) 

"Why is the General Will always right and why 
do all desire constantly the happiness of each, 
unless it is because there is no person who does not 
appropriate to himself the word each, and who does 
not think of himself ivhile voting for all? Which 
proves that equality of rights and the notion of 
justice produced by it, comes from the preference 
each gives to himself and consequently from the nature 
of man. (Books II, 4, 6.) Here is Interest. 

There are several passages in which Rousseau 
describes the destruction of the General Will. 
"But when the social knot begins to relax and the 
state to weaken, when individual Interests com- 
mence to be felt, and small societies to influence 
the great, the Common Interest changes and finds 
opponents — the General Will is no longer the Will 
of all." 

"Finally when the state, near its fall, exists only 
by a vain and illusory form ; when the social tie is 
broken in all hearts, when the vilest Interests flaunt 
boldly in the name of public welfare, then the Gen- 



NO SOCIETY WITHOUT INTEREST. 175 

eral Will becomes silent * * * Iniquitous decrees 
are passed falsely under the name of law, which 
have for their object, individual Interests only * * * 
Each in detaching his own Interest from the Com- 
mon Interest sees that he cannot separate it entirely 
- * * This particular good excepted, he desires 
the general well-being for his own Interest as 
strongly as any other." (Book 4, 1, 6.) 

There are two passages which of themselves 
would suffice to show that Rousseau naturally 
turned to Interest as the explanation of Society. 

"The citizens having but one Interest, the people 
but one Will." (Book 4, 2, 3.) 

" Only the General Will can direct the forces of 
the state according to the object of its establishment, 
which is the common good ; for if the opposition of 
individual Interests had rendered the establishment 
of societies necessary, it is the accord of these same 
Interests which has rendered it possible. It is what 
is Gommon in their different Interests which forms the 
the Social Tie; and if they were not in accord, no 
Society could exist." (Book 2, 1, 1.) 

It would seem that Rousseau's position can be 
worked into a complete description of socialization 
with Dr. Baldwin's position as a part of that whole. 

(1) The material that is socialized is thoughts. 
(Baldwin.) 



176 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

(2) The method of association is the "self- 
thought " situation — Imitative and Invention being 
the ways in which the "self-thought" situation is 
worked out. (Baldwin.) 

(3) Then comes in Rousseau's position that In- 
terest is the socializing force which causes Imitation 
and Invention, produces the "self-thought" situa- 
tion and makes Society. 

(The question as to Rousseau's meaning when he 
uses Interest stands open for consideration. If, as 
has been said, he means only Self-interest, I have a 
clear field for the thesis that Psychological Interest 
in Others is the Basic Explaining Principle in 
Social Psychology.) 



CHAPTER XVII. 

Interest, the Basic Principle of Psychology, is, by 

its own Nature, the Basic Principle of 

the Philosophies. 

The "I " (the question of what this "I" is in its 
essential nature, is considered in the last chapter of 
this book,) and the "me" or the "self" are, accord- 
ing to the view herein presented, the Principle of 
Interest on the one hand and one's Interests on the 
other. James has a long chapter on one's Interests 
being one self, i. e., the me. 

Now when we come to examine this me (our In- 
terests) we find that it is, in a sense, identical with 
the Mental Object 

Suppose a man had never had a single glint of 
the idea that he has a physical body. Would he, in 
his "me" or "self," whatever else of content he 
had there, have the idea that the body entered into 
the "me" as part of it? The answer is plainly 
negative. Never having had, as a Mental Object, 
the thought of his body, his " me " or " self " would 
contain no thought of a body. 
12 



178 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

But let a man's only Mental Object, i. e., his 
subject of constant thought, be his body and his 
body becomes the whole of the "me" or "self," 
for him. If, on the other hand, God be made the 
single Mental Object — the one Interest to which one's 
Principle of Interest clings — God has become to this 
man his "me" or " self." 

(It is stated in the preface that the view is held 
that Psychology looked at, as in these papers, finds 
striking agreement with the Psychology of Paul and 
of Christ. This thesis has not been fully developed 
and is not now presented. But here it may be said 
that the New Birth of the Bible affects this "me" 
or "self" — i, e., affects the Interests which consti- 
tute the "me." The individual's Interests are 
changed in the hour of the New Birth, however men 
may explain it. But to change his Interests is to 
change the "me" — the "self." Hence here is a 
New Birth. According to this view a man's Mental 
Objects after the New Birth must be different, for 
these constitute the self. But the New Testament 
insists on this very point — that the test of the New 
Birth is heavenly-mindedness — i, e., new and better 
Mental Objects. 

But the view of these papers is that the Mental 
Object is the product of Interest. Hence to change 
the trend of Mental Objects, to revolutionize their 



INTEREST IS THE NEXUS OF SCIENCES. 179 

character, means that the Principle of Interest itself 
is affected in the New Birth. This point is here 
inserted in order that it may be insisted that New 
Testament Psychology may be thought over from 
this standpoint.) 

But the point which I wish to make is this, that 
the Sciences and Philosophies have their centre in 
the Principle of Interest. 

The Principle of Interest stands as the Nexus of 
the Sciences and of the Philosophies. The three Great 
Concepts, Matter, Man (all Life) and God, are in 
themselves and in their ramifications the Basic Con- 
cepts of the Sciences and of the Philosophies. Yet 
even in the Sciences, Interest stands in the midst. 
There is a Science of geology, not merely because 
there is an earth, but also because there are the two 
concepts, Interest and the earth. The side of Con- 
sciousness (Interest) is usually presupposed as 
regards the Sciences, but it is none the less true that 
one of the two basic concepts in geology is Interest. 
Let mind be different from what it is and the Science 
of geology would be different. 

All that the Science of electricity can give is this, 
Interest in its relation to electricity. There may 
be ranges of electrical fact which Human Interest 
(knowledge) cannot reach after; if so, they are 



180 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

beyond the bounds of this Science. This is true 
also of all the Sciences. The limits of the possibil- 
ities of a Science may lie either on the side of the 
basic concept Interest, or on the side of the basic 
concept which distinguishes this particular Science 
from other Sciences. 

There may be either no possibilities of Interest to 
reach after all the possibilites of electricity, or on 
the other hand, no possibilities of electricity for all 
the possibilities of Interest to reach after. 

The Principle of Interest stands as the centre, not 
only of the Sciences, but also of the Philosophies. 

(1) There is the Philosophy of Matter. The 
basic explaining Principle here is Interest — not be- 
cause it is maintained that Interest is a part of 
Matter, or because it is held Interest dwells in rocks 
and mountains, etc., but because the only approach 
man has to Matter is through Interest. All that is 
known of Matter is what Interest's (the Mind's) 
interpreting power gives us. 

It is held that the Philosophy of Matter must be 
written with the understanding that one of the 
basic explaining Principles of Matter, so far as we 
know, is Interest. For Interest might have turned 
to vibrations of the ether lower than those we have 
in the solar spectrum, and thus all our color world 
would have been entirely different. Could not Inter- 



DsTEKEST IS THE NEXUS OF PHILOSOPHIES. 181 

est have fixed itself upon something in that sphere 
we call Matter, which it has never been attached to, 
and so has never made into a Keality ? And if this 
be possible, as it is, why may it not have been pos- 
sible for the whole of Interest to have fixed itself 
upon something absolutely different from all that we 
now call Matter, and then our Sciences of Matter 
would be entirely different. The bird, Interest, has 
winged its way through the great void — that which 
it has seen and felt, it has called Reality or Matter. 
But its way could have been winged along another 
route, and that it saw and felt would have been a 
world entirely different from our so-called world of 
Reality. Hence it is maintained that the very 
Philosophies of Matter must posit Interest as an 
explaining Principle. 

(2) There are the Philosophies which deal with 
man. Here, too, the basic explaining Principle 
is Interest. Interest in the Man, I e., Interest in 
Others, has rendered possible all Sciences apper- 
taining to Society. 

Hence the Philosophies of the Sciences respect- 
ing Man must start with Interest as the Basic Prin- 
ciple, adding in each case the Concept, which is the 
fundamental one of the particular Science. Thus the 



182 ANALYTIC INTEEEST PSYCHOLOGY. 

Philosophy of Social Psychology finds its basic 
explaining Principle to be Interest in Others. 

(3) There are the Philosophies which deal with 
Divinity. Here, too, it is held Interest in its rela- 
tionship to Divinity mast be studied. 

It is not held that matter is not a Reality, but it 
is thought that Psychological Idealism is true. 
Therefore the question is raised whether there is 
not just this same mediate knowledge of what is 
termed "Spiritual Realities." 

•The view herein presented is that the Mind (In- 
terest) is not a mere heavy-footed plodder, tied by 
its own weight to the material and bound by its own 
nature to the mere bodily and earthly, dependent 
upon materialistic, physical and biological explana- 
tions for the secret of its activities ; but that it is a 
light-winged bird of incomparable rapidity of flight 
which has senses for the material, it is true. But 
may it not have senses for regions higher — regions 
which we call eternal ? 

Because the Philosophies find in Human Interest 
their common basic Principle, Philosophy finds its 
synthetic point in Interest, and we have naturally 
Synthetic Interest Philosophy. 



CHAPTER XVIII. 
Problems Concerning the Principle of Interest. 

(Read in the Hopkins Psychological Seminary, 
November 29, 1904.) 

Sixteen years ago I faced one of the greatest 
problems concerning Interest I think I ever faced. 
This problem was how I, as a public speaker, could 
cause my hearers to become interested in what I said, 
and that problem lives with me today. 

The second problem concerning Interest which I 
faced all these years is this : How to interest men, 
in order to manage men. 

The third problem concerning Interest which I 
faced was this : How to place Interest as fundamen- 
tally in Psychology, as I knew it to be in practical 
Life, and how to do this scientifically. The thesis 
that Interest is "The Mental Dynamic or Law of 
Physic Progressions Determining the Construction of 
Every Mental Object,'" was my endeavor to answer 
this problem. 

My fourth problem respecting Interest was what 
Interest was, if it determined Mental Objects. 

With Interest right up against the Mental Object, 
as was the case, in the view that Interest was the 



184 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

Mental Dynamic, this great problem as to what 
Interest was, I faced in my thinking. 

So I hit upon the view that Interest is the Nexus 
of the Mind, holding all together, and that Interest 
is the Psychological Ego. But the question I ever 
carried with me was as to how Interest could deter- 
mine Mental Objects, if it were only Conative, or if 
it were only Conative and Affective. So, I came to 
see, as I think, that Interest is Cognitive also. 

I reached, also, the view that Interest is the 
Apperceiving Principle, and then, that Interest and 
Consciousness are identical. 

Now as to whether Interest is Cognitive : 

(1) To suppose that Interest, defined as affect- 
ive — conative process, can deal directly with Mental 
Objects, involves, to my mind, a fallacy. It is estab- 
lished, as certainly as anything in all Psychology, 
that the cognitive function deals directly with 
Mental Objects. Then, if this be true, that the 
cognitive function constructs mental objects, and 
if Interest constructs menta] objects, Interest must 
be Cognitive. 

(2) The axiom must be admitted that whatever 
deals directly with meanings, is Cognitive. The very 
nature of an idea is to have meaning — meaning 
makes the idea. Now, to say that conative-affective 



INTEREST IS BASIC IN PSYCHOLOGY. 185 

process deals directly with meaning is, to my mind, 
impossible. I can only say what seems to me to be 
the case. 

(3) But, again, my view is that Psychology does 
not start with Interest and the Object, but with 
Interest 

It is true that when Interest stands forth as de- 
veloped Interest, there is objective reference. But 
Science is not content to take a swarm of bees, as it 
clusters on the limb of a tree, and study that as a 
whole — it will do that of course. Just so Science 
can never be content to take Interest and the Object 
together and say, as, for instance, Ward does, in one 
of his volumes, in regard to Subject and Object, that 
you must not ask questions about them — that you 
must take the two together. Science insists that it 
has a right to ask, not only about that cluster of 
bees, as a whole, but also about each bee and about 
the constituent part even of each bee. 

Just so my view is that we are forced by the 
scientific spirit to study, examine and differentiate 
the dualism of Interest and the Object. 

But, moreover, to start Psychology with Interest 
(as conative-affective process), and the Object is, 
paradoxical as the statement may be, not to start with 
mere Interest, {conative-affective) and the Object. 



186 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

For in the very fact of the Object being there, Cogni- 
tion is involved. Certainly there can be no Object 
without Cognition. Hence, in starting with Interest 
(conative-affective) and the Object, there is the 
fallacy, it seems to me, of starting also with Cogni- 
tion. 

Now as this Cognition has to inhere in Interest 
(there being nothing else for it to inhere in) this 
means that really my position, that Interest is Cog- 
nitive as well as conative-affective, is fallen into. 

Another problem concerning Interest. 

But a question which is very important in Psy- 
chology is as to whether our knowledge of the 
external world is immediate. The usual teaching of 
the psychologists is that we are immediately con- 
scious of externality. There is much to be said in 
favor of that view. The long line of illustrious 
names of those, who stand for the view that knowl- 
edge is immediate, give one cause to pause in pro- 
posing to think even of a different view. The new 
psychologists are almost a unit in maintaining that 
immediate knowledge is the true view. He who 
holds to Idealism among the psychologists has to 
take his stand with the little company in which 
Spencer is the central figure. Of course, it is differ- 
ent as regards the philosophers. The same man, it 



THE PHILOSOPHER AND IDEALISM. 187 

may be, will be as a psychologist keenly insistent on 
the immediacy of knowledge, and as a philosopher, 
a rank Idealist. One hardly, therefore, knows where 
to take his place. Yet sometime or other he must, 
if he is to think for himself, decide or seek to decide 
whether Idealism or Eealism in Psychology is right, 
and in the Genetic study of Psychology he must 
decide early in the action. 

The philosopher is swung toward Idealism by his 
view and theories of Matter. If Matter be not what 
it seems — if there be not being there, but mere 
motion — if all that Matter has is but attributes, as it 
were —if Matter be but electric points the philos- 
opher has ready reason to declare that our so-called 
knowledge of a tree or of a horse is not immediate. 

But, of course, this whole argument of the philos- 
opher turns upon the nature of the Matter. Change 
your theory of Matter and, it may be, your theory of 
knowledge would also change. Hence, you make 
your Psychology wait upon your Physics and you 
are in the position where certain results cannot be 
hoped for. How frequently the theories concerning 
Matter have changed — they are changing today. 
Twenty years from this time they may be teaching, 
in the Physical Department of this University, 
theories entirely different from those held now. If 
this Psychological Department must, for its theory 



188 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

as to the mediacy or immediacy of knowledge, wait 
upon the deliverances of the Department of Physics, 
we would be in bad shape indeed. 

Then too, if you take your stand as a Psycho- 
logical Idealist with Spencer, let us say, you are in 
danger of feeling that your great and distinguished 
companion is where he is, in great part, because he 
wanted a good evolutionary explanation of the Mind, 
and finding one in the hierarchies of feeling which 
he imagined were built up one on another, he was 
content to live and die on the Idealistic side in 
Psychology, not so much from an absolute scientific 
and critical examination of that view as because it 
suited him. 

The view which I hold, that Interest is Conscious- 
ness, does not give much light here. I have made 
a study of this question of the immediacy of 
knowledge from the standpoint of each one of at 
least three different thesis subjects of mine — from 
the standpoint that Interest is the Nexus of the 
Mind — that Interest is the Apperceiving Principle, 
and that Interest is the Psychological Ego, and I 
have to confess that while my faith in the teaching 
as to immediate knowledge of the External world 
has been shaken, I do not see my way absolutely 
clear as to the matter of Psychological Idealism. 
I believe, however, that when the opportunity 



CHAPTER VIII GIVES THE MATURED POSITION. 189 

presents itself for me to take time to properly 
classify, in my own thinking, the arguments, pro 
and con, that Psychological Idealism will have 
another humble believer. 

(1) The philosophers are largely in favor of 
Idealism. 

(2) The psychologists, in great part are of uncer- 
tain sound on this subject — it would seem that many 
prefer to bear the ills they know than fly to others 
that they know not of in Psychological Idealism. 

(3) The identification of Sensation (affective) and 
Perception (cognitive) is certainly fallacious. 

(The treatment on Psychological Idealism of 
Chapter VIII was written after this paper was read 
and expresses my matured convictions on that sub- 
ject. I therefore refer to that in this connection.) 



CHAPTER XIX. 

The Principle of Interest is the Psychological 
Subject. 

(This thesis is one contained in the paper sub- 
mitted at the Hopkius, October, 1904. No farther 
development is given than that contained in that 
paper. Of course what this Psychological Subject 
is, in itself, is considered in the philosophical sec- 
tion where it is held that Interest is an expression 
of something deeper.) 

Ward in his celebrated Article in the Encyclo- 
pedia Brittanica stands emphatically for a Subject in 
Psychology. But what the Subject is, psychologi- 
cally, which many psychologists realize must be 
posited, he cannot say. 

Stout, in his last Psychology (1903), takes the 
position held by many that investigation as to a 
Psychological Subject is fruitless. 

Now in Cognition, the Subject, so far as Psychol- 
ogy can discover it, is Interest. The extended 



PSYCHOLOGICAL EGO AND SUBJECT IDENTICAL. 191 

treatment of Interest as the Psychological Subject, 
given under the topic of Interest as the Psychologi- 
cal Ego is referred to in this connection. Because 
the thesis of this chapter has already been treated 
in that connection, it is thought that it is unneces- 
sary to continue the subject here. 



CHAPTER XX. 

The Will. 

There can be no attempt in this connection to 
properly consider the Will from the standpoint of 
the line of thought of these chapters. The only 
thought here is to point out one or two facts which 
seem to be basic in any treatment of the Will from 
this standpoint. 

(1) The question of the Will first rises when we 
'pass from the study of an instinctive Interest- Moment 
to the study of the reflective Interest-Moment. In the 
instinctive Interest-Moment there is the mere 
striving or energizing or conative tendency. But 
in the reflective Interest- Moment there is the delib- 
erateness and the premeditation which are essential 
characteristics of a Will and of a Person. Hence 
the problems of the reflective Interest - Moment 
are those which deal with the Will and Person- 
al^. Could one fathom all the mysteries of a 
single reflective Interest-Moment the secrets of the 
meaning of the Will and of Personality would stand 
unveiled before him. This reflective Interest- 



IS THERE REAL PERSONALITY? 193 

Moment, which is, according to our definition, the 
period of Interest's incubation of a new gleam of 
meaning, has in it problems vaster than any which 
have been considered. How has this deliberate 
Interest-Moment arisen? In what does it differ 
from the absolutely instinctive Interest-Moment? 
Is that which seems to be the case, the truth of the 
situation and is there developed from the instinctive 
that which has the form of choice, as we term it? 
There seems to stand something upon the founda- 
tion of the instinctive processes of our minds which 
looks into the face of this instinctive Judgment- 
Cluster or of that, and which seems to say, "This I 
take" and "That I reject." Have we here the sweep 
of fixed necessity, and is this seeming freedom but 
that which hides the iron bonds of absolute Fate, 
forged by the instinctive mental processes? Or is 
there in the difference between an absolutely instinc- 
tive Interest-Moment and a deliberate Interest- 
Moment that which may truly be called the differ- 
ence which comes from Personality existing in the 
latter case? Can it be possible that Mind has in it 
the possibility of the development of that which we 
call a Person and of that we call Free Will ? 

May it not be possible that, according to evolu- 
tionary theory itself, there should evolve from the 
13 



194 ANALYTIC INTEREST TSYCHOLOGY. 

fixed and awful necessities of the case that we call a 
Person? (This, of course, became just as in this 
thing we call Mind or Interest, there is the possi- 
bility of Personality just as there is the possibility of 
knowledge.) There has been found a stage wherein 
mind had to develop ability to judge the external 
world, which it did not know immediately, and can 
never know in the slightest detail in an immediate 
way, and the mystery of knowledge was born. Can 
it be possible that the mystery of Personality and of 
what we call Free Will has been born in some such 
a way ? Let us suppose that that which is a person 
and that which is Free Will should give, in and of 
itself, tremendous advantage in the matter of sur- 
vival and in the matter of preservation, why may 
not this wonderful and mysterious thing we call 
Mind or Interest which, in its very embryonic state, 
showed itself capable of real and true interpretation, 
show itself, at a vastly later epoch of its develop- 
ment, capable of real and true choice ? According to 
strict evolutionary view, if it could be shown that 
real Free Will and real Personality are tremendous 
advantages in Mind's development and survival, 
science would not and could not hesitate to write 
even such an hypothesis. Science does not hesi- 
tate at the wonderful, because it is strange and 
wonderful ; she hesitates at the wonderful only 



FKEE WILL AND EVOLUTION. 195 

when the wonderful is posited without, as she says, 
good and sufficient reason. But if one can show 
good and sufficient reason, — if one can show that 
this wonderful thing is a fact explaining thing, 
science has no hesitation in writing it in the very 
text-books. Hence, it is repeated, all that which 
has been written in regard to Evolution being the 
final decision against the idea of real Free Will 
and of a real Person is but false science. Show 
that your real Free Will and your real Personality 
are tremendous factors as regards advance and pro- 
gress, as tremendous factors as any the world has 
had, and science itself must needs consider whether 
just as real cognitive powers have been developed, 
real Free Will and real Personality may not have 
been developed, or rather whether as Mind started 
with an affective process, it did not also start with 
an inchoate Personality, or did not attain to this in 
process of development. 

Supposing the evolutionary hypothesis to be true, 
let us go back to the first embryonic mind which is 
supposed to be the progenitor of all minds. In this 
first mind, we study its first Interest-Moment. This 
first Interest-Moment, according to the definition of 
the Interest-Moment, was the period during which 
Interest incubated a glint of meaning. At last this 



196 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

glint of meaning comes. The first Interest-Moment 
lias resulted in the first Judgment-Burst of all time. 
There was in all probability immediate bodily action 
upon this first Judgment-Burst. In man all action 
depends upon an idea — meaning of some sort must 
stand before the mind before there is bodily action. 
Hence, if this be true as regards man, we can 
reason that it must be true as regards animals. 

Then follows the second Interest-Moment of all 
time ; but this is wonderfully different from the first, 
for cognitive Interest has already functioned in a 
particular way and this tends to become an instinc- 
tive Interest-Moment. Very probably this first 
Interest-Moment is repeated — is made a part of the 
second Interest-Moment. The second Interest- 
Moment issues in a new glint of meaning. 

Thus the processes went on. The whole trend 
being absolutely to the development of instinctive 
Interest- Moments. By the time, let us say, the mil- 
lionth Interest-Moment was reached, a mass of pos- 
sible instinctive Interest-Moments stood ready to 
rush in on every new Interest-Moment. Now has 
all development been the result of the storm, stress 
and fight between instinctive Interest-Moments 
struggling to enter into the composition of a pre- 
sent Interest-Moment? Has there been here just a 



THE SURVIVAL OF MEANING -GLINTS. 197 

case of the survival of the fittest ? Has the strong- 
est killed off the weakest? There can be no ques- 
tion that when the facts are fully considered, one is 
forced to the conclusion that if Evolution be true, 
the problems of Evolution are not the so-called 
struggles of animals as masses of bone and sinew — 
as material things. Darwin's view of Evolution 
utterly fails to view the true battle-field of survival. 
This also is true of the Organic Evolution of Dr. 
Baldwin and others. If there were this great stress 
and strain for survival in the past, if ages have been 
marked by unending struggle for ascendency and 
development has proceeded along evolutionary lines, 
the battle fields have been in the province of Mind. 
This may be posited, it would seem, as a necessarily 
axiomatic truth. What is strength and muscle if 
there be no judgment to tell the distance of an adver- 
sary or to tell if such an object is an adversary? 
The struggle between instinctive Interest-Moments, 
or to put it perhaps in a better way, between in- 
stinctive Meaning-Glints for reinstatement in a per- 
son's Interest-Moment have been necessarily the ab- 
solutely decisive battles of the ages. For here have 
been decided not the fate of earthly kingdoms or 
empires, but the fate of categories of knowledge, of 
logical processes and of epistemological systems. 



198 ANALYTIC INTEKEST PSYCHOLOGY. 

All other battles and struggles have turned upon 
this struggle between instinctive Meaning-Glints for 
reinstatement. 

As has been said, we are trying to follow the 
development of instinctive Interest-Moments and of 
Instinctive Meaning-Glints, supposing Evolution to 
have been the case. The battles described above, 
for supremacy in Interest's attention on the part of 
instinctive Meaning-Glints, would result in certain 
of the strongest Meaning-Glints surviving in almost 
every Interest-Moment. This indeed has been the 
case. The so-called categories of space and time, 
etc., are but some of these strongest instinctive 
Judgment-Bursts or Meaning-Glints which have 
found for themselves the place they deserve in almost 
every Interest-Moment or in certain great classes of 
Interest-Moments. They have fought their battles 
and won their place. Now this would all necessarily 
tend to fixedness along certain lines. These instinctive 
Meaning-Glints which gained the day would domi- 
nate more and more in each new Interest-Moment. 
There would be the discovery of new meanings 
along the track they set, but Interest would pass 
by, unnoticed, all other possibilities which Interest 
might have noticed. This is exactly what we see 
in the case of the dog or horse. There are cer- 



DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ANIMAL AND MAN. 199 

tain lines of meaning for them — certain Interest- 
Clusters predominate and rule. The grooves have 
been fixed and Interest functions only in certain 
fixed lines and Interest-Moments can incubate only 
a narrow class of New meaning for them. Now the 
essential difference beiiveen man and the animal is that 
in the latter we see deliberate Interest-Moments and 
deliberate Judgement-Clusters. 

But if man has developed from the animal in the 
sense that the Human Mind has absolutely nothing 
which the animal mind has not — if so-called Free 
Will and so-called Personality be but a myth, why 
has not the tendency for Interest-Moments to run 
in narrower and still narrower grooves been followed 
in his development? Behind him are the mental 
processes of the ages — in him are gathered vast 
instinctive possibilities, and, because these tend to 
fixedness, he, of all animals, should be the most fixed 
in his mental operations. The Instinctive-Judg- 
ment should work in him with all the force of the 
highest development of its automatic powers, and 
nothing else should work. 

Yet the very opposite is the case. Instinctive Judg- 
ments there are, but there is a wide opportunity for 
variation. There is the widest variation of human 
Interest. The child, according to the view which 



200 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

makes human Interest absolutely the same as the 
clog's, would be most fixed in his instinctive Judg- 
ments. Yet he is not. 

"Language explains this," says one, "the use of 
concepts prevents the Mind from running in a 
fixed channel." But the laborer's store of concepts 
amount to some hundreds — the dog or the monkey 
may have several dozen rudimentary concepts. The 
dog is fixed in his mental processes, the laborer is 
not. Are the two or three hundred concepts he 
holds sufficient explanation why the mighty tide, 
which in all Minds tends to the strengthening of 
instinctive Judgment Processes, has been absolutely 
stayed, and why another bent and direction is found 
within him ? 

Necessarily it would seem, even supposing Evolu- 
tion to be the case, that there has arisen, either from 
within the sphere of Interest or tbe Mind or from 
the sphere of what we call the Spiritual, this thing 
we term Personality which is the Breaker of instinc- 
tive Judgment Processes and the Giver of mental 
variations. 

There is that which seems to stand upon the very 
categories and upon the instinctive processes and 
choose, reject or accept. It is held that this is a 
real fact because only this can explain the breaking 



THE QUESTION OF PERSONALITY. 201 

up of the fixed tendencies wliicli have been formed 
for Interest to function in a certain way. There are 
facts which require the positing of what we call 
Matter. There are facts which require the positing 
of what we call Life. There are facts which require 
the positing of what we call Mind, and, just so, there 
are facts which require the positing of what we 
call Personality. 

There is a fundamental law of Mind that bodily 
action is always in view of a Meaning-Glint or Judg- 
ment-Cluster, i. e., in view of what is called an idea. 

Now in the deliberate Interest-Moment the incu- 
bating time of this idea or Judgment-Cluster may 
be delayed. Judgment-Bursts (Meaning-Glints), one 
after the other, may be thrown out and not allowed 
to go into the composition of the idea and hence, 
bodily action is delayed. 

Now James, in the first volume of his Psychology, 
in the section in which he treats of the question as 
to the possibility of personality, raises the question 
as to whether what is called a person can really 
delay a decision for so much as a second. James 
says that if this can really be done, almost every- 
thing is involved therein. Now it is certainty true 
that if physical action can be delayed for a second, 



202 ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

let us say, we thereby put ourselves in accommoda- 
tion with what is really different external Eeality 
from that we would have accommodated to had the 
action taken place a second sooner. The passage of 
the locomotive over the spot on the track where we 
a second ago were standing does not injure us ; the 
difference of a second in accommodating to environ- 
ment has in this case saved our life. Here, then, in 
the delay to complete the image or idea or Judgment- 
Cluster, in view of which physical acting occurs, there 
is one of the very essentials of Personality and. of 
Choice. 

Now this delay in physical action about which 
James raises question, and which he counts so tre- 
mendous a factor, if it does exist, is one of the 
characteristics of the deliberate Interest-Moment. 
While a bit of new Meaning is being incubated 
instinctive Judgment-Bursts are thrust aside. The 
Mind functions on, but its product is allowed to fade 
away until the neiv Meaning-Glint comes, and lo ! 
instantly there is built up the image or Judgment- 
Cluster because of which we act physically. 

Hence, we see that there is in Mind wonderful 
instinctive processes which act with precision and 
validity, because processes just like these have been 
the very means of the preservation of the race. The 



REAL PERSONALITY A FACT. 203 

race has interpreted Reality more and more cor- 
rectly, and the possibilities of these correct inter- 
pretations have been written into us and have be- 
come a part of our heritage. 

The categories are ours — they live in us — logical 
ability is ours, because the correct ability to inter- 
pret Externality aright has been an incalculable 
blessing, and the race has preserved these gains by 
heredity. Thus the primal operations of our Mind 
at any moment are largely instinctive. The In- 
stinctive Coefficient Judgments are instinctive. The 
flight of logical thought is often, as we say, in- 
tuitive, i. e., an instinctive process backed by the 
validity of the correct reasoning of all the Past. 

But there is, also, in every moment of our conscious 
life, that which stands upon this base of instinctive 
operations, and breaks, rejects, alters, builds in Mean- 
ing-Glints, delays the complete formation of the Mental 
Object, or hurries that formation, and thus alters con- 
stantly the time of accommodation to the External 
World. Here, by James' own test, it would seem, we 
have what must be called a Personality. 



CHAPTER XXI. 
Meaning. 

A word should be said as to Meaning. It is held 
in these papers that the Interest-Moment is the 
incubating time of a glint of Meaning — that all 
Meaning we have in any mental state is flashed 
forth by cognitive Interest upon sensation (affective) 
stimulation — that in this moment this is done be- 
cause the ability to do this has been given by acqui- 
sition of ability — that there are instinctive Interest- 
Moments in which Meaning is incubated and flashed 
forth, and (2) deliberate Interest-Moments which 
essentially mark the incubation of a New Glint of 
Meaning. 

It is by this acquisition of Meaning that Reality 
comes. Just as Meaning is extended Reality is ex- 
tended. No Meaning means no Reality. All Meaning 
means all Reality. No nearer to ivhat ive call Reality 
can ice come than through Meaning, tested and authen- 
ticated. Our Meaning we may test, i. e., we may 
examine whether the sign or the interpretation is valid 
in the light of other Meaning, but Meaning stands 



THE UNIT OF COGNITIVE CONTENT. 205 

closest to Reality. Through Meaning we infer what 
we call Reality. 

Now, there is in all Mentality at this moment just so 
much Meaning. There is just so much true interpre- 
tation of Reality. All this Meaning has come through 
Interest-Moments each of which incubated a new glint 
of Meaning. Hence the unit in the Meaning sphere is 
the Judgment- Burst or Meaning-Glint which Interest 
gives as the result of its functioning in a single Interest- 
Moment. These Meaning -Glints are gathered or syn- 
thesized into the Judgment- Clusters {concept or percept) 
— These Judgment- Clusters are synthesized again and 
thus, from the unit which we have found to be tJie pro- 
duct of the first Interest-Moment, all the Cognitive Con- 
tent is given. 

It is to be pointed out that there is in Meaning 
also the Conative or Volitional side. "I mean to do 
that" means "I purpose to do that." The whole 
question of Conation's relation to Meaning has to 
be deferred. This only may be said, (1) physical 
actions by a Mind are always in view of Meaning; (2) 
much physical action is psychically automatic, i. e., 
instinctive Judgment gives Meaning and the physical, 
action is a kind of reflex upon the presentation of that 
Meaning. The point, however, is to be absolutely 



20 b' ANALYTIC INTEREST PSYCHOLOGY. 

insisted upon that one of the fundamental errors of the 
■psychohgy of today is that this Meaning-Glint in the 
so-called instinctive reflex action is not recognized. 
(3) The point is made that the sphere of Free Will 
may he found alone in the sphere of tlie formation of 
the Mental Object and the physical action may be 
automatic upon the full satisfactory formation of that 
Mental Object, or we may have to look for Free Will 
also in the projection of the Mental Object into physical 
Action. 



I^RT II. 

Outlines of New Philosophies — Interest 
Philosophies* 



14 



PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. 

A number of these Outlines of Philosophies were 
developed in my earliest thinking on Interest. 

The theses are merely stated. No endeavor is 
made to give the treatment, which in several cases, 
is already of some extent. It has been felt that it 
would be better merely to indicate the line of 
thought. 

Thus, any one who may be interested will the 
sooner have placed before him, a compend of what 
the author hopes to attempt in these fields. There 
is no Philosophy presented here, which does not 
demand separate and protracted investigation. The 
whole of Psychology must be thought over from the 
standpoint of Interest before the proper Philosophy 
of Psychology can be produced. A new field seems 
opened in this department of investigation by the 
identification of Interest and Consciousness. 

In the sphere of Life Development, the friend of 
whom I speak in Chapter III, of this Part, has 
already much material gathered and we have the 
plan and outlines for a volume. 

In the domain of Social Psychology, there are no 
theories or positions held by any of the great scien- 



212 OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES. 

tists which will not have to be reviewed. When the 
Basic Principle of a science or of a Philosophy is 
found, all other principles, of necessity, take their 
proper and subordinate place. 

Imitation may claim to rule in Social Psychology 
or Suggestion may assert that it holds dominion 
there, but when the Principle of Interest asserts its 
rights, as it will, both must give place. They must 
stand subordinate to the one great explaining prin- 
ciple. Hence, in order to review the vast extent of 
the literature of Social Psychology, to examine the 
various theories, to show their real subordination to 
Interest, to trace the genetic progress of Interest in 
Others in the constitution of society as a ivhole, and 
in the formation of social groups, shoidd have a vol- 
ume or rather volumes, in itself 

There can be no doubt that volumes may be 
written upon this one aspect of Interest as the psy- 
chological explaining Principle in Social Psycho- 
logy. 

As to the sphere of Practical Life, the same state- 
ment may be made. Sociology itself is but a study 
of Interest at work. In the varied life of our civili- 
zation, there are thousands of throbbing Interest 
Centers and few more fascinating studies can be 
found than studies of such Centers. The labor 
organizations of today, the trusts and combinations, 



NEW FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION. 213 

etc., show the field of investigation for him who 
comes to study the Interest Philosophy of Practical 
Life. Everywhere the mighty motive force will be 
found to be Interest of some kind. But to differen- 
tiate Interest, to note its developments, to ivatcli its 
productive operations, to follow its way, when seemingly 
it lias disappeared, gives a wide and varied field of 
investigation. 

Or, in the sphere of History, the subject has 
equally important ramifications. As to Law and 
Government, the same is true. In the sphere of 
Ethics and of Keligions the same Basic Explaining- 
Principle demands fullest consideration. 

As has been said, it has seemed best in regard to 
each Philosophy for the author merely to outline 
his general position. Thus he will have the oppor- 
tunity at a later day, it is hoped, to take up subject 
by subject and consider them in some sense as 
fully as in his estimation they deserve. 



CHAPTER I. 
The Interest Philosophy of Psychology. 

Interest is the Basic Explaining Principle in the 
Philosophy of Psychology. 

The Philosophy of Psychology is, from this point 
of view, found in that which is the Basic Principle 
of Psychology — the Principle of Interest. 

Psychology, if the theses presented in that part 
of this volume which deals with Psychology, be cor- 
rect, finds its explaining principle in that which is 
at once its basic principle and its constructive prin- 
ciple. 

The treatment in the part of the volume called 
Analytic Interest Psychology, has been, as the name 
indicates, Analytic, and hence its results are but a 
tracing of the explaining principle itself. We find 
that Interest is the Basic Principle of the Mind, 
that it is that which constructs Mental Objects — 
that Interest is the Nexus and the Psychological 
Ego — that Interest is the Mental Ultimate funda- 
mental to Cognition, Feeling and Conation, and they 
but express the Nature of Interest — that Interest is 



INTEREST IS A PHILOSOPHY IN ITSELF 215 

the Apperceiving Power of the Mind — that Feelings 
and Emotions are the product of Interest — that 
Interest explains Abnormal Psychology — that In- 
terest is to be identical with Consciousness of Pro- 
cess. 

Now, if these original theses positions be true, 
it means that Interest itself is a Philosophy of 
Psychology. 



CHAPTER II. 
The Interest Philosophy of Social Psychology. 

The thesis here is : Interest in Others is the Basic 
Explaining Principle in the Philosophy of Social 
Psychology. (This thesis was advanced in my paper 
read at the Hopkins, May, 1904.— See Chap. XVI, 
Part I.) 

Dr. Baldwin maintains that Suggestibility is the 
fundamental socializing factor. My position is that 
Suggestibility is no Suggestibility unless it arouses 
Interest — that were two persons to live on either 
side of the street all their lives and there be abso- 
lutely no Interest on the part of one in the other, 
there would be absolutely no social tie between 
them. Yet every day there would be Suggestions to 
sociability (unconscious though they are) coming 
from one to the other. Yet, because one has no 
Interest in the other, there is no social tie — no trace 
of the social bond — between them. Hence it is 
clearly seen that Suggestibility is not the funda- 
mental socializing force. 



IMITATION BUT THE PATHWAY OF INTEREST. 217 

It is also held by Tarde (in his narrow nse of the 
term) and by Dr. Baldwin (in his wider nse of the 
word) that Imitation is the Explaining Factor of 
Social Psychology. 

But, however we may define Imitation, one thing- 
stands fixed and sure — that there is no imitation on 
the child's part or on the adult's part without Interest 
in that which is imitated and this Interest is the Ex- 
planation of the Imitation. Then, since the explana- 
nation of the Imitation has been found, the Imitation 
no longer stands as the Explaining Principle. 

The Imitation which these authors speak of is 
imitation of persons, but this imitation is of persons 
simply because we are more interested in persons than 
in animals. Were ive more interested in animals than 
in persons, our imitation would be of animals and social 
bonds ivould bind us to the dog or horse and not to the 
human family. Imitation is but the pathivay in which 
the mighty living socializing force of Interest treads. 
Even though we make our Imitation self-conscious 
Imitation, the fact stands certain that this self-con- 
scious Imitation exists only because Interest prompts 
thereto. 

Take the child in its earliest social aspect. It is 
first drawn by Interest to note the mother's face — 
the outline of that face is built up — Interest clus- 
ters to this form, and the child is socialized, so far 



218 OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES. 

as the mother is concerned; and the mother, because 
of her intense Interest in the child, is socialized, so 
far as the child is concerned. So the family 
develops. The mighty social bonds which unite the 
family are no mere imitation of father and mother 
on the part of the children — no mere imitation of 
the husband by the wife or of the wife by the hus- 
band. That which socializes the family is the 
Interest of one in the other — this Interest is the 
heart of all love and affection. This Interest it is 
which is the Social Nexus, just as in Pare Psychology 
we have found it to be the Nexus of the Mind itself. 
Let this social bond fail in the family and the dis- 
united units fall apart — the father is now at variance 
with the mother and, it may be, the divorce court is 
invoked. 

The child, socialized in the family circle by 
Interest in the other members of the family, finds, 
however, in his school life contact with another 
circle of life. There is no county school in all the 
land where socialization is not taking place and this 
socialization is along the line of the child's 
Interest. The boys flock with boys because their 
Interests are common — they love to run, to play, 
even to fight, it may be. The girls, however, on 
their side, are kept together by their Interests. 
Just so far as their Interests find union, and boys 



INTEREST SOCIALIZES IN THE CHURCH. 219 

and girls are interested in common things, the 
socialization between the males of the school and 
the females is complete. Then too, there is the 
case of the "Tom boy" — the girl whose Interest is 
altogether in boyish sports. There is also the case 
of the "Miss Nancy" — the boy whose Interest is in 
dolls and whose social ties are not with his own sex. 

Soon the child feels, it may be, the socializing 
force of the Church. But here, too, it is Interest 
in the Church and in the great verities for which 
the Church stands which makes him a social unit 
in his denomination. No mere imitation, even of the 
Divine Master himself, suffices to socialize him in the 
"City of God." Only as he lias vital Interest in his 
fellows of that faith and in the faith itself, is he 
socialized in the Church. 

The youth finds himself face to face with political 
parties. Here, again, it is his Interest which gathers 
him into the social unit of the party. 

It is greatly regretted that the demand for space 
prevents the extended treatment of the present 
thesis that Interest in Others is the Basic Explain- 
ing Principle in Social Psychology. A few facts, 
however, may be noted. 

One great authority insists that Society is to be 
explained, in part, at least, by what he calls " Con- 
sciousness of Kind." Thus animals have a " Con- 



220 OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES. 

sciousness of Kind." But this " Consciousness of 
Kind" means simply Interest in their Kind. As has 
already been shown, Interest and Consciousness are 
identical, and Consciousness of Kind becomes Interest 
in their fellow animals. That this Interest does 
exist there is no question. That it explains So- 
ciality there can also be no question. Mere imita- 
tion of animals by animals or of man by man does 
not explain vital Society, i. e., Society that lives and 
moves and has its being in our streets. Nor does it 
explain the socialization of the animal species. 

Again, Dr. Baldwin's "Social Impulse" is nothing 
save Interest in others. The child becomes interested 
in persons. Persons become a great part of his Men- 
tal Object and simply because persons become a great 
part of his Mental Object does that result folloiv which 
Dr. Baldwin stresses in his Social and Ethical Inter- 
pretations, i. e., the reading of one's self into others 
— the fact of a common self The explanation of this 
common self is found in this — a man's Mental Object 
tend to become his self — persons become in great part 
one's Mental Object, hence they tend to become one's 
self. Thus toe see that it is Interest in others which, 
produces the very situation ivhich Dr. Baldwin, in his 
volume, Social and Ethical Interpretations, makes 
the fundamental fact in socialization. Hence the fun- 
damental fact is not that we have, as it were, a common 



IMITATION NOT ENOUGH. 221 

self, but that this common self exists because Interest, 
attaching itself to persons, makes them a self for us. 

(2) Dr. Baldwin lias much to say in the same 
volume about social tradition and social heredity as 
explaining facts in social psychology, the idea being 
that social heredity avails itself of social tradition. 
But social heredity lays hold on social tradition 
only through Interest being aroused in this tradi- 
tion. Hence social heredity reduces to Interest. 

Thus all these leading scientific explanations of 
Society, like that of "Consciousness of Kind," 
"Imitation" (Tarde), "Self - Conscious Imitation" 
(Baldwin), a Self which is Common (Baldwin & 
Royce), "Social Impulse" (Baldwin), "Social 
Heredity" (Baldwin), are totally defective in that 
they do not state the root of the matter. 

(1) One may have a Consciousness of Kind in the 
sense of a knowledge of his kind and yet not be 
socialized. 

(2) One may imitate another all his life and yet not 
be socialized. 

It is only as the imitation is the outcome of Interest 
that there is socialization, for the imitation may be 
the outcome of hate itself. Imitation may be imita- 
tion of one's enemy in order to become as sti^ong as 



222 OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES. 

one's enemy, and hence, although there is complete 
imitation, complete " self-conscious imitation" even, 
there is absolutely no socialization. 

(3) Thus one may have "self-conscious imitation" 
and be an absolute enemy of the man imitated. The 
Persians ivould have been glad to self-consciously 
imitate the Greeks in ivarlike acts. But had they been 
able fully to do so there would have come no ivave of 
socialization — they ivould have still fought on. Hence 
self-conscious imitation has been mistaken for the 
true socializing factor simply because the true factor 
— Interest — shows itself therein. 

(4) "The Social Impulse" (Baldwin), is nothing- 
save Interest in others. If there is not Interest in 
others there is no "social impulse" — whenever u the 
social impulse" exists there is Interest in others. 
Hence, since the explanation of u the social impulse" is 
found, "the social impulse" as an explaining principle 
falls aivay. 

(5) The thought that the Ego and the Alter have 
a common self (Baldwin) is either : (1) a figure of 
speech, or (2) it is to be reduced to what has already 
been pointed out, i. e., that Persons become a self for us 
because we are interested in them since the psychological 
law is that our Interests tend to become a self. 



OTHER EXPLAINING PRINCIPLES FAIL. 223 

(6) "The social heredity which absorbs social 
tradition" (Baldwin), cannot mean that the social 
tradition is absorbed in a mere biological way as 
though the striving to absorb it were all. Hence, 
since the social tradition can be absorbed only in a 
cognitive way, the social heredity which absorbs 
it becomes necessarily a cognitive process in part. 
But this means that Interest cognizes the social 
tradition. 

Thus the various scientific explanations which have 
been given of socialization are seen to depend absolutely 
upon Interest for their validity. Hence they all fall 
away as real and fundamental explaining principles 
when Interest in Persons is posited as that principle. 

Hence Social Psychology will have necessarily to 
find revision. "The social tradition" of Dr. Bald- 
win is nothing more or less than the Interest- 
deposits, to which reference is made in the Phil- 
osophy of History. 

A statement is here given of some of the chapters 
in my work on the Interest Philosophy of Social 
Psychology which is in preperation : 

Chapter I. A Historical Review of former theories 
of Socialization. 

Chapter II. A review of present explaining theories 
of Social Psychology. 



224 OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES. 

Chapter III. Interest and the Individual. 

Chapter IV. Interest and the Mental Object. 

Chapter V. An examination of the character of the 
Mental Object ice call a Person. 

Chapter VI. We understand the other person not 
because ive really have a Common Self but just as we 
understand anything else, i. e., by our judging ability, 
(the idea of a Common Self is a figure of speech — 
my Self is my Self.) 

Chapter VII. Interest is the Social Nexus of the 
Family. 

Chapter VIII. Interest is the Social Nexus of the 
Party. 

Chapter IX. Interest is the Social Nexus of the 
Church. 

Chapter X. Interest is the Social Nexus of the State. 

Chapter XI. Liter est and Institutions. 

Chapter XII. The Effect of Institutions upon In- 
terest. 

Chapter XIII. The Genius from the standpoint of 
Interest. 

Chapter XIV. The Social Incompetents explained 
from the standpoint of Interest 



AN ILLUSTRATION. 225 

Other lines of investigation will be taken up in 
this connection. This somewhat fuller statement as 
regards Social Psychology is given in order to show 
that each separate Philosophy given here, although 
it is in but brief outline, is capable of full amplifica- 
tion. Necessarily that which is the basic principle 
of the Mind, will be basic in the sphere of the Phil- 
osophies. We have but to dig to strike the vein of 
truth. 

I well recall a certain walk taken, in December, 
1903, in Druid Hill Park, Baltimore. At that time, 
I was seeking, in my thinking, to place the Principle 
of Interest, properly, in the human Mind. As I 
state, in the Preface, no psychologist, so far as I 
could see, had done this. I chanced, as I walked 
that day in the Park, to see a rare and beautiful 
flower nestling in the grass. Just as I discovered 
the flower, a gentleman and lady, whom I had never 
seen before, passed and caught sight of the flower. 
Immediately, there were, as it were, three flames of 
Interest round that rare plant. No introduction 
was needed. In a second's time, because of our 
common Interest in that flower, we were socialized. 
We talked of the flower for a few minutes, and were 
I now to meet and recognize them, there would be 
between us the social bond of that common Interest. 

15 



226 OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES. 

I well recall how, for almost a year, I lived two 
doors from a gentleman, of whose existence I was 
hardly aware. One day I saw him walking down 
the street, half a square ahead of me, carrying a 
fishing rod and three fine black bass. In a trice I 
was socialized so far as he was concerned. Com- 
mon Interest in one single sport socialized us. 

If you are a business man, a professional man, a 
man who knows men by constant contact and asso- 
ciation, you say to me : "Why, in a chapter that pre- 
tends to deal with scientific subjects, do you inflict 
upon us so self-evident a proposition, as that Inter- 
est is the socializing factor in human life?" My 
reply is this : "This great fact, that Interest is the 
socializing factor, Science has not dealt with. The 
great theories of Socialization and of Social Psy- 
chology overlook it. This theory, that Interest is 
the socializing factor in the world, which looks so 
commonplace, is new in scientific literature, as are 
the other theses of this volume." 

It is maintained that the whole extent of Social 
Psychology may be thought over — that the so- 
called basic stones of the structure are not the true 
foundation — that the so-called ExjDlaining Principles 
are not the true Explaining PrincijDles. 



NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR STUDY. 227 

It is believed that wlien the Principle of Interest 
is }3osited as the explaining Principle in Social Psy- 
chology, scholars have new opportunities for succes- 
ftil work. 



CHAPTER III. 

The Philosophy of Life Development. 

The Thesis here is that, just so far as Evolution is 
true, Interest is the determining factor, and that, in the 
Sphere of Individual Life Development, Interest is the 
determining Factor. 

(A friend and I are collaborating on this theory 
of Life Development. He is a man of high ability, 
with fine scientific sense.) 

(1) Between Matter and Life there is an "Inter- 
esse." (This means tJiat Life and Matter never stand 
in immediate relationship — that there is always an 
"Inter-esse" — a something behveen.) 

(2) This "Inter-esse" behveen Life and Blatter is the 
great determining Principle in all Life Development. 
(This means that Life Development is not merely bio- 
logical, but tJtat the controlling factor is the Mental 
factor.) 

(3) This "Inter-esse," which stand between Life and 
Matter, and which is the determining principle of Life 
Development, is Interest. 



INTEREST DECIDES LIFE DEVELOPMENT. 229 

Whether Evolution be true or not, in the sense 
that Man has evolved from the animal, it is main- 
tained that all Life Development has as its determin- 
ing factor the Mental — that Interest and Interest alone 
sets the pace of Life Development. 



CHAPTER IV. 
The Philosophy of History. 

Interest is the Basic Explaining Principle in the 
Philosophy of History. 

Many scientific historians question whether, after 
all, there is such a thing as a real Philosophy of 
History. Progress there has been, but the scientific 
secret of that constant progress in human better- 
ment they cannot locate. The Christian historian, 
on the other hand, asserts, and properly so, that 
there is a Divine Hand in Human History and 
maintains that progress is due to Deity. But here 
again the question comes as to the method em- 
ployed by Divinity, in the slow but certain work 
of civilization's advance. The question of how the 
coral reefs are built is important. How much more 
important the question as to the secret of civiliza- 
tion's certain advance — the question, as to what, 
after all, is the Philosophy of History ! 

The thesis herein presented is, that there has 
been a slow but sure evolution in human Interest — 



THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY. 231 

that the secret of a tribe's advance, of a people' *s pro- 
gress, of a church's ennoblement, of the ivorld's de- 
veloping civilizatian, is that human Interest has risen 
imperceptibly but surely to higher and better things. 

The thesis is, that on earth, "The City of God" 
itself, will appear, when, in the slow course of the 
centuries, human Interest has risen to the sphere of 
eternal verities. 

Hence, it is maintained that in the historical 
study of Human Interests, which are the deposit of 
the living principle of Interest, is to be found the 
very key to the Philosophy of History. 

He who traces the course of human history as the 
course of Human Interest, will fnd the very Philosophy 
of History in the History itself. 

The thesis is also held that History itself is but 
the Study of Human Interest at tuork in the past. 

Only as History is able to lay hold on the vital 
principle of a people's Interest, at a particular stage 
of development, can History make the past stand 
real before us. Unconsciously the trend of histori- 
cal investigation in recent years has been turning in 
this direction. The position of this chapter is 
borne out by this fact. 

Author after author, professor after professor, 
could be named whose historical study, they must 
allow, when their attention is called to the fact, is 



232 OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES. 

almost altogether with the Interests of the people they 
study, i. e., ivitli the products of human Interest at a 
particular date. 

"Interests" are the things to study as regards the 
past — the touchstone of emphasis upon historical 
fact must be : " Was this a matter ©f Interest to 
that generation." The scientific historian can now 
seize upon all that he can see to have been of In- 
terest to the age, and generalizing from these facts 
he can present the age vital and real. He can do 
this in accordance with strict psychological truth, 
for Interest is the Psychological Ego. 

Not only therefore, is the principle of human 
Interest the explaining principle in the sphere of 
the Philosophy of History, but it is, also, in its 
development, in its results, in its deposits in human 
institutions, laws, customs, religions, etc., the one great 
subject of the historian's investigation, as he comes to 
deal with any nations history, or any epoch of the 
ivorWs history. 

The question ever with the historian, therefore, 
from this point of view, will be this : "What is the 
Interest of this people at this stage of their devel- 
opment?" The key of history is here. Just as 
Interest is the key of Psychology, of Social Psy- 
chology, of Abnormal Psychology, of Education, of 



THE KEY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTOKY. 233 

all Development ; so the key of the Philosophy of 
History itself is the Principle of Human Interest. 

Reference is made in this connection to Chapter 
III, Part I, in which the thesis is defended that 
Interest is the Nexus of the Mind. In that chapter 
a description is given of how the Mental Object is 
held momentarily in the synthetic grasp of Interest 
— of how Interest loses the least interesting parts of 
the Mental Object and is drawn on in its functioning 
by the most interesting part of the dismembered 
Mental Object. 

Now, all this is descriptive also of a nation's 
advance — the people are to be studied as a unity 
and their unity is found in their Mental Object, i. e., 
their Interests. That which holds the thought of 
the people is the Mental Object of this nation. Its 
most interesting part becomes the nucleus of the 
new Mental Object or Interest and so, on and on, the 
nation goes with constant transition in the Mental 
Object which stands before the gaze of men. The 
Interest of the nation functions forth the Interests 
which become fixed in institutions, customs, etc. 

Thus the Philosophy of History reduces itself, if 
the terminology of the first part of this volume be 
allowed, to this : 



234 OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES. 

(1) The Interest-Moment of a people. 

(2) The Meaning-Glint which come to a people. 

(3) The Mental Object of a people. 

(4) The physical reactions produced by the Na- 
tional Mental Object, (just as the image in the indi- 
vidual Mind may start the reaction of bodily move- 
ment, so may it be in the National Mind.) 

(5) The Judgment-Cluster, which constitutes the 
National Mental Object at any time, is the subject 
for study and analysis by the historian, just as the 
Judgment-Cluster which constitutes the Individual 
Mental Object is the subject for study and analysis 
by the pyschologist. 

The object here is only to give that which is indi- 
cative of the trend of the author's thought. Of 
course the genetic progress of Interest's develop- 
ment in the case of a number of nations must be 
traced for the proper presentation of this Philoso- 
phy of History. It is, however, thought that while 
this would be a work requiring much effort and in- 
vestigation, the basic working principle is here 
found and the lines sufficiently indicated to show 
that a Philosophy of History with Interest as the 
basic explaining principle, is no mere idle thought. 



CHAPTER V. 

The Philosophy of Practical Life. 

Interest is the Basic Explaining Principle in the 
Philosophy of Practical Life. 

Practical Life has within itself History, Religion, 
Sociology, Ethics, etc. It is complex in the extreme. 
Yet this explaining Principle Interest, reveals its 
secret. 

Interest, in the Business World, has, largely, with 
many become Self -Interest. Yet, even here, where, 
in the rush and war of business of all places on 
earth seemingly, Self-interest rules, it is by no means 
the tremendous factor Interest itself is. The bonds 
of Business Life are not forged by mere Self-Inter- 
est, although the latter is a powerful factor. 

The youth frequently follows his bent in the 
matter of employment. His Interest leads him to 
this position or the other. There is developed an 
Interest in that he does. He who has none of this, 
fails in his class as a workman. With vast multi- 
tudes business is a pleasure. The multi-millionaire 
does not continue business merely to make money — 



236 OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES. 

it is the making of money — the business itself — which is 
fascinating to him. The old man who gives up busi- 
ness soon dies, it is said. His Interest was yonder 
— the business was his very self. This self has 
been cut away and he dies. 

The Man's Mental Object — his very self — is his 
farm or business or profession. It is Interest in 
that, which is the inspiration of his endeavors. 

Interest, which is the Nexus of the State, of 
Society, of the Man's own Mental Objects, is the 
Nexus of ivJmt he calls his life. He is but a unit in 
the millions of earth, but each one of these millions 
is like him, in the fact that his Interest is the in- 
spiration of his life. 

In the diversification of industries and develop- 
ment of business we have not an exhibition of a 
mere money-making spirit, as it is generally held. 
If this business world be carefully studied it will be 
found that almost every one of the great business houses 
has been founded by a man whose passion was not so 
much money making, as it ivas that in and with ivhich 
he worked. His was the spirit of the discoverer 
with the land he has found or of the inventor with 
the instrument he has produced. The Interest ivhich 
gave vigor to his effort and brought ultimate success to 
the business enterprise, was not Self-interest. His ivas 
an enthusiasm ivhich Self-Interest never knows. His 



INTEREST AND BUSINESS. 237 

was a consecration to his business which Self-interest 
cannot imitate successfully. Just as Interest produces 
the Mental Object, causing it to stand before the mind, 
so his Interest has been that which has at last produced 
the magnificent business plant which is his. 

This description is not that of an isolated case, 
but it is the rule. 

Just thus has it been with that great class of men 
who have risen by their own unaided efforts to high 
places. Self-interest has not been that which has 
alone nerved them for their endeavors. There has 
been, it is true, the thought of their own betterment, 
but that which they have followed has had a fasci- 
nation for them. 

Only as we realize these facts can we do justice to 
the life around us. There is not mere cold-blooded 
selfishness prompting every action, but in the very 
business world itself, where Self-interest seems to 
be the God of All, pure spontaneous Interest holds 
dominant place. 



CHAPTER VI. 

The Philosophy of Law and of Government. 

Interest is the Basic Explaining Principle in the 
Philosophy of Law and of Government. 

The rule may be stated that, the greater the 
Interest in any Object, the greater the tendency to 
safeguard it by laws. 

The Interests of a people, at any epoch of their 
development, determine the character of their laws. 
The tribes of lake-dwellers must have given, in any 
legal arrangements that were theirs, especial atten- 
tion to the rights of fishermen — their Interests were 
in that direction. 

A pastoral people, on the other hand, has laws 
regulating affairs appertaining to cattle. 

Soon, of course, the great motives of Self -Interest 
come into play in the enactment of law. This side 
of the problem has been treated by Hobbes and by 
Rousseau, etc. But the trend towards law and gov- 
ernment finds its origin not in mere Self-interest, 
but in Interest itself. For Self-Interest is but a 
development of Interest. 



THE OIHGIN OF THE STATE. 239 

The codes of a People present fine historical 
material simply because the codes were produced as 
the result of the People's endeavor to safeguard 
their Interests, and, since Past Interests are, as is 
stated in another place, the true subject of historical 
investigation, the codes of former times give fine 
historical data. 

The government of a country is the expression of 
what Kousseau would call the General Will. This 
General Will, which many modern philosophers 
admit to exist in some sense, is really the General 
Interest. This is not necessarily the general Self- 
interest, but the general Interest as Interest. 

It was not the Self-interest of England, Germany 
and Prance which prompted them to send their 
thousands to fight as Crusaders for the recovery of 
the Holy Sepulchre ; yet the General Interest was 
so intense that men were drawn into those great 
Crusades by the hundreds of thousands. Self- 
Interest is calculating and cool ; Interest is spon- 
taneous and instantaneous, and has been the domi- 
nant factor in the organization and continuance of 
government. 

Government or the State has almost always its 
origin in some burst of Interest, which fuses 
together otherwise disunited districts or divisions 
of country. This Interest may be in some one 



240 OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES. 

man who becomes the focus of attention. He 
stands before the eye of human Interest, and men 
are fused together through him and a State has its 
origination. 

The test of the great man in human affairs has 
ever been his ability to interest men. If he be a 
general he welds them to his purposes, and his sol- 
diers become as very organic units of his own body. 
If he be a politician, men are swayed by him as 
though his were a magic wand. If he be a great 
statesman, he follows his far-reaching plans, and 
the nation follows him. 

But the State usually has its initiation in some 
great idea which dominates the Interest of the time. 
Thus our country began. One of the French philos- 
ophers asserts that each nation is the incarnation of 
some one great idea. If this be the case, it is 
simply because this great idea has been the con- 
structive factor in the nation's development. This 
idea has caught men's Interest, and has been for 
men, their standard. Thus, it cannot be doubted 
that the idea of Jehovah was that which made 
Israel. When that idea was forgotten, their 
Interests became diversified, the tribes became 
segregated and ruin came. 



INTEREST IS THE NEXUS OF THE STATE. 241 

It is only as there is Common Interest that a 
State stands. Decay comes with absolute differen- 
tiation of Interests. 

The thesis that the Principle of Interest is the basic 
explaining principle in law is worthy of consideration. 
It is believed that just as Interest is the Nexus of the 
individual mind holding together the constitutent 
parts of the Mental Object, so it is the Nexus of the 
State. 



16 



CHAPTER VII. 

The Philosophy of Ethics. 

Liter est in the Right is the Basic Explaining Princi- 
ple in the Philosophy of Ethics. 

There is Interest in Self — This is Self-interest. 
There is also Interest in Others — This is Alter- 
Interest. Now Interest in its relations to Self and 
to Others presents the problems of Ethics. 

The Basic Explaining Principle of the Philosophy 
of Ethics is Interest — Interest in the Right 

The meaning of this latter concept — the Source of 
its Meaning — the question as to what Reality 
answers to the Universal Instinctive Judgment- 
Burst or Meaning-Glint of the Right, is the great 
question. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

The Philosophy of Education. 

Interest is the Basic Explaining Principle in the 
Philosophy of Education 

The proper explanation of Education many have 
attempted. The Educators, forced to recognize the 
vast importance of Interest as a practical means of 
securing educational advance on the part of their 
pupils, have done much effective work in the treat- 
ment of Interest. The great psychologists who 
have emphasized Interest have been generally those 
who were concerned with educational matters. 
Thus Herbart advanced his views on Interest in his 
letters upon the subject of Education. Dewey, who 
has given much attention to Interest, but unfortu- 
nately, as has been stated, wholly from the conative 
point of view, has done so, it would seem, largely 
under the inspiration of the fact that he was 
interested in Pedagogics. Stout and Koyce stand 
almost as exceptions among psychologists. Thej^ 
seem to have been led to consider Interest without 
reference to Education. But both are unfortunate 



244 OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES. 

in that they have not realized the place or import- 
ance of Interest. 

We find one Educator after another emphasizing 
the importance of Interest in the matter of the acqui- 
sition of knowledge. Their uniform position, how- 
ever, is that merely their experience teaches that In- 
terest on the scholar's part must be aroused in order 
for acquisition. They, in no case, enter upon a 
critical psychological consideration of the reason 
why Interest is so important in Education. As one 
who has made such an investigation reads the 
writings of this Educator or that, the wonder grows 
upon him that no one has been led to take up the 
careful consideration of this question. 

The thesis here is that the Basic Explaining 
Principle in Education is Interest, 

(1) For acquisition it is necessary not merely that 
one will to study but that one be interested in that 
which he studies. There can be no doubt that In- 
terest is cognitive in its nature. There is nothing so 
absolutely cognitive as a consuming Interest. The 
slightest hint is caught. The faintest glint of meaning 
is seized upon. The least sign brings cognitive response, 

(2) There is no essential difference between so-called 
mediate and immediate Interest. The so-called medi- 



THE GENIUS. 245 

ate Interest finds something in the object or line of 
action that is really interesting. The boy may study 
only to keep from being whipped, but he is at least 
interested in not being whipped, and this gives the 
lesson which otherwise has for him no attraction, 
something of Interest. 

(3) There is always found in the so-called Genius 
a marvelous Interest in that line wherein his 
genius shows itself. The great artist is as a man 
hypnotized — he, indeed, is hypotnized by Art. 
Other things, other lines of effort, all the world of 
life and effort do not exist for him. There is little 
or no Reality for him save the ivorld of Meaning he 
finds in Art, There is a ivorld of Meaning for him in 
that which other men do not even notice. There is a 
wealth of Meaning, for the Artist, which overpowers 
him, in this landscape which the laborer works amid 
with never, in all his long and uneventful days, a 
single glance of Interest for. 

The same is true of the Genius in any field. He 
has eyes for Meaning in his particular field to which 
other men are blind. He wonders that others do 
not see. When he sees a certain stretch of Meaning- 
he thinks that certainly all men must know this. 
He goes forth confident, that this wealth of Meaning 
which has flashed forth for him and shines for him, 



246 OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES. 

lie can with no trouble make others see and lo ! 
they yet are blind. He is ahead of his generation. 
Men think of him as given up to a single idea. But 
that which to them is but a single idea is a whole 
world of Meaning to him, and when he has gone on 
his way, never having brought men to see with his 
eyes the truth which shone for him, that truth at 
last begins to shine for a few men — their Interest is 
kindled and a new Science, as we say, has been born. 
But this science has been really bom in the one man 
whose Interest was of such a kind that he caught 
Meaning where no other man found it. 

Thus Sciences are born. Out into the wilderness of 
the Possibilities of Meaning, where never human Inter- 
est set foot, the Genius goes and builds a very world of 
Truth and lives therein and then other men move in 
and this region of Truth becomes a Science. This is 
the history of every Science. Some Prometheus 
brings fire down from heaven. It is generally the 
case also that he is bound to the Mountain of Man's 
Blindness to suffer all his life. 

The Genius does not need to be educated in the 
sense that the term is usually employed. Yet his is 
a wonderful education, which in itself presents the 
Philosophy of Education. His education goes on 
while other men sleep, or laugh, or jest or rest. His 
thought has a single resting place when it comes 



INTEREST AND THE GENIUS. 247 

home from the excursions of business or social 
demands. 

The problems which the teacher sets for the pupil, 
which the professor insists that the student con- 
sider, are ever before him. He is fascinated by 
these problems. He struggles with them. He 
seeks to explain them. Interest flashes forth a glint 
of meaning for him away yonder in what seems to 
him an impenetrable wilderness. The fascination is 
upon him. He follows the seeming will-'o-the-wisp. 
His Interest dwells on this glint of meaning. The 
second Interest-Moment begins for him and so, on 
and on, the process goes. 

Thus it is seen that the so-called uneducated 
genius is educated after all. The difference between 
him and the college bred man is simply this : In 
his case his own bent — the impulsive tendencies of 
his Interest — have set the problem, while, in th 
case of the college man, the professor has set the 
problem. 

(4) The emphasis placed upon Memory in Edu- 
cation is, from the standpoint of this Philosophy of 
Education, one of the great evils of the day. To 
attempt to bring a pupil or a student to remember a 
thing is, as has been seen in the analytic psycho- 
logical section of this volume, a misnomer. There 



248 OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES. 

is no such thing as the faculty of Memory in the 
ordinary use of that term by psychologists. 

There are certain instinctive Coefficient Judgments 
lohich are functioned forth by cognitive Interest ivhich 
decide luhether the Judgment- Cluster of ivhich they 
form "part slmll stand as a " Memory" for us. This is 
all there is in so-called memory. 

Yet many Educators will take a line of work and 
insist that the pupil drive it home upon his Memory. 
Now the only way this can be done is to drive it 
home upon his Interest. Then, since Interest- 
Moments tend to become instinctive, the next time, 
when the teacher thinks that the pupil's memory 
is working, instinctive Interest-Moment processes 
are going on and that which was learned is being 
recited because of these processes. 

Hence, to be true to the Philosophy of Education, 
a scientific and careful study of the trend of childish 
Interest is necessary. There is in the childish mind 
vast instinctive Interest-Moment possibilities. What 
these possibilities are, in what order easiest develop- 
ment may be made, what studies are best suited 
to appeal to only the absolutely instinctive Interest 
processes at first, just when the attempt should be 
made to arouse the deliberative Interest-Moment, 
whether there be danger to Personality if this is 
aroused too soon in the child's life, just what part 



INSTINCTIVE MENTAL POSSIBILITIES. 249 

in educative work the instinctive Interest- Moment 
must bear to the deliberate Interest-Moment, are 
problems worthy of the attention of the greatest 
scholars of the day. 

Here is a wonderful trunk which had been packed 
by many hands — precious are its contents but won- 
derfully fragile — the contents seem to be interlaced 
and interwoven. We must needs send for one who 
is an artist in his line that the trunk be properly 
unpacked. The mind of the child is just this 
trunk — vast and wonderful are the possibilities 
which the Past has stored therein. To unpack 
these contents, or rather these possibilities, is the 
work of Education, and the way best to do so is the 
problem of the Philosophy of Education. But who 
knows, in any sense, as much of what we may call 
the strata of the child's instinctive judgment pro- 
cesses as the most unskilled geologist knows of the 
strata of the earth's crust? He was a genius, who, 
in the grasp of his intellect held the facts apper- 
taining to the earth and evolved the science of 
geology, but he, who will hold in his mind the mul- 
tidinous and complex facts presented by the opera- 
tions of the instinctive judgment and who will 
properly classify the strata of instinctive mental 
processes, so that the Educator will know, from 
strict Science, the proper way of approach in begin- 



250 OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES. 

ning to bring forth the instinctive mental powers 
of the child, will be a greater genius than the 
founder of geology. 

Here then, in briefest outline, is the Interest 
Philosophy of Education. Interest is the Basic 
Explaining Principle. 

The instinctive possibilities which the Mind has 
must be brought out by Interest, for it has been Interest 
which packed these possibilites therein. 



CHAPTER IX. 

The Philosophy of Religions. 

Interest is the Basic Explaining Principle in the 
Philosophy of Religions. 

Interest in ivliat we may call the Religious Concepts 
explains the rise, the development and the continuance 
of Religions. Because a certain people had artistic 
Interest their Religion embodies the artistic ele- 
ment. Because another race is intellectual in 
their Interest, the intellectual side is emphasized in 
their Religion. Because another people's Interest 
is sensual, their Religion is sensualistic. 

From this standpoint, one could study a people, 
without knowing their Religion, and from a knowl- 
edge of their Interests gather much knowledge of 
their Religion. True, this particular people may 
have traditions or written records which are counted 
sacred and which help to prevent the present In- 
terest from affecting the trend of religious thought, 
} T et even here the Interest of the people will largely 
type the Religion. 



252 OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES. 

The Christian Religion, although possessing the 
greatest of sanctions, has, in the centuries past, re- 
received a hundred different variations dictated by the 
Interest, (not the Self-interest) of men. Some have 
found certain doctrines interesting and lo ! a sect 
with these doctrines as the basic principles. 

Another sect have been interested in a line of 
doctrine the direct opposite, and so stand as the 
very antithesis of the first. 

The explanation, from a human standpoint, of 
Judaism, is that the Jews were interested in the con- 
ception of Jehovah. In those times when, in their 
God, their Interest was vital, they were unified. 
When their Interest failed they fell apart. "Je- 
hovah was," as one of their sacred writers said, 
" their standard. " 

Just as from the spring on the mountain side, the 
streamlet can be traced through miles of meander- 
ings, down to the valley and on and on through 
stretches of verdure, until it becomes a river and at 
last a pathway of commerce, so a heathen Religion, 
had we the data at hand, could be traced by the 
single means of the Interest of the people. 

Where there is no interest in this doctrine or 
that — or in this aspect of faith or that — these things 
atrophy and become but dead excrescences on the 



CHANGES IN KELIGIOUS BELIEF. 253 

living body of the cult, as it is held by the people 
of that particular age. 

Hence, many of the changes of Religion, on the 
part of heathen people, are due to the gradual 
approximation of that stage of Interest in the 
newer faith, at which the change can come rapidly. 

The missionary finds that this explanation of the 
Philosophy of Religion is true. His experience 
shows that where a race is stolid and fixed in their 
Interests, where, if their faith does not teach im- 
mortality, there is no Interest in that doctrine, that 
his doctrine has no quickening power. Whereas, if 
the missionary finds a ready Interest in the truth he 
brings, his work is easy. 

It is to be noted here that the question as to what 
it is which quickens Interest in the religion is not 
discussed. The point is made that Interest must be 
quickened in the doctrines of the Christian Religion 
before converts to that faith can be gained, and that 
hence there is no exception in the case of the true 
Religion to the rule that Interest is the explaining- 
principle here. It may be stated, incidentally, that 
the author has, in his thinking, been brought 
to take up the question as to whether Interest may 
not be quickened (1) by Externality, (2) by Mind 
and (3) by w T hat we call the Spiritual. 



254 OUTLINES OF NEW PHILOSOPHIES. 

According to this view, there have been few relig- 
ions founded by impostors. There has stood forth 
some one man who, like Buddha or Mohammed, was 
intensely interested in that he held and taught. He 
himself was a flame of Interest in that he called his 
doctrine. We find one or two or a few who re- 
sponded to his teachings, whose Interest was kin- 
dled. Thus the assimilative process went on until a 
nation, it may be, was built into the new faith as a 
living whole. 

The law which other religions follow, the true 
Religion itself, when it was given, followed also. In 
"the fullness of time" the Messiah came. Had He 
come three hundred years or seven hundred years 
before the time of his Advent, there would have 
been found none or not enough to become interested 
in Him as the type of Messiah he was. But, 
coming when he did, he found an Anna, a Simeon, 
a John, a James, a Simon Peter, etc., who were 
drawn by the bands of Interest, which soon passed 
to love, and He thus found a few who were, by their 
Interest in Him, assimilated to Himself. Christian- 
ity, in later centuries, often grew, because, with kings 
and emperors as her votaries, it was Self-Interest 
which prompted the convert's adherence ; but the 
real and permanent growth came as men became in- 
terested in her truth, her ritual, her practice and the 



INTEREST IS THE NEXUS OF A RELIGION. 255 

life and immortality she offered. Just as Interest has 
been the single great constructive and determining 
factor in Psychology, in the field of Social Psychol- 
ogy, in all the extent of History, etc., so, in the 
domain of Religions, Interest has been building. 
Interest, the Nexus of the mind, as has been seen, 
is the Nexus of the body politic and of society and 
also the Nexus of the Church and of Religions. 
Interest is thus the explaining principle in the sphere of 
the Philosophy of Religions. 



PART III. 

Synthetic Philosophy — The Interest 
Synthetic Philosophy. 



17 



CHAPTER I. 

Preliminary View of Interest Synthetic 
Philosophy. 

We owe a certain debt to the Truth we find. For 
Meaning to reveal itself to us and to do this in such 
a way as that we feel no doubt, necessarily implies 
an obligation on our part to this Meaning or this 
Truth. The one reason therefore that I even think 
of such a thing as a Synthetic Philosophy is that 
the Meaning-Glint of an Interest Synthetic Phi- 
losophy came to me in my thinking. But the very 
thought of such a thing seemed too daring. 

That first Glint of Meaning in that direction 
having come to me, however, I could not stay the 
line of thought. The stones of several Philoso- 
phies seemed to take their place of themselves in 
the wall. From the earlier period of my thinking 
on Interest, the line of philosophical work has 
been part and parcel of the whole, and the Philoso- 
phies have naturally taken place together in an 
Interest Synthetic Philosophy. 



260 INTEREST SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY. 

That which explains the Human Mind itself 
should be the explaining Principle in the Philoso- 
phies. It is maintained that the Human Mind has 
not been seen to be the real and potent explaining 
principle in all circles of Human Life, because the 
essential nature of the Mind itself has not been 
seen. Only as we stress the fact that Psychology is 
the Science of Interest, can the Human Mind stand 
forth clear and distinct as a Synthetic Philosophy in 
itself. The concept "Consciousness," as has been 
said, is Static. What idea of progress, of action, of 
marvelous ability, does the statement, "I am con- 
scious," convey? But the statement, "I am inter- 
ested," has connotations of another kind. Here 
the essential of Mind stands forth before us as it exists, 
ready for action. I can find no better term than the 
term Dynamic to express just this view of Mind. 
Now it has been this acting Mind — this Interest — 
which explains the facts of Mind. 

As has been said, there is a series of powers and 
qualities catalogued by the psychological authorities 
which one feels must find much farther reduction 
before the fundamental truth can be found. Asso- 
ciation of Ideas, Memory, Representation, Perception, 
Conception, Apperception, Imagination, etc., cannot 
stand segregated departments, as it were, of Mental 
ability. We, of this age, may be satisfied with such 



A SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY CAN BE FOUND. 261 

a view, but the thinkers of coming centuries will inevi- 
tably throw themselves against the great Problem of 
the Reduction of this complexity to simplicity. The 
thinkers of coming times will inevitably posit, as funda- 
mental truths, statements something like these: 

(1) That Mind itself must be a clear and simple 
explanation of the facts of Life, for Mind has produced 
Human Life. 

(2) That, if the idea of Mind or Consciousness does 
not give true explaining light, there must be examination 
made of this concept itself 

(3) That scientific basic truth is being reached when 
that which is clearly seen to be the explaining truth in 
Psychology is seen also to be the explaining truth in 
Social Psychology, in Education, in Law and Govern- 
ment, in History, in all Life Development, in the field 
of the Religions, etc., etc. 

The search after a Synthetic Philosophy is valid. 
Spencer, although some derided him, was but 
expressing the necessary and inevitable demand of 
M'n id that unity of explanation be found. That the 
views here advanced are simpler than those Spencer 
advanced — that they are views which the laymen 
may more readily understand, should not be held 
against the positions herein presented. The axiom 



262 INTEREST SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY. 

must stand that Truth is simple — Truth is of such a 
character that when we read it we think, this I really 
almost knew before — this has a ring of familiarity 
about it. 

The ring of familiarity which the views of this 
book may have to any one, comes because he has 
heard the ring of humanity's heart throb, not because 
he had read these views in scientific literature. 
However old these truths may be in human life, 
they are, so far as I know, after examining the 
American, German, French and English literature, 
new in literature and in science. 

The axiom must and will stand as a beacon 
light for Science of the coming centuries — a Synthetic 
Philosophy must be found — a Synthetic Philosophy 
already made, lies hidden in the mines of Truth. All 
that is necessary to find this true Synthetic Philosophy 
is to search and ponder, fascinated by the search. 

Now the question, raised in this part of this 
present volume, is this: Is the true and real Synthetic 
Philosophy, Interest Synthetic Philosophy? These 
chapters are presented in the hope that thinkers 
may take under consideration this question. 



CHAPTER II. 

Interest Synthetic Philosophy. 

In the preceding chapter the question as to the 
possibility of a Synthetic Philosophy has been 
touched upon. It has been insisted that such a 
thing is possible. Let us suppose that various 
Philosophies have been worked out — that we have a 
Philosophy of Religion, a Philosophy of History, a 
Philosophy of Social Psychology, a Philosophy of 
Education, etc. After long and assiduous labor, we 
have, let us suppose, reached what to us are funda- 
mental explaining principles in each field. There 
stands now for us a separate and distinct Philosophy 
in each field. Yet the same spirit, which drove us 
to inquire as to the "Why" of things and which 
impelled us to continue our investigations until we 
reached what for us is fundamental truth in a par- 
ticular field of Philosophy, will lead us to continue our 
investigations in order to discover whether xve cannot 
find an explaining principle fundamental to each and, 
all the explaining principles of the different Philosophies 
which ice have found. 



264 INTEREST SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY. 

(1) Certainly Mind lias produced Human Life. 
However vast the deposits which Human Life have 
made — however complex the systems of develop- 
ment which are found — however different the 
sciences which appertain to man, if Mind has been 
the constructive factor, Mind must explain all this. 
The explanation of the building which stands before 
us is found only in the architect's own mind. So 
the building and fabric of all human Philosophies 
have their explanation in Mind itself. 

Now it is maintaned : 

(a) That Interest is essentially human Mind and 
that human Mind is essentially Interest. 

(b) That when, without any reference to ivhai Inter- 
est is, ive study Human Life from the standpoint of 
Interest toe find that Philosophies can be written from 
this standpoint. 

(c) That since that which is essentially Mind and 
that ivhich is the explaining principle in the facts gath- 
ered about Mind, and that ivhich is the explaining 
principle of the Philosophies, are one and the same 
thing, we have necessarily a Synthetic Philosophy and 
this is Interest Synthetic Philosophy. 

(2) The failure, partial or complete, of other 
attempts in the line of a Synthetic Philosophy 
should cause one to consider well the attempt to 



INTEREST MARSHALS ALL THE FACTS. 265 

outline a Synthetic Philosophy. The fact that au- 
thors in the past have pressed too far their explain- 
ing principle should be taken into account. All this 
leads to the position, however, that one must be 
careful in his building — not that one must not 
undertake to build. 

That there are subsidiary explaining principles in 
the domain of each Philosophy is not denied. 
These must be searched out and properly used. 
The thought is not that there are no Colonels or Cap- 
tains ivhicli have helped to marsJial the army of facts, 
but that the General who has marshalled the very Col- 
onels and the Captains, and thus, through them, mar- 
shalled the multitudinous army of facts, is the Prin- 
ciple of Interest. 

(3) As has been stated, the reason for this 
attempt to write Synthetic Philosophy is found in 
the fact that it has been forced upon the author. 

The only credit that I take to myself for the truth 
found here, if it be truth, is that for long years in 
my thought I have been intent upon the problems 
herein presented. The Meaning-Glints, which have 
led me on in these lines of Thought, came intui- 
tively. In a second I was in another sphere of 
Thought. Hence, to be true to what is held to be 



266 INTEREST SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY. 

the truth, I must attempt to write Synthetic Philos- 
ophy from the standpoint of Interest. 

(4) The positions of this part of the book, and 
in fact, of all the volume, are in but mere outline. 

It may be, therefore, that the writer does not 
make himself clear, that he does not properly stress 
points in the chain of thought which should be am- 
plified into chapters, and which are presented only 
in some thesis position as those of Chapter XII, 
Part I. The position of Chapter I, Part I, that In- 
terest is the Mental Dynamic, the Basic Principle of 
Psychology, was to the writer, when it flashed upon 
him, far removed from all he had read and heard 
before, but the positions, advanced in the remaining 
chapters of Part I, are still farther removed from the 
line of present psychological thought. Hence, the 
Interest Psychology, upon which the very Interest 
Philosophy is based, has to be first examined by 
thinkers, and tested. The positions of Interest as 
cognitive, of Interest as identical with the Conscious- 
ness of Process, of Interest as the Psychological Ego 
and the Psychological Subject, of Instantaneous Reca- 
pitulation, of Instinctive Judgment, of the Genetic Ex- 
planation of Cognition, of the Genetic Explanation of 
the Emotions, of the Interest-Moment, the Meaning- 
Glint as the unit of Cognitive Content, etc., etc., must 



PROBLEMS TO BE CONSIDERED. 267 

all be tested by thinkers before they come really to 
the testing of a single Interest Philosophy. 

Then, of course, the question of Interest in the 
sphere of the Philosophy of Psychology, must be taken 
up and tests made here. The same processes must be 
followed as regards the place of Interest in Social Psy- 
chology, and as regards Interest's place in all Life De- 
velopment, from the hiuest biological life to the highest 
human life. All the line of thought in regard to In- 
terest's place as the Explaining Principle in the Phil- 
osophy of History and of Religions would have to be 
considered as well as the question of Interest's place in 
the development of Law and Government, its place in 
the Philosophy of Ethics and of Education, etc. 

Only then can the thinker take up the question of 
Interest as a Synthetic Philosophy. 

Hence all that the author might write as to Inter- 
est Synthetic Philosophy would have to await decis- 
ions reached, appertaining to his positions in Psy- 
chology, and to his positions in the field of the sep- 
arate Philosophies. Hence, it is thought that the 
attempt to amplify in any degree, the position that 
Interest Synthetic Philosophy is the True Synthetic 
Philosophy may be delayed, while the problems 
which lead up to this position, are being considered. 
To the mind of the writer, however, the position is 



268 INTEREST SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY. 

I 

one well matured. The problems which presented 
themselves in Psychology, it is thought, have been 
in some sense satisfactorily explained, and the way 
opened to the proper presentation of the position 
that the only Synthetic Philosophy is Interest Syn- 
thetic Philosophy. 



Pi^RT IV. 

The Philosophy of Interest Itself. 



CHAPTER I. 

The Philosophy of Interest (i. e. the Philosophy of 
Synthetic Interest Philosophy iteslf.) 

My view is that Interest, as the Psychological 
Ego, is itself a manifestation — an expression. 

But of what is it an expression? Of the mere 
chemical processes of the brain neurones? Is In- 
terest but a flame coming up from the depths of 
Matter itself — an efflorescence upon the bosom of 
the material ocean? 

But what is the Material? How is it known, 
even if Interest be but the result of chemical pro- 
cesses in brain neurones, that the so-called Material, 
is Material, after all, in our sense of the term ? 
How can you prove that the so-called Material is 
not really the so-called Spiritual ? Let us suppose 
the Spiritual to be hard and fixed in its conditions 
and to have ever compassed Mind on all sides, and 
just the same results would exist as do exist. 
Matter, so one of the latest theories goes, is bits of 
electric points ; why then may not the Material be 
the very Spiritual ? 
18 



274 THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTEREST ITSELF. 

But this aside, it is to be said : The views pre- 
sented here constitute an absolute antithesis to 
the materialistic tendencies of much Psychology. 
The view here is that instead of mere biological facts 
reaching up to explain Mentality, Mentality reaches 
down and explains biological facts. It is the view 
here that the supposition that Matter first brought 
forth Mind, and that then this inchoate Mind 
turned to dominate Matter cannot be held. The 
thought that it can be shown that Life is evolved 
from Matter has nothing of the strength it pos- 
sessed twenty years ago. Shall we, however, go 
beyond such a view and maintain that Mind itself is 
but a flame from the depths of the Material ? 

Instead of Matter bringing forth biological life 
and biological life bringing forth Mind, why may it 
not be possible that Mind or Interest has been the 
constructive Principle itself? 

Is the Mind dependent upon a brain, or is, in 
strict evolutionary sense, a brain dependent upon a 
Mind ? The two are now found together and Mater- 
ialism holds that the brain makes the Mind. But, 
from a strict evolutionary stanclpoiDt, the view herein 
presented is (see Chapter III, Part II, on Life De- 
velopment, on which a friend and I are collaborating) 
that the factor in Life Development has been Mental. 
Then the Materialist has to say : " Matter brought 



IS THEKE A PHILOSOPHY OF INTEREST? 275 

forth Mind, but having brought forth Mind her 
work was done in this line and Mind has done the 
rest." But this cannot be the case. That which 
brought forth Mind must continue to support Mind 
and to direct Mind, and to give the bent to Mind. 

It is said, in the Philosophy of History (see Part 
II), that the secret of civilization's advance has been 
that Interest has risen to higher things. But the 
question conies back, why has Interest risen to 
higher things? What is the Philosophy of In- 
terest Synthetic Philosophy itself? Interest there 
is, and Interest constructs all life — it is the explain- 
ing Principle of all Life — it is the Synthetic Philo- 
sophy. But what then ? Is the last word said ? 

After reducing all Philosophies to the one prob- 
lem of Interest we have to ask : Is there a Philo- 
sophy of Interest itself? Can the problem of what 
this Ego is, which holds in its bosom the explana- 
tion of so many mysteries, be solved? The ad- 
vantages of an Interest Synthetic Philosophy now 
become apparent. For now the deepest problems 
of the ages can be reduced to the one problem of 
Interest. Interest, the solution of so many prob- 
lems, becomes the problem we now attempt to solve. 
It is here, in the Philosophy of Interest Synthetic 
Philosophy itself, that great thinkers may spend 
their lives. It is well to seek to know whither the 



276 THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTEREST ITSELF. 

ship is bound by investigating what is aboard the 
craft, and by noting the effect of wind and wave on 
the vessel, but it is better to seek to know the ves- 
sel's destination by a study of the direction from 
which it has come and in which it is bound. So it 
is well to study, that which this vessel, Interest, 
which plows the unknown spaces of the great 
void, has aboard ; it is well to note that the very way 
in which the vessel has been constructed explains 
the position, situation and relationship of all 
which it has on board and of all which it has ever 
carried. It is better, however, to ask what the 
vessel itself is. This is the problem which I venture 
to term the Philosophy of Interest itself. 



CHAPTER II. 
The Conscience. 

(This chapter on Conscience is placed here, instead 
of where it properly belongs in the Psychological 
Section, because it is thought that the Philosophy 
of Interest may gain some light from certain posi- 
tions which, it seems, one must take as regards Con- 
science. There are at least three great questions as 
regards Conscience : 

(1) Is the feeling in Conscience an intellectual feel- 
ing or a primal sensation (affective) of some kind? 

(2) If Conscience be an intellectual feeling what is 
the nature of the Interest-Moment in which it is pro- 
duced, and ivhat is the Raw Material of the Judgment- 
Cluster or idea in which it is involved? 

(3) Since the Judgment-Burst or Meaning-Glint in 
Conscience is instinctive and universal, why does not 
this Meaning-Glint answer to Reality?) 

Is Conscience a mere feeling of the "Ought" 
which, as some teach, has developed from the 
"Must"? Has Conscience thus developed from the 
constraint laid upon individuals in the past, and does 



278 THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTEREST ITSELF. 

Analytic Psychology reveal the fact that there is in 
man nothing save the absolutely animal nature 
which has taken on what may be called higher 
types? Is the Ought, which seems to rule our lives, 
an instinctive feeling which has come up from the 
mere fact that men have been under constraint? 

(1) Now, the feeling of Ought seems to be an in- 
tellectual feeling. Hence the question arises as to 
whether this be not the feeling which accompanies a 
Meaning-Glint or a Judgment-Burst, and whether 
Conscience has not a Judgment here, fundamental to 
the so-called Feeling. In all functioning of so-called 
Conscience there is an apprehension of Meaning — 
the Meaning of Oughtness is given, and, with this, 
that feeling is given which some think to be the 
whole of Conscience. The real question of Con- 
science is as to this Meaning in Oughtness. What 
is this Meaning — has it followed the law of develop- 
ment which all Meaning has followed, i., e., has it 
developed because of fast and fixed necessity in the 
face of Reality ? There is no Meaning which Univer- 
sal Instinctive Judgment gives which has not thus 
developed. The Universal Instinctive Judgment 
has played its part in survival — it has helped in the 
battle of life — it has proven a real interpretation of 
Reality and has thus become a part of human 



DOES CONSCIENCE START WITH THE "MUST"? 279 

endowment because it is true to Keality. But how 
as to the Meaning which is in the intellectual feeling 
of Conscience? This has come because there have 
been Interest-Moments which issue in a Judgment- 
Burst or Meaning-Glint. Now is this Meaning- 
Glint which is involved in Conscience unlike all 
other instinctive Meaning-Glints in that it tells 
nothing of Beality ? 

(2) As has been said, some authorities hold that 
the Ought comes from the Must. This can only 
mean that the Judgment-Cluster or concept of Ought 
has as its raw material the Judgment-Glint Must — 
that genetically there is a glint of the Must at the 
base of all Ought. 

One trouble with such a view is that insistence 
here is placed upon the idea of Subjection, i. e., the 
Idea in Must, and this idea of Subjection, which is 
adverse to the evolutionary view that the strongest 
must survive, is made a basic principle in survival — 
such a basic principle or fact as that only those sur- 
vive who have it. 

(3) Moreover, when we come to a problem in 
our philosophies which we cannot solve, we are 
thrown back upon the answer of the " Must," which 
is in itself no proper explanation. We have seen 
that the Mental Object, L e., the world in fact, is 



280 THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTEREST ITSELF. 

explained not from the standpoint of "Must," but 
from the standpoint of a Subject. Why may it not 
be that the deep problems, which are the residuum 
problems of the Philosophies, find their explanation 
in a Subject as well ? The orbit of Interest has 
been eccentric to a degree which has forced upon 
the author's thought the question as to how this 
is to be explained. That there has been progress 
Interest well explains, but what sets the trend of 
this progress? That man has a religious nature, 
in some sense, must be admitted, but how came 
this — what is its utility from the evolutionary stand- 
point, and how came it to arise so early in human 
development as to have become universally instinc- 
tive ? ' 

(4) There is always danger on an author's part in 
forcing an explaining Principle too far. He should 
take warning by the past. The evolutionary hypo- 
thesis is already burdened with difficulties of expla- 
nation — there are great questions to be settled as 
regards it. Hence, one feels cause to pause when 
he attempts to write Philosophy from a certain 
standpoint, to examine the validity of his explaining 
Principle as something which explains all life. The 
author can only give that which to him seems the 
most feasible hypothesis. He maintains that as the 



WHAT IS THE BEST HYPOTHESIS? '281 

facts bear out the theory of the Instinctive Judg- 
ment, the facts bear out the theory that Interest can 
be affected by something besides Human Mind and 
Externality. This chapter is one of the last of these 
papers to be written. The thesis that Interest may 
be affected by something beside Mind and Matter 
would not have been here maintained had it not been 
for the line of thought pursued in the Outlines of 
Philosophies. The fact stands that only as we 
maintain the above thesis can the trend which Inter- 
est has followed be explained. 

Science, therefore, must needs determine whether 
so-called Spiritualism is based upon such a fact 
as that Interest can be affected by that we call 
a Spiritual World — whether the results attained 
by the Societies of Psychical Research have any 
bearing here — whether the facts of religion have 
not some explanation here — whether Conscience is 
not best explained thus — whether certain instinctive 
religious judgments are not best explained thus — 
whether the unexplained residuum in the Philoso- 
phies is not best explained in this way. Science 
must have simplicity of explanation, and properly 
so. She does not turn a deaf ear to the wonderful 
because it is wonderful. She insists that her hypo- 
theses must be fact-explaining hypotheses, and that 
they must be as simple as possible. Hence, as a 



282 THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTEREST ITSELF. 

fact-explaining hypothesis, this hypothesis, that 
Interest may be affected by something beside human 
Mind and Matter, is advanced. You may call 
this unknown influence affecting Interest, God or 
the Spiritual World or what you please, but to the 
author it seems that it must be posited. Then, if 
that be the case, the only scientific way to posit it is 
to write, in Psychology itself, that Mind or Interest 
may be affected by something beside human Mind 
or Matter. 

Hence the question is raised as to whether 
the raw material of the Conscience Judgment- 
Burst, i. e., of the Ought concept is an impres- 
sion arising from what we call another world. The 
proper elaboration of the above thought would 
require extended treatment. That Conscience has a 
Judgment in it is certain. That this is an Instinctive 
Judgment which has become a racial Instinctive Judg- 
ment is clear. The battle must be as to the raiv mate- 
rial of this Judgment which Conscience has. To my 
mind the Philosophy of Interest itself cannot be 
properly written unless it be written that Interest may 
be affected (1) by Externality, (2) by Interest itself 
(3) by what ive may call a Spiritual World. 



CHAPTER III. 

Can Interest be Affected by Ought Beside Human 
Mind and Matter? 

It may seem passing strange to even suggest such 
a supposition as that Interest may be influenced 
by something beside Human Mind and Matter. It 
would seem that Science has postulated as an axiom 
that there is no Spiritual World, and that the sup- 
position of such a thing cannot be allowed. 

Now, it is readily admitted that Science has suf- 
fered many things by the disposition to unload upon 
the Spiritual World one's inability to explain the 
natural world. The absence of any disposition to 
think about the great problems of life or the lack of 
any ability to consider these problems may be con- 
cealed by the assertion that one, who holds with 
the Church, need not consider such things. There 
are thousands, in the world today, who really think 
that, as regards the great problems of Free Will, 
of Personality, of Conscience, of Immortality, of 
God, of the Soul, etc., they have firm and decided 
convictions, whereas they have absolutely nothing 
but traditions — the truth of none of these great prob- 



284 THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTEREST ITSELF. 

lerns has, in any sense, been assimilated by them. They 
have the ivord merely ; there has been no series of 
Interest-Moments for them in ivhich Interest func- 
tioned forth Meaning for the term God, or for the 
term Immortality. Anything which may be difficult 
of explanation and which they are indisposed to 
ponder upon, is made a mystery, and its explana- 
tion is referred to the Spiritual World. There are 
thousands who woidd groan, if , for the space of an 
hour, they had to think intently upon the great and fun- 
damental problems of existence, ivho, yet, from the 
heights of their vast and colossal ignorance, look down 
and pass judgment upon men, icho, fascinated by these 
same problems, never rise in the morning without 
pondering them or never sleep at night without 
meditating upon them and who live and have their 
being in the very atmosphere of these fundamental 
questions. 

Science has had so much of this disposition 
of mind to contend against — she has found such 
ready dependence placed in the hypothesis of a 
Spiritual World that she has seemingly swung off 
almost absolutely to the other extreme, and one of 
the most fundamental axioms which Science has, it 
appears, is that there is nc Spiritual World and that 
there can be none. Then, too, the evolutionary 
hypothesis, with its insistence upon matter and 



TRUTH IS TRUTH WHEREVER FOUND. 285 

mere biological life as explaining all, has fixed Sci- 
ence in its view that it is absolutely unscientific to 
even dream that there can be a Spiritual World. 
Of course, on Sunday, it is proper to take the 
Spiritual World as a fact and hear some discussion 
about it, but for scientific thought it must not be 
considered. 

In the early centuries of the Christian Faith, the 
Christian scholars were intent upon explaining their 
Eeligion and their Philosojjhy so that they could be 
shown to agree. There seems little of this disposi- 
tion today. Science must swing on its way with 
never a thought for that the Church holds to be 
fundamental and absolute truth, and too often the 
Church goes on its way with never a thought for 
that which Science maintains is absolute fact. 

Now, truth is truth wherever found. It matters 
not whether it be between the lids of a Bible or in 
rocks, groves and trees. To neglect the considera- 
tion of any sphere of even so-called truth, in con- 
stucting scientific hypothesis, is plainly wrong. 

My position is that the scientist cannot reject a 
hypothesis because it comes from a certain source. 
There must be no question as to whence the hypo- 
thesis comes — there must be no question as to how 
much the hypothesis may have made Science suffer 



286 THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTEREST ITSELF. 

in the past — the only question is as to whether the 
hypothesis is the best which can be formulated. 

Noiv to explain Interest there are two hypotheses, 
and only tivo. 

The first is that Matter and Human Mind together 
Jiave produced Mind. Now this, necessarily, since 
Blind (human Mind) is not eternal as to the past, re- 
duces to this — that Matter produces Mind. But we 
have, from our psychological analysis of Part I, firm 
ground under our feet when we talk of a Subject, 
whatever this may mean. There can be no question 
that Interest is the Subject of the Mental Object, 
hence, the above hypothesis, that Matter produces 
Mind, means that Matter is the Subject of Mind — 
that as the Mental Object is flashed forth by Inter- 
est, Interest itself is flashed forth by Matter. 
Matter thus first produces the interpreter, and is 
then interpreted. 

Now, Science has to choose between this view and 
the supposition of a Spiritual World, There is no 
other alternative. 

It is not to be supposed, for a single instant, that 
psycho-physical parallelism gives any aid when we 
come to philosophize. Either Matter is the fun- 
damental fact or else there is a Spiritual World. 
This alternative may not be written clearly and plainly 



THE TWO VIEWS HELD TODAY. 287 

in text-books and magazines, but, none the less, it is 
written in the minds of thinkers. The kind of tacit 
understanding not to raise the wraith of discussion does 
not prevent men from thinking and deciding, and in 
the world today there are just hvo classes of scientists : 

(1) Those ivho, in their heart, hold that Matter is the 
fundamental and that Mind is but its efflorescence, and 

(2) Those who hold, in their heart, to a Spiritual 
World. 

Now there can be no doubt that the sympathies 
of many are with the view that there is a Spiritual 
World, but the facts seem adverse to such a posi- 
tion. There is many a scientist, today, whose sym- 
pathy is with the declaration that there is a Spirit- 
ual World, who, in his own heart, feels that there is 
not sufficient evidence to think of such a thing as a 
Eeality. 

The usual line of thought is this : Science must 
have simplicity of explanation. Science abhors the 
postulation of a number of explaining principles. 
Matter is a fact — it is a Reality — it explains much. 
It should, therefore, explain all. To posit the Spiritual 
World is to go out of one's way — it is to multiply 
explaining principles. It is to resort to ivliat we do 
not know — it is, in a word, unscientific. Matter is real 



288 THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTEREST ITSELF. 

to us ; the so-called Spiritual World is not ; hence the 
so-called Spiritual World must not he considered. 

But the vieiv of Psychology, given in these chapters, 
shoivs that Reality comes through Meaning. (See 
Chap. XXI, Part I.) Only as there is Meaning is 
there Reality, and wherever there is Meaning there is 
Reality. The ivhole problem of Reality reduces to 
this. The extent of Reality is even being widened. 
Franklin widened it when he began the science of 
Electricity. His Interest found Meaning, and Re- 
ality in the electrical field was the result. 

But Reality is that which Meaning, tested and 
authenticated, gives. Reality does not exist simply 
because I imagine it to exist. It does not exist 
because I merely have an image in my mind. 

The only ivay to be sure that Meaning bespeaks Re- 
ality is to have this Meaning tried and tested as though 
by fire. Now this fire which has been the trial and test 
of Meaning has been the struggle of Life Development or 
Evolution itself. If the Meaning has stood this test — if 
still there be this interpretation, this sign, ive must accept 
that which it points out as Reality — all the testing we 
can give has thus been given. We can do no more. 
This is, in all cases, the limit of our testing of Reality. 

Now, of all testing of Meaning the absolutely funda- 
mental and conclusive method is that of Meaning- Sur- 
vival. The thesis is held and is stated here, in order 



THE ONE AUTHENTICATION OF MEANING. 289 

that the author may have opportunity at a later day to 
ivork out the position properly ', that the Basic Explain- 
ing Principle in the Science of Epistemology is this 
Principle of Meaning- Survival as described here. 

This method of testing Meaning is, in fact, our 
method as individuals — the Meanings, which have 
lived with us, not for a few days, but for years, 
which have been beacon lights for us, which have 
stood all the storm of the years and which have sur- 
vived, live now for us with increased clearness and 
power. But this is a thousand fold truer as regards 
Humanity or Mentality as a whole. The one and final 
authentication of Meaning has been Meaning- Survival. 
The storm and stress of the centuries and of the ages — 
the fierce battles for ascendency on all the Past — 
the unending conflict for self-preservation, has placed 
transcendent premium upon valid and true Meaning. 

The animal whose Meaning was valid, whose in- 
terpretation of Reality was correct and who thus had 
the power of best reading the signs of sensation (af- 
fective) ranked highest in the scale of those who 
could hope to survive. 

Thus the animal which had a better sense for Space 
Meaning (this Space Meaning being, according to 
the view of these papers, an interpretation of 
Space Eeality), had a vast advantage over his 
19 



290 THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTEREST ITSELF. 

competitor whose Space Meaning was invalid. 
For the first was accurate with the blow of his 
paw or in his reach for food, while the second 
was not. The first had advantages every day over 
the second, and thus there was the Space Meaning- 
Survival. This Space Meaning- Survival ive have in 
what is called the Category of Space. For all animals 
and for man this interpretation of Beality has sur- 
vived. It has become written into the very texture 
of our mind itself, as it were. Or, to speak accord- 
ing to what is held by the author to be the scien- 
tific explanation (See Part I, chapters on Cogni- 
tion, and especially Chapter XII), Interest has so 
often functioned this Judgment-Burst or Meaning- Glint 
that it is basic in the Judgment- Cluster which is a 
percept. Just as there is always bread, at a meal, 
whatever else may or may not be found on the table, 
so there is always in every percept a Meaning-Glint 
of Space. Here is a case of the Survival of the 
Fittest which has counted for far more as regards real 
progress than the survival of any species of animals. 
In fact, in this single Space Meaning-Survival — 
i. e., the survival of the space interpretation — there 
is the survival of all life, for life cannot continue 
without it. Hence, according to strict evolutionary 
theory, those animals, which were not exact and 
accurate in their instinctive space judgment, soon 



PRESENT THEORIES OF EVOLUTION WRONG. 291 

went to the wall. That which has been stated in 
other places of this volume is repeated here — the 
absolute and essential conditions of animal survival, 
supposing Evolution to be true, were not in any sense, 
those which Darwin, Huxley, Wallace, etc,, of yester- 
day, and Baldwin, Morgan, etc., of today, hold to have 
been the essential conditions. The whole matter of sur- 
vival, the whole question of selection, the whole trend of 
Evolution ivas decided long before those later conditions 
arose where their theories of Evolution can come into 
play. They start with the animal, however minute 
he may be, as a thing luhich sees, hears, smells, tastes, 
remembers even. Now the p>osition of these papers is 
that the absolutely decisive battles of Evolution ivere 
already fought when the animal stood forth, capable of 
seeing, smelling, tasting, etc. For vast processes of 
judging had to be passed through before an animal 
series reached the point where the animal could see 
with accuracy. 

In this one matter of differentiating light from 
darkness, which we do instantly, what stages of 
struggle once went on ? Only those animals could 
have survived which developed the instinctive ability 
to make this differentiation and then to use this 
instinctive judgment differentiation of light from 
darkness as a background against which objects of 
one sort or another might be brought out. In the 



292 THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTEREST ITSELF. 

mere fact that we distinguish light, what struggles 
do we not recapitulate ! Thus there was not only 
space Meaning-Survival but sight Meaning-Survival. 

Mentality also reached the Meaning-Glint of 
Time. What imagination can picture the first dawn 
of that Meaning-Glint in the first mind in which it 
came ! But come it did and this mind stood forth, 
armed and panoplied for life's struggle, as no other 
mind of that age was. This mind which had gained 
this Meaning-Glint of Time stood forth, the Genius 
of his day, and survived, in virtue of the advantages 
which were his, because he possessed Meaning, i. e., 
interpretation of Reality, which no other Mind had. 

Thus, too, there has been the Time Meaning- 
Survival. The races of animals went down in 
which this did survive. Today Time Meaning lives 
in us — Instinctive Judgment flashes forth the Time 
Meaning-Glint with automatic precision as part of 
the content of each Judgment-Cluster. 

Then, too, there has been Past Meaning- Survival. 
What tremendous advantages in this one thing of 
ability to judge that a thing has been seen before — an 
ability to recognize! Those animals, which had this 
ability, survived and those which did not went down in 
the struggle. 

Time would fail to speak of the Taste, Touch, 
Smell, and Hearing Meaning-Survival. Those ani- 



A SPIRITUAL WORLD. 293 

metis in which Instinctive Judgment processes gave 
Meaning- Glints along these lines survived, and, because 
they survived, there has been the survival of the Mean- 
ing-Glints themselves, in the sense that they have become 
Instinctive Processes. 

Now all this seems, certainly, a far cry to a Spirit- 
ual World. All this seems, it may be, to some, a 
digression from the line of thought of the first part 
of this chapter. The truth, however, is that all this 
leads up to tl\e very thought of the chapter itself For 
the point of all the above is that there has been, in every 
case, the Meaning- Survival of that which is a true and 
absolute interpretation of Reality. But there has been 
also, and this is the point of the whole chapter, Mean- 
ing-Survivals in the sphere of what ice call a Religious 
Nature and Conscience. Are these Meaning- Survivals 
exceptions to the great law which has been already found, 
that all Meaning-Glints, ivhich have survived the storm 
and stress of the ages, are stamped as valid and au- 
thentic? It is repeated that the absolute test of Mean- 
ing's validity is this Survival. But here are Meaning- 
Glints of the Religious Nature which are instinctive and, 
universal — here are Meaning- Glints of Conscience ivhich 
are instinctive and universal — these have survived and 
are Meaning-Survivals. Bo they not interpret or stand 
as signs for Reality ? Science, to be true to her own fun- 
damental laws, must answer that they do. She cannot 



294 THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTEREST ITSELF. 

say that Space Meaning- Survival is the survival of a 
valid Meaning and Conscience Meaning- Survival is the 
survival of an invalid Meaning. She may say this, it 
is true, after she has scrutinized the ivhole situation and 
found sufficient cause to say it, but it is maintained that 
Science is saying this very thing today without giving 
the subject, in any sense, the attention it demands. 

One says : "Matter is a Reality. I know it to be 
a Reality because of Meaning — of interpretation of 
this Reality, tested and tried." "Yes," it is 
answered, " that is all that you know of Matter, 
absolutely all, for Psychological Idealism is true." 

Just so, the so-called Spiritual World is a Reality 
— I know it is a Reality because of Meaning, i. e., of 
interpretation of this Reality, tried and tested by the 
very evolutionary test itself — that of the survival of 
the fittest Meaning. The instinctive Judgments of the 
Religious Nature and of Conscience are in-wrought into 
all humanity and hence, by the great Evolutionary Law, 
laid down in these papers, of the Survival of the Fittest 
Meaning, they must stand as valid and true interpreta- 
tions of Reality. 

If, in one case or in any case, ive hold that the laiv 
here laid down is correct, and that the authentication of 
the validity of Meaning is Meaning- Survival, we must, 
necessarily, hold to this same law in other cases. 



INTEREST AND A SPIRITUAL WORLD. 295 

There is, then, nothing else for us but in our very 
Psychology to write, as a scientific fact, that Interest 
may be affected by something beside Human Mind and 
Blatter. 



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